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Berkeley's Idealism: Arguments Of The First Dialogue

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BERKELEY'S IDEALISM: ARGUMENTS OF THE FIRST DIALOGUE

by

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Abstract

Berkeley's arguments in the first of *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* for the claim that the objects of immediate perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them are examined. This claim is central to Berkeley's idealism, since once he has established it, he uses it as the basis from which to argue that apart from minds, nothing exists but what these minds immediately perceive.

The first section is an examination of Berkeley's grounds for limiting objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities. The next three sections provide an account of the three arguments which Berkeley employs in his attempt to convince the materialist of the central claim that sensible qualities are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. In section 2, it is concluded that this the Argument from Perceptual Relativity plays no positive role in Berkeley's case for the central claim. In sections 3 and 4, the Argument from the Causal Theory of Perception and the Identity Argument (based on the claim that there is no distinction between hedonic sensations and sensible qualities) are considered. It is concluded that these arguments are used by Berkeley in his case for the central claim, but that they can only play this role because they involve the assumption that there is no distinction in immediate perception between the act of awareness and the object of awareness. This assumption is defended in an argument found later in the First

Dialogue (the Flower Argument), which I also examine in section 3. In section 5, Berkeley's so-called Master Argument is considered. The conclusion drawn is that the Master Argument involves the assumption that in conception, there is no distinction between the act of awareness and the object of awareness.

The principal conclusion of this thesis is that Berkeley's case for the central claim that the objects of immediate perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them rests on the assumption, defended in the Flower Argument, that there is no distinction between acts of awareness and objects of awareness.

Keywords: Berkeley, idealism, perception, perceptual relativity, causal theory of perception, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, act\object distinction.

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Introduction

Berkeley is best known for his idealism, which involves the claim that the immediate objects of perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. A perennial question which arises for readers of Berkeley's philosophy, particularly of the two main works (*A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713)[1]), concerns the grounds on which Berkeley rests his idealism in general and this central claim in particular. The first seven sections of PHK, in which Berkeley takes himself to have established this claim, are notorious both for the confidence with which Berkeley asserts the truth of this central claim as well as the difficulty of locating an argument that supports it. Fortunately, due to the resistance with which the idealism expressed in PHK was at first received, Berkeley devotes much greater attention to defending this claim in the restatement he gave of the core of his system in DHP. Roughly ninety percent of the First Dialogue is devoted to arguments aimed at persuading the materialist that the immediate objects of perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. The First Dialogue is the *locus classicus* of Berkeley's case for this central claim of his idealism.

Despite the greater attention which the central claim receives in the First Dialogue, commentators have been unable to reach any consensus concerning the interpretation to be

given the arguments found there. There are a couple of main reasons for this. First, the arguments which Berkeley offers in support of this claim do not seem to be sufficient to warrant the confidence with which Berkeley asserts its truth. As a result, commentators have attempted to illuminate underlying philosophical commitments that Berkeley does not fully recognize and which remain largely implicit in the texts, yet do play a role in determining the path Berkeley takes to idealism. The aim is to identify commitments which it is almost certain that Berkeley would have absorbed in the course of his philosophical education, which allow for convincing readings of Berkeley's explicit arguments, and which show Berkeley's position, even if inadequate, to be that of a sophisticated philosopher. Since the search is for implicit commitments, no decisive textual evidence is to be found that would allow the question of which commitments were actually at work to be easily settled. Secondly, the dialogue form which Berkeley adopts in DHP leads to interpretive difficulties. Due to this rhetorical style, Berkeley does not present a straightforward exposition of his system but rather has his spokesperson, Philonous, try to persuade Hylas, the materialist, of the truth of his central claim. As a result, it is at times unclear which of the arguments offered by Philonous are intended to merely undermine his materialist interlocutor's position, and which are intended to provide positive support for the central claim of Berkeley's idealism.

In light both of the difficulties faced in interpreting the First Dialogue arguments for the central claim and of the importance of these arguments in Berkeley's system, I believe that a careful, detailed reading of these arguments is not out of place.

I have said that the claim that the immediate objects of perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them is the central claim of Berkeley's idealism. Before mentioning some notable attempts to identify the philosophical commitments underlying Berkeley's arguments for this claim, I shall first indicate why this is the central claim of Berkeley's idealism, and then give a catalogue of Berkeley's First Dialogue arguments for this claim. Quite simply, this is the central claim because it is on the basis of this claim that Berkeley argues that, apart from minds, nothing exists but what these minds immediately perceive. At the end of the First Dialogue, after having had Philonous persuade Hylas of the truth of the central claim, Berkeley goes on to argue that since nothing can be like an immediate object of perception but an immediate object of perception, nothing that so much as resembles an object of immediate perception can be mind-independent. And Berkeley devotes the Second Dialogue to arguing that once it is admitted that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent, no content can be given to the position that the production of objects of immediate perception is in any way dependent on, or made more

intelligible by, the existence of mind-independent objects. So Berkeley uses the central claim as the basis for rejecting all positions on which there are mind-independent existents: which is why it is the central claim.

The arguments used by Philonous to convince Hylas of the central claim in the First Dialogue are as follows. After some preliminary sparring concerning the terms of their forthcoming debate, Philonous convinces Hylas that nothing is immediately perceived but sensible qualities. Once this has been settled, Philonous goes about convincing Hylas that sensible qualities are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. That is, Philonous goes about convincing Hylas of the central claim. The discussion that ensues may usefully be divided into two main parts. In the first of these parts (DHP 175-91), Hylas and Philonous debate the mind-dependence of specific sensible qualities taken individually. These sensible qualities are subdivided according to (a) the sense modality to which they belong and (b) whether the quality is primary or secondary. Hylas and Philonous first debate the mind-dependence of the secondary qualities, beginning with the tactile (heat and cold) and moving through taste, odour, sound, and the visual (light and colour). They then move on to consider primary qualities such as figure and extension, motion, and solidity. In the discussions of the individual sensible qualities, three arguments are employed by Philonous, although no more than two of these are applied to

any individual sense modality. The argument most widely applied is the argument from perceptual relativity (APR). Here Berkeley has Philonous use the fact of perceptual relativity--the immediate object of perception (a determinate sensible quality) varies with the conditions, both internal and external to the perceiver, under which perception occurs--as the basis of an argument which convinces Hylas that the sensible qualities to which it applies are mind-dependent. Berkeley also supplies Philonous with the argument from the causal theory of perception (CTA). Once again, starting from the fact of perceptual relativity, Philonous persuades Hylas to accept the causal theory of perception, according to which objects of immediate perception are produced in the perceiver's mind in accord with the laws of nature. Third, there is the argument from the identity (or inseparability) of hedonic sensations (pleasure and pain) from the objects of immediate perception (IA). Here Philonous convinces Hylas that since hedonic sensations cannot exist without the mind and the immediate objects of perception are nothing distinct from particular hedonic sensations, immediate objects of sensation cannot exist without the mind.

The second of these two parts (DHP 192-203) consists mainly of objections raised by Hylas to the central claim, which he has been forced to accept by the arguments of the first part. Philonous's reply to one of these objections is particularly pertinent to Berkeley's strategy for securing the

central claim. Hylas tries to draw a distinction between the act of awareness (which Hylas calls a sensation) and the object of awareness in order to avoid the conclusion that since sensations cannot exist without the mind, immediate objects of awareness cannot exist without the mind. Berkeley rejects Hylas's proposed distinction on the ground that since the mind is passive in perception, there are no acts of perception which could be distinguished from objects of immediate perception. Thus Berkeley defends the position that there is no distinction between the act of perception and the object perceived. (I shall call Berkeley's defence of this position the "Flower Argument" since illustrations involving flowers are used.) Also of note in the second part is Berkeley's notorious Master Argument, by which he attempts to show that it is impossible to conceive of sensible objects existing without the mind.

All these arguments (APR, CTA, IA, the Flower Argument, and the Master Argument) have been sharply criticized. This (as well as the difficulty of locating the argument(s) of PHK 1-7) has motivated commentators to try to identify underlying commitments that help explain both Berkeley's enthusiastic assertion of the central claim and the arguments that he provides in support of this claim. Two relatively recent attempts are the Inherence Interpretation and the Nominalist Interpretation.[2] According to the Inherence Interpretation,[3] Berkeley accepts the (Aristotelian) principle that sensible

qualities are dependent beings, and so require a substance, which is capable of independent existence, in which to inhere. Substance provides the required "existential support" for sensible qualities. The role this principle is said to play in Berkeley's idealism is as follows. As Berkeley rejects material substance, sensible qualities are left with nothing in which to inhere but mental substance, and so must be mind-dependent. Furthermore, since it is argued that to inhere in a mental substance is to be perceived by that mental substance, the Inherence Interpretation yields the conclusion that sensible qualities must be perceived to exist. It is to be noted that on t ` Inherence Interpretation Berkeley does not follow the argumentative pattern which I laid out several paragraphs back, since according to the Inherence Interpretation Berkeley rests his idealism on his immaterialism rather than resting his immaterialism on the cent~al claim. On the Nominalist Interpretation,[4] Berkeley's idealism rests on the principle of nominalism, which is defined as a pair of theses that are not clearly distinguished by Berkeley. These principles are: "(1) There exist no universals, immanent or transcendent: qualities are as "particular" and determinate as the objects which Possess them" and "(2) Qualities cannot exist in isolation or separation from each other."[5] Berkeley's central claim can then be seen to be the result of the following pattern of argument:

> [a] If a sensation and a sensible quality are separable, then we can form abstract ideas of them.
> [b] Abstract ideas are impossible because they violate the principle of nominalism [the conjunction of (1) and (2)].
> Hence: [c] Sensible [qualities] are inseparable from sensations.[6]

And since sensations cannot exist without the mind, sensible qualities, the objects of immediate perception, are mind-dependent. While both the Inherence and Nominalist Interpretations have attractive features,[7] I shall follow neither in the subsequent account of Berkeley's First Dialogue arguments for the central claim.

Instead of taking either the inherence principle or the principle of nominalism to be the basis for Berkeley's assertion of the central claim, I shall attempt to show that, in the First Dialogue, the key element in Berkeley's case is the Flower Argument, which is found at DHP 194-7. Here Berkeley argues that as there are no acts of awareness, sensations (which both Hylas and Philonous assume are mind-dependent but which Hylas attempts to classify as acts of awareness in order to distinguish them from objects of awareness) are the objects of immediate awareness. This is the key element because both CTA and IA rest on the assumption that is defended in the Flower Argument: that is, both CTA and IA rest on the assumption that the act of awareness is not distinct from the object of awareness, and so that what is immediately perceived is a mind-dependent sensation. Furthermore, since APR is not used by Berkeley to provide

support for idealism (Philonous uses APR to *persuade Hylas* of the truth of idealism, but does not himself take it to be capable of establishing idealism), Berkeley's entire case in the first of the two parts of the First Dialogue rests on the Flower Argument. Also, the Master Argument, which is the only other argument in the First Dialogue which might plausibly be held to be used by Berkeley to establish idealism,[8] itself rests on the assumption that there is no distinction between the act of conception and the object conceived. Thus Berkeley's case for idealism rests on the principle that there is no distinction between acts of awareness and objects of awareness.

This conclusion regarding the basis of Berkeley's idealism has had its share of support. Thomas Reid argued later in the eighteenth century that the root of Berkeley's idealism is the failure to distinguish between the act of perception and the object perceived.[9] At the beginning of this century, G.E. Moore argued for the same conclusion.[10] More recently, Phillip D. Cummins has argued "that Reid did uncover the central thought pattern or one of several perhaps incompatible thought patterns in Berkeley's philosophy."[11]

I shall present my case in the following manner. In the first section, I shall examine Berkeley's concept of immediate perception. This is required since Berkeley claims at the beginning of the First Dialogue that (1) whatever is perceived is immediately perceived and (2) whatever is immediately

perceived is a sensible quality. Once these claims are accepted, Berkeley needs only show that sensible qualities are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them in order to show that all objects of perception are so dependent. Thus, in order to understand Berkeley's subsequent limitation of the First Dialogue discussion to sensible qualities, Berkeley's concept of immediate perception must be understood. In the second, third, and fourth sections, I shall examine the three arguments found in the first part of the First Dialogue: APR, CTA, and IA. I shall also include a discussion in the section concerning CTA (section 3) of the flower argument. Attention will be paid in these sections to Berkeley's precursors, particularly Locke and Malebranche, in order to locate possible influences on Berkeley's arguments. Finally, in section 5, I shall examine Berkeley's Master Argument.

NOTES

1. Hereafter, *The Principles of Human Knowledge* will be referred to as PHK and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* will be referred to as DHP. Quotations from Berkeley's writings are taken from *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (eds.), 9 vols., London and Edinburgh:Nelson, 1948-57. References to PHK are by section number. References to DHP are by page number of volume 2 of the Luce and Jessop edition. Where Berkeley's other writings are referred to, citation will be made to section number where possible, otherwise to page number of the appropriate volume of the Luce and Jessop edition.

2. These labels are borrowed from the introduction to *Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays*, Robert G. Muehlmann (ed.) University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.

3. This interpretation was first developed by Edwin B. Allaire in his "Berkeley's Idealism," *Theoria* 29 (1963), 229-44. Another early paper in which this interpretation is expounded is Phillip D. Cummins, "Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 24 (1963), 202-14.

4. The Nominalist Interpretation is to be found in Robert G. Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, Indianapolis:Hackett, 1992.

5. Muehlmann, Introduction to *Berkeley's Metaphysics*, 8.

6. Muehlmann, Introduction to *Berkeley's Metaphysics*, 9. I have relettered the propositions.

7. While I will not assess either of these interpretations, there are several factors which weigh in favour of the Nominalist Interpretation. For an account of these factors, see Muehlmann's introduction to *Berkeley's Metaphysics*. In addition to those virtues of the Nominalist Interpretation relative to the Inherence Interpretation which Muehlmann mentions, the Nominalist Interpretation manages to account for a broader range of Berkeley's texts. Proponents of the Inherence Interpretation rely largely on PHK. Muehlmann, on the other hand, traces a line of development from Berkeley's *Notebooks* through PHK to DHP.

It should be noted that since these underlying commitments are not made explicit and their role is not fully recognized by Berkeley, the supposition that several, perhaps incompatible, commitments all played a role in determining the path which Berkeley takes to idealism cannot be rejected. (Cf. the passage from Cummins quoted below.)

8. In fact, I shall argue that Berkeley, at least in DHP, does not intend the Master Argument to be by itself sufficient to

demonstrate the truth of idealism, but rather uses it to establish the weaker claim that alternatives to idealism (including materialism) are inconceivable. These alternatives are inconceivable since, according to the Master Argument, it is impossible to conceive of mind-independent sensible objects. So, while the Master Argument is not used in the first dialogue as a proof of idealism, it is used to provide support for idealism.

9. Reid makes his case in both *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764) and *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785). Both are found in volume one of *The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.*, seventh ed., Sir William Hamilton (ed.), Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872.

10. In his well-known "The Refutation of Idealism," in *Philosophical Studies*, London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 1-30.

11. "Berkeley's Ideas of Sense," *Nous* 9:1 (1975), 55-72. The quoted passage is from page 58. Alan Hausman and David Hausman, in both "Berkeley's Semantic Dilemma: Beyond the Inherence Model," (*History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 13:2 (April 1996), 221-38), and "A New Approach to Berkeley's Ideal Reality," (in Robert G. Muehlmann (ed.), *Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays*. University Park:Pennsylvania State University, 1995, 47-65)

take what I call the Flower Argument to be central to Berkeley's case for idealism.

1. Immediate Perception

Berkeley's strategy in the opening section of the First Dialogue (DHP174-191) is to first establish that the objects of perception are sensible qualities, and then to argue that sensible qualities cannot exist unperceived or in an unperceiving substance. So before his arguments concerning the mind-dependence of the objects of perception can be discussed, Berkeley's method of establishing that the objects of perception are sensible qualities must be examined.

The first step in the strategy of the First Dialogue, that the objects of perception are sensible qualities, is taken on the basis of the concept of immediate perception[1]. Berkeley requires two things from this concept. The first is that whatever is perceived is immediately perceived. The second is that whatever is immediately perceived is a sensible quality. On the basis of these two elements of the concept of immediate perception Berkeley can draw the conclusion that whatever is perceived is a sensible quality.

Berkeley alternatively defines immediate perception in terms of perception without an intermediary or in terms of perception without inference or suggestion. While Pitcher argues that these two ways of defining immediate perception should be distinguished,[2] Winkler notes, correctly, that for Berkeley they come to the same thing.[3] This is because on Berkeley's account the intermediary functions as the basis for the inference or suggestion. That Berkeley takes perception

without inference or suggestion and perception without intermediary to be equivalent can be clearly seen in the passage in the First Dialogue in which Berkeley uses the concept of immediate perception to force the conclusion that what is perceived are sensible qualities (DHP174-5). The connection between intermediaries and *suggestion* is evident in the following excerpt:

> PHILONOUS. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or may those things properly be said to be *sensible*, which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?
> HYLAS. I do not sufficiently understand you.
> PHILONOUS. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters, but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. (DHP174)

The connection between intermediaries and *inference* can be seen in the following concession that Philonous extracts from Hylas:

> To prevent any more questions of the kind, I tell you once for all, that by *sensible things* I mean only those which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately: for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason. (DHP174-5)

Not only is perception without intermediary equivalent to perception without inference or suggestion, but perception without intermediary (i.e. immediate perception) is, strictly speaking, the only sort of perception there is. This is because neither inference nor suggestion belong to the faculty of perception, and so ideas arrived at by inference or

suggestion are not deliverances of the faculty of perception.

Since "the deducing of causes or occasions from effects or appearances...entirely relates to reason", ideas arrived at via inference are not, strictly speaking, objects of perception but rather objects of the reasoning faculty. Thus those mediate objects of awareness inferred from the immediate objects of perception are not objects of perception. Nor are the ideas suggested by the immediate objects of perception themselves strictly objects of perception; they are objects of the imagination. This is clear from the following passage from *The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained* (hereafter TVVE):

> The peculiar objects of each sense, although they are truly or strictly perceived by that sense alone, may yet be suggested to the imagination by some other sense.[4] The objects therefore of all senses may become objects of imagination, which faculty represents all sensible things. A colour, therefore, which is truly perceived by sight alone, may, nevertheless, upon hearing the words *blue* or *red*, be apprehended by the imagination. It is in a primary and peculiar manner the object of sight: in a secondary manner it is the object of imagination: but cannot properly be called the object of hearing. (TVVE 10)

Since all mediate objects of awareness are in fact the objects of either reason or imagination, the only objects of perception are immediate objects of perception. Thus, since he views the faculty of perception to be distinct from and independent of the faculties of reason and imagination, Berkeley can limit the objects of perception to the objects of immediate perception. In this way the concept of immediate

perception fulfills the first requirement imposed on it by Berkeley.

While Berkeley limits perception to immediate perception by distinguishing perception from reason and imagination, the basis for his limitation of the objects that are immediately perceived to sensible qualities is not so clear. After Philonous convinces Hylas that whatever is perceived is immediately perceived, Berkeley has the discussion continue in this way:

> PHILONOUS. This point is then agreed between us, that *sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.* You will further inform me, whether we perceive by sight any thing beside light, and colours, and figures: or by hearing any thing but sounds: by the palate, any thing beside tastes: by the smell, beside odours: or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.
> HYLAS. We do not.
> PHILONOUS. It seems therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible. (DHP175)

Hylas accepts the limitation without argument, and so the reader is left wondering about the basis for their agreement on this point. Why say we immediately perceive only the sensible qualities of objects, rather than allowing that it is objects so qualified which are perceived? Why are the objects of immediate perception sensible qualities; why are not the objects of immediate perception objects that have these qualities? One possible answer to this question lies in Berkeley's position that immediate perception is infallible. The idea is that if the sense of infallibility which Berkeley takes to apply to immediate perception requires the objects of

immediate perception to be limited to sensible qualities, then an answer is supplied to the question of why Berkeley holds that the objects of immediate perception are limited to sensible qualities. What then is the sense of infallibility which Berkeley takes to apply to immediate perception?

Phillip D. Cummins examines the notion of infallibility as it applies to immediate perception in "Berkeley's Manifest Qualities Thesis."[5] He distinguishes three ways in which immediate perception may be claimed to be infallible.

> The first is that if some object is immediately perceived, then it exists; one cannot immediately perceive what does not exist. The second is that if someone immediately perceives an object to have a quality, then it has that quality; one cannot immediately perceive an object that lacks a quality to have that quality. The third is that if someone immediately perceives an object and does not immediately perceive it to have a quality, then it lacks that quality; an object that is immediately perceived cannot have a quality that it is not immediately perceived to have. (392)[6]

Cummins's formulation of the ways in which infallibility can be applied to immediate perception is, however, misleading, at least with respect to Berkeley's concept of immediate perception. The point can be made by considering Cummins's formulation of the second way in which immediate perception might be thought to be infallible. Cummins's formulation embodies the notion that the object of immediate perception is a qualified object which is immediately perceived to have some sensible quality. However, it has just been noted that for Berkeley, what is immediately perceived are sensible qualities, not qualified objects which are perceived to have

some sensible quality. Thus Cummins's formulation of the ways in which infallibility can be applied to immediate perception is not an appropriate formulation insofar as Berkeley's concept of immediate perception is concerned.

A better formulation (because it takes sensible qualities rather than qualified objects to be the objects of immediate perception) of the second way in which immediate perception might be thought to be infallible is as follows:

> If someone immediately perceives a sensible quality, then some object has that sensible quality; one cannot immediately perceive a sensible quality that does not belong to some object.

While this formulation of the second sense of infallibility is consistent with Berkeley's concept of immediate perception, it is of little use in suggesting an explanation of why Berkeley limits the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities, since it simply presupposes that what is immediately perceived are sensible qualities. What is needed is some reason to think that what is immediately perceived are sensible qualities.

The reason why Berkeley opts for sensible qualities rather than qualified objects can, I think, be disclosed by considering Cummins's discussion of the third sense in which immediate perception may be thought to be infallible. Cummins argues that Berkeley's concept of immediate perception does not include the third sense of infallibility, not on the basis

of direct textual evidence, but on the basis that it is not implied in a model of immediate perception which Cummins argues may be plausibly ascribed to Berkeley (Cummins labels this the E-relation Model).

> In awareness, on this theory, the mind plays no productive role, so the object of awareness, considered solely as an object of awareness, is in no way determined or altered by the perceiver. It is given to consciousness, not made or conditioned by consciousness or any other faculty of the perceiver. Nothing besides the given object adds anything that could partially or fully determine what the object is immediately perceived to be. That is why what is immediately perceived exists and has the qualities it is immediately perceived to have....[However, the] awareness model...does not guarantee that what is immediately perceived or given is given in its entirety and with all of its qualities revealed. Just because awareness adds nothing to and in no way determines or conditions its objects, it need not reveal all of its object's qualities. Even though, on the awareness model, what is immediately perceived cannot fail to exist and cannot fail to be what it is perceived to be, it does not follow that it cannot be *more* than it is perceived to be. (393)

Cummins's argument is correct: Berkeley does not think that immediate perception is infallible in this third sense *if the objects of immediate perception are taken to be qualified objects*. No instance of immediate perception necessarily reveals all the sensible qualities of a qualified object. However, I think the argument shows that the claim that Berkeley takes qualified objects to be objects of immediate perception should be rejected, rather than showing (as Cummins intends) that Berkeley would not accept the third sense of infallibility. In other words, rather than using the claim that the immediate objects of perception are qualified objects

to reject the third sense of infallibility, the third sense of infallibility should be used to reject the claim that the immediate objects of perception are qualified objects. I think that it is because he accepts the requirement that the objects of immediate perception be revealed in their entirety in every instance of immediate perception that Berkeley believes that the objects of immediate perception are sensible qualities rather than qualified objects. It is the requirement that the immediate objects of perception be revealed in their entirety in every instance of immediate perception which leads Berkeley to restrict the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities. For as Cummins argues, if qualified objects are taken to be the objects of immediate perception, then they are not necessarily revealed in their entirety in any instance of immediate perception. Cummins's third sense of infallibility of immediate perception may then be restated in the following way:

> In every instance of immediate perception, the object of immediate perception is revealed in its entirety.[7]

This formulation of the third sense does not involve the assumption that the objects of immediate perception are sensible qualities (as did my formulation of the second sense); however, it does set constraints on the objects of immediate perception which can plausibly be taken to restrict the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities.

Thus this formulation of the third sense can be viewed as supplying a reason for rather than embodying the assumption that the objects of immediate perception are restricted to sensible qualities.[8]

Given that this third sense of infallibility does provide a reason to restrict the immediate objects of perception to sensible qualities, are there any grounds for attributing this third sense to Berkeley? First, it is plausible to suppose that Berkeley took this third sense of infallibility to be analytically true of immediate perception: that is, Berkeley may well have believed that to claim that what is immediately perceived is not revealed in its entirety is to contradict oneself. That Berkeley believed the connection between immediate perception and the third sense of infallibility to be analytic would explain the lack of argument (noted above) for the claim that only sensible qualities are immediately perceived. Secondly, the fact that Berkeley does restrict the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities and the fact that the third sense of infallibility provides a reason for so doing is, in the absence of a better explanation for Berkeley's restrictions on the immediate objects of perception, itself evidence that Berkeley accepts this third sense of infallibility.

Thirdly, the following passage might be thought to provide textual evidence for the ascription of the third sense of infallibility to Berkeley:

> HYLAS. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?
> PHILONOUS. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that in case he advances toward the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. *But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that)* but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. (DHP 238, my italics)

That this passage backs up the ascription of the third sense of infallibility (in my formulation of it) to Berkeley's concept of immediate perception can be questioned. First, it might be interpreted as supplying evidence only for the ascription of the second sense of infallibility. Secondly, the ascription of infallibility (in whatever sense) to immediate perception in this passage might not be supposed to be due to Berkeley's concept of immediate perception per se, but rather to Berkeley's classification of the objects of immediate perception as ideas.[9] While it would remain true that whatever sense of infallibility is being referred to in

this passage does apply to immediate perception, it would apply only because of the nature of the objects of immediate perception, and so could not be used as a reason for determining which objects can be immediately perceived. Nonetheless, since Berkeley claims, without explicitly supplying a reason for doing so, that it is a manifest contradiction to think that error concerning the objects of immediate perception is possible, this passage provides some basis for thinking that Berkeley takes the connection between immediate perception and the third sense of infallibility to be analytic. Be this as it may, I suggest that the third sense of infallibility should be ascribed to Berkeley's concept of immediate perception since it provides plausible grounds for limiting the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities, and since in any case it seems plausible to suppose that Berkeley would take the connection between immediate perception and this sense of infallibility to be analytic.

Berkeley, then, limits the objects of perception to the objects of immediate perception in virtue of his distinction of the faculty of perception from the faculties of reason and imagination and in virtue of the claim that the faculty of perception is sufficient in itself for a certain range of awareness. Thus, in the First Dialogue he can use arguments that target the immediate objects of perception to show that the objects of perception are existentially dependent on the

mind perceiving them. But as the arguments Berkeley uses for this purpose are arguments concerning sensible qualities, Berkeley must limit the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities. That Berkeley does take the objects of immediate perception to be restricted to sensible qualities is clear from the passage at DHP 175 quoted above. It is plausible to suppose (it cannot be proven as Berkeley does not himself make the argument) that Berkeley justifies so restricting the objects of immediate perception on the basis of the third sense of the infallibility of immediate perception: in every instance of immediate perception the object of immediate perception is revealed in its entirety.[10] However, this requirement means that physical objects, as Berkeley conceives of them, cannot be immediately perceived, as they are collections of sensible qualities not all of which are necessarily revealed in any instance of immediate perception.

While I have claimed that Berkeley restricts the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities, some commentators believe that Berkeley takes objects such as trees, books, and tacos to be immediately perceived. One such commentator is George S. Pappas.[11] Pappas thinks that Berkeley, if his claims to be the defender of common sense are to be taken seriously, needs to be able to accept the thesis that "Some physical objects are immediately perceived."(203) In order to do this, Pappas believes, Berkeley must accept the

thesis that "A physical object (e.g., a green chair) is immediately perceived just in case some primary constituents of the chair are immediately perceived, or some derivative constituents of the chair are immediately perceived."[12] This clearly violates the third sense of infallibility: on Pappas's account an object can be immediately perceived that is not revealed entirely in any instance of immediate perception. Pappas is not worried that immediate perception of qualified objects is fallible since he believes that "epistemic interpretations of immediate perception for Berkeley...should be resisted."[13] According to Pappas, on an epistemic interpretation the following are ascribed to Berkeley: "(1) If an object O is immediately perceived by a person, then the person's assertion (belief) that he/she perceives O cannot be mistaken" and "(2) If an object O is immediately perceived by a person, then the person immediately knows that he/she perceives object O."(202-3) One reason that Pappas believes that an epistemic interpretation should be rejected is:

> For Berkeley, all finite percipients immediately perceive some things whenever they perceive at all. Thus, very small children also immediately perceive some entities whenever they perceive. However, such children and more generally anyone who is "conceptually impoverished" would often lack the appropriate concepts necessary for it to be true that their respective assertions (or beliefs) that they perceive something could not be mistaken.(202)

However, in the third sense of infallibility (in every instance of immediate perception, the object of immediate perception is revealed in its entirety) the perceiver's

beliefs about the object of immediate perception or knowledge that the object of immediate perception is being perceived play no part. On my account, immediate perception reveals the object in its entirety regardless of what the perceiver believes about what is perceived or of the perceiver's knowledge that the object is perceived.[14] Pappas's objection to the epistemic interpretation does not touch the "infallibility interpretation", but nonetheless the infallibility interpretation serves to exclude qualified objects as objects of immediate perception. Pappas's objection to the epistemic interpretation does not rule out the exclusion of qualified objects as objects of immediate perception.[15]

Another more promising line of objection to the exclusion of qualified objects such as trees and scrap paper, a line which Pappas shares with Winkler, is that there is substantial textual evidence that Berkeley himself takes qualified objects to be objects of immediate perception. Two examples of such texts, one each from PHK and DHP are:

> Take away this *material substance*, about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by *body* what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities, or ideas: and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. (PHK 95)
> Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them, but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by my senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind;

> their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when therefore they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt of their existence. (DHP 230).

On the basis of texts such as these,[16] Winkler and Pappas argue that Berkeley takes qualified objects to be objects of immediate perception.[17]

Nonetheless, I shall argue that the interpretation that Berkeley takes qualified objects to be immediately perceived should be rejected. Not only must Berkeley restrict the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities for the purposes of the argumentative strategy he employs in the First Dialogue, there is substantial direct textual evidence that Berkeley does so restrict the objects of immediate perception. Two extensive quotations are required to present this evidence. The first of these is from the end of the First Dialogue:

> I grant we may in one acceptation be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident, that in truth and strictness, nothing can be *heard* but *sound*: and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested by experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure, which are properly perceived by that sense.....As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience grounded on former perceptions. (DHP 204).[18]

The second is from the fourth dialogue of *Alciphron*:

> EUPHRANOR. Upon the whole, it seems the proper objects of sight are light and colours, with their several shades and degrees; all which, being infinitely diversified and combined, do form a language wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to us the distances, figures, situations, dimensions, and various qualities of tangible objects--not by similitude, nor yet by inference of necessary connexion, but by the arbitrary imposition of Providence, just as words suggest the things signified by them.
> ALCIPHRON. How! Do we not, strictly speaking, perceive by sight such things as trees, houses, men, rivers, and the like?
> EUPHRANOR. We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend those things by the faculty of sight. But, will it follow from thence that they are the proper and immediate objects of sight, any more than that all those things are the proper and immediate objects of hearing which are signified by the help of words or sounds?...
> ALCIPHRON. I see therefore, in strict philosophical truth, that rock only in the same sense that I may be said to hear it, when the word *rock* is pronounced.
> EUPHRANOR. In the very same.
> ALCIPHRON. How comes it to pass then that every one shall say he sees, for instance, a rock or a house, when those things are before his eyes; but nobody will say he hears a rock or a house, but only the words or sounds themselves by which those things are said to be signified or suggested but not heard? Besides, if vision be only a language speaking to the eyes, it may be asked, when did men learn this language? To acquire the knowledge of so many signs as go to the making up a language is a work of some difficulty. But, will any man say he hath spent time, or been at pains, to learn this Language of Vision?
> EUPHRANOR. No wonder; we cannot assign a time beyond our remotest memory. If we have been all practising this language, ever since our first entrance into the world: if the Author of Nature constantly speaks to the eyes of all mankind, even in their earliest infancy, whenever the eyes are open in the light, whether alone or in company: it does not seem to me at all strange that men should not be aware they had ever learned a language begun so early, and practised so constantly, as this of Vision. And, if we also consider that it is the

> same throughout the whole world, and not, like other languages, differing in different places, it will not seem unaccountable that men should mistake the connexion between the proper objects of sight and the things signified by them to be founded in necessary relation or likeness; or, that they should even take them for the same things. Hence it seems easy to conceive why men who do not think should confound in this language of vision the signs with the things signified, otherwise than they are wont to do in the various particular languages formed by the several nations of men.
>
> It may also be worth while to observe that signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, but only in their relative capacity, and for the sake of those things whereof they are the signs, it comes to pass that the mind overlooks them, so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we run over the characters with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Hence, it is frequent for men to say, they see words, and notions, and things in reading of a book; whereas in strictness they see only the characters which suggest words, notions, and things. And, by parity of reason, may we not suppose that men, not resting in, but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of sight, as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention onward to the very things signified, and talk as if they saw the secondary objects? which, in truth and strictness, are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen. (154-6)[19]

The apparent conflict of these passages with those passages quoted above in which Berkeley seemingly asserts that qualified objects are immediately perceived is clear. There have been two attempts to reconcile this apparent conflict.

The first of these attempts is made by Winkler.[20] Winkler attempts to reconcile passages wherein Berkeley apparently denies that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception with those passages wherein he apparently asserts that they are immediately perceived by drawing a

distinction between the proper objects of perception and the common objects of perception. Proper objects of perception are those objects which are perceived by individual sense modalities; thus light and colours are the proper objects of sight. Common objects of perception are those objects which are or can be perceived by more than one sense modality: since coaches can be both seen and heard they are common objects of perception.[21] In general, for Berkeley, proper objects of perception are sensible qualities while common objects of perception are qualified objects. Winkler's claim is that in the passages wherein Berkeley is apparently denying that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception, Berkeley is actually denying that they are the proper *and* immediate objects of perception. Since denying that qualified objects are the proper and immediate objects of perception is consistent with claiming that they are the immediate objects of perception, the two sets of passages are thereby rendered mutually consistent. According to Winkler, qualified objects are common objects of perception and also immediate objects of perception.

However, the claim that Berkeley, in the two passages just quoted, is saying merely that qualified objects are not proper and immediate objects of perception, and so is leaving the door open to claim that common objects are also immediately perceived, does not stand up to scrutiny. To begin with, in the first passage quoted (the passage from the

end of the First Dialogue), Berkeley explicitly says that the common object of perception, the coach, is *mediately* perceived. The coach is his example of a mediately perceived object. So in this passage Berkeley is identifying common objects of perception with mediately perceived objects and immediately perceived objects with proper objects of perception. And in the second passage quoted, Berkeley contrasts the immediate and proper objects of sight to secondary objects, previously identified as things such as rocks and houses, "which, in truth and strictness are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen." What is suggested is, according to Berkeley, mediately perceived. In short, the contrast which Berkeley draws in these passages is between proper and immediate objects of perception on the one hand, and common and mediate objects of perception on the other. The contrast is not, as Winkler would have it, between proper and immediate objects of perception on the one hand, and common and immediate objects of perception on the other. That Berkeley restricts the immediate objects of perception to proper objects is evident from the following section of TVVE.

> By a sensible object I understand that which is properly perceived by sense. Things properly perceived by sense are immediately perceived. Besides things properly and immediately perceived by any sense, there may be also other things suggested to the mind by means of those proper and immediate objects. Which things so suggested are not objects of that sense, being in truth only objects of the imagination, and originally belonging to some other sense or faculty. Thus,

> sounds are the proper object of hearing, being properly and immediately perceived by that, and by no other sense. But, by mediation of sounds or words all other things may be suggested to the mind, and yet things so suggested are not thought the object of hearing. (TVVE 9)

The distinction between proper and common objects of perception cannot help reconcile the two sets of apparently conflicting passages, since the distinction between proper and common objects is extensionally equivalent to the distinction between immediate and mediate objects of perception.

The second attempt to reconcile these two apparently conflicting sets of passages is to be found in Pitcher's paper, "Berkeley on the Perception of Objects." Pitcher argues that in passages in which Berkeley apparently affirms that qualified objects (Winkler's common objects) are immediately perceived, Berkeley is "speaking with the vulgar" rather than speaking strictly and philosophically. That Berkeley does condone speaking with the vulgar in certain contexts is clear from PHK 51.

> [I]t will...be demanded whether is does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man deservedly be laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to *think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.* They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system, do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun sets, or comes to the meridian: and if they affected a contrary style in common talk, it would without doubt appear very ridiculous.

In the next section Berkeley expands upon his reasons for

occasionally speaking with the vulgar.

> In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they be, if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay this is unavoidable, since propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most rigid philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense, from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowance for those inaccurate modes of speech, which use has made inevitable. (PHK 52)

In both of the quoted passages in which Berkeley denies that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception, he writes that "in truth and strictness" only the proper objects of each sense modality are immediately perceived. Berkeley is here alerting the reader that this is his considered philosophical opinion, even though it may depart from the language that is suited to received opinions. Although he may "give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies" when he returns to the language that is suited to received opinions and speaks with the vulgar, the "fair and ingenuous reader" will make "allowance for those inaccurate modes of speech." It is plausible to suppose that Berkeley reverts to inaccurate modes of speech when he asserts that qualified objects are immediately perceived. If this is so, and I think it is so, then Berkeley's strict and philosophical opinion is that only sensible qualities are

immediately perceived.[22]

This conclusion can be supported by noting the contexts in which Berkeley claims that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception. Noting these contexts will also allow a better grasp of the sense in which Berkeley is speaking loosely when he claims that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception. The context of the passage quoted above from DHP 230 is one in which Berkeley is contrasting his account of physical objects with the account offered by the representative realist. The representative realist holds that we never immediately perceive physical objects, but that we are immediately aware only of the effects that physical objects produce in the perceiver, some of which resemble the objects that cause them. The context of the passage quoted above from PHK 95 is one in which Berkeley is contrasting his account of body with the account offered by those who take bodies to be an unperceivable material substance that underlies the sensible appearances of which perceivers are aware. In both contexts, Berkeley is setting up a contrast with those accounts according to which physical objects are in some sense unperceivable. The account Berkeley contrasts to these is one on which the constituents of physical objects are the objects of immediate perception. Now, there is a straightforward sense in which perceiving constituents of a thing is to perceive that thing. It is not implausible to suppose that the vulgar take perception of some part of

physical objects to be perception of physical objects. However, while this is a straightforward sense in which we immediately perceive physical objects, it is also, according to Berkeley, a loose and unphilosophical sense. Speaking strictly and philosophically, we immediately perceive nothing but constituents of physical objects. This does not alter the fact that this straightforward but unphilosophical sense is available to Berkeley but unavailable to his philosophical opponents. Berkeley can help himself to this unphilosophical sense in which physical objects are objects of immediate perception since he does hold that constituents of physical objects are immediately perceived.[23] His philosophical opponents are barred from this unphilosophical sense since they either claim that no constituents of physical objects are objects of immediate perception or that body is something other than what is immediately perceived. Thus the contrast that Berkeley claims to exist between him and his philosophical opponents concerning the immediate perception of physical objects stands, even though the expression of this contrast employs a loose and unphilosophical sense of immediate perception. Berkeley can accommodate the loose and unphilosophical while his opponents cannot. Berkeley can state, loosely and unphilosophically, that qualified objects (i.e. physical objects) are objects of immediate perception, while his opponents cannot say this, even loosely and unphilosophically. Berkeley can consistently think with the

learned and speak with the vulgar, while his opponents' learned thinking bars them from speaking with the vulgar.[24]

Having established to his satisfaction that we perceive nothing that we do not immediately perceive, and that we immediately perceive nothing but sensible qualities, Berkeley can set about arguing that all objects of perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them by arguing that sensible qualities are mind-dependent.

NOTES

1. By "perception" I mean *sense* perception, as opposed to awareness of ideas through imagination, reasoning, or memory.

2. George Pitcher, *Berkeley* (London, Henly, and Boston, 1977), 9-12.

3. As noted by Winkler, *Berkeley*, 149-60.

4. The following remark made by Phillip D. Cummins in "Berkeley's Manifest Qualities Thesis," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28:3 (July 1990) 385-401, should be noted:

> Berkeley errs, surely, in making the object of mediate perception always an object of another sensory mode. When I hear a series of notes and identify it as Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, both what I immediately perceive and what I mediately perceive are sounds. Correcting Berkeley on this point does not significantly alter his contrast between what is perceived and what is suggested. (391)

5. Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Manifest Qualities Thesis."

6. Winkler, *Berkeley* (152-4), gives a list of the important characteristics of immediate perception. Included in this list are the three senses of infallibility (although Winkler only labels one of the senses "infallibility"), which, however, differ in an important respect from the senses given by Cummins. On Winkler's rendition, the three senses have an epistemic component: they involve claims about the beliefs had or the knowledge possessed by the perceiver. Cummins'

formulation of the three senses does not mention epistemic states of the perceiver. The importance of this difference will become apparent below.

7. For the sake of completeness, I include a reformulation of the first sense of infallibility which Cummins lists:

> If some sensible quality is immediately perceived, then it exists; one cannot immediately perceive what does not exist.

8. This formulation of the third sense of infallibility can then serve as a justification for my formulation of the second sense--in that it justifies the assumption that the immediate objects of perception are sensible qualities.

9. That this is so is suggested by George Pitcher in *Berkeley* (London, 1977), 97.

10. Pitcher, *Berkeley* (96-9), gives a somewhat similar account of Berkeley's likely motive for restricting the objects of immediate perception to sensible qualities. Pitcher, however, frames his account in terms of having incorrigible knowledge of the object of immediate perception rather than in terms of having the entirety of the object of immediate perception revealed in every instance of immediate perception.

11. "Berkeley and Immediate Perception," E. Sosa (ed.), *Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley* (Boston, 1987), 195-213.

12. "Berkeley and Immediate Perception," 211. Pappas's distinction between primary and derivative constituents is irrelevant to the present discussion.

13. "Berkeley and Immediate Perception," 202. While Pappas rejects epistemic interpretations of immediate perception per se, he thinks that there is an epistemic element to the immediate perception of ideas although not of qualified objects. This is discussed further below.

14. The infallibility interpretation is ontic rather than epistemic. Compare Robert G. Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology* (Indianapolis, 1992), 119-20 for an analogous distinction. What he says there about the relationship between (p1) and (p2) can be applied to the relationship between the epistemic and infallibility interpretations of immediate perception.

Since I claim that there is no epistemic component to immediate perception, the question arises as to the relation between epistemic states of the perceiver and immediate perception. Winkler (*Berkeley*, 151-2) suggests what I take to be the correct answer to this question:

> Like many of his predecessors and contemporaries, Berkeley holds that immediate perception is an operation of the unaided senses, and he follows tradition in opposing the senses to the faculties of judgment and belief. But he nevertheless believes that immediate perception, *as it occurs in us*, always carries belief along with it. It may not be a conceptual truth that perception involves belief, but for Berkeley it is an *anthropological* truth, a truth about perception in its human form.

I disagree, however, with Winkler's tendency to take the claim

that immediate perception carries belief along with it to imply that belief is *part* of perception.

15. While my account of the probable motives for Berkeley's accepting that the immediate objects of perception are restricted to sensible qualities is in many respects similar to that forwarded by Pitcher (*Berkeley*, 96-9), he phrases the constraints that Berkeley places on these objects in terms of the perceiver's knowledge of the objects of immediate perception rather than in terms of the infallibility of immediate perception, thus leaving himself open to objections of the sort Pappas makes.

In fact, Pitcher seems curiously inconsistent regarding the epistemic aspect of immediate perception. On page 9 of *Berkeley*, Pitcher writes that "Immediate perception of something...is a sensuous awareness of it that is devoid of any 'intellectual' element, such as an interpretation of the object or a belief about it." On page 97 he writes: "Whatever a person immediately (or directly) sees he has incorrigible knowledge of."

Another commentator who provides an epistemic interpretation of Berkeley's concept of immediate perception in Georges Dicker ("The Concept of Immediate Perception in Berkeley's Immaterialism," in C.M. Turbayne (ed.), *Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, Minneapolis, 1982, 48-66). Dicker writes that Berkeley's concept of immediate perception is:

> D2 X is immediately perceived$_e$ = $_{df}$X is perceived in such a way that its existence and nature can be known solely on the basis of one's present perceptual experience. (49)

Dicker argues that Berkeley takes D2 to be extensionally equivalent to D4:

> X is immediately perceived$_k$ = $_{df}$X is perceived in such a way that its existence and nature can be known on the basis of one's present perceptual experience independently of any correct expectations concerning what other experiences would be obtained under different conditions. (54-5)

Dicker takes Berkeley to accept D4 (and thereby the extensionally equivalent D2) due to a conflation with what Dicker argues is a completely different concept of immediate perception:

> D1 X is immediately perceived$_p$ = $_{df}$X is perceived without (the perceiver's) performing any (conscious) inference. (49)

According to Dicker, Berkeley illegitimately slides from D1 to D4 by failing to clearly distinguish both (1) the habitual and unconscious association of sign and signified from conscious inferences from sign to signified and (2) the making of learned associations from having conditional expectations, however these are acquired. Pitcher takes D1 to be a true but innocuous concept of immediate perception, but that the conflation of D1 and D2 leads to errors in the philosophy of perception (including the doctrines that physical objects are unperceivable and that only Berkeleian sensations or ideas are perceivable).

16. Other texts cited by Pappas to support the contention that qualified objects are objects of immediate perception are DHP 183, DHP 236, and DHP 174.

17. Pappas and Winkler recognize that the textual evidence for taking qualified objects to be immediate objects of perception conflict with what they recognize as textual evidence for the epistemic interpretation of immediate perception (Pappas cites DHP 238, DHP 230, TVVE 20, and section 22 of the Introduction to PHK as examples of such passages ("Berkeley and Immediate Perception," 205-6)). Any episode of immediate perception does not present the perceiver with all the qualities of a qualified object, and yet Berkeley insists that immediate perception is infallible. They take a similar approach to this apparent conflict: they both argue that Berkeley's references to what they take to be the epistemic qualities of immediate perception are limited to Berkeley's account of the immediate perception of sensible qualities or ideas. On the other hand, perception of qualified objects is not infallible or incorrigible, and yet Winkler and Pappas hold that it is nonetheless immediate. While I think that this attempted resolution is less than convincing, I shall base the rejection of interpretations which ascribe immediate perception of qualified objects to Berkeley on other considerations.

18. Cf. NTV 46.

19. These passages are quoted in part on page 100 of George Pitcher, "Berkeley on the Perception of Objects," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24:1 (January 1986), 99-105.

20. *Berkeley*, 154-8. Pappas, "Berkeley and Immediate Perception," ignores the passages in which Berkeley claims that qualified objects are not immediately perceived.

21. For Berkeley, all common objects are collections of ideas, since he holds that all the objects of each individual sense modality are numerically and specifically distinct from all the objects of every other sense modality. This thesis has been termed Berkeley's "Heterogeneity Thesis." See Phillip D. Cummins, "On the Status of Visuals in Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision*" E.Sosa (ed.) *Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley* (Boston, 1987) and Margaret Atherton, *Berkeley's Revolution in Vision* (Ithaca, 1990).

22. Moreover, since the division of the physical world into physical objects is carried out by humans (albeit according to natural connections which exist between the ideas that are collected into the various objects) in order that language may be feasible, it is not clear that physical objects are objects in the sense required if they are to be objects of immediate perception. As immediate perception is prior to and independent of our collecting and naming activities, it would seem that the objects of immediate perception are themselves determined independently of such activities.

23. Of course it is open to Berkeley to take this philosophically unsound sense in which we immediately perceive physical objects and turn it into a philosophically sound concept of some other sort of perception. Thus Berkeley could hold that while the sense in which we immediately perceive physical objects is unsound, there is a philosophically sound concept (call it direct perception) which has the same content as the philosophically unsound sense of immediate perception. We directly perceive any physical object of which we immediately perceive some constituent quality. A key difference of direct perception as compared to immediate perception is that it is not infallible in the third sense. (Thus Cummins' formulation of the three senses of infallibility apply to direct perception rather than to immediate perception.)

24. Berkeley's account of immediate perception can accommodate the vulgar's beliefs about immediate perception just as (to borrow Berkeley's example from PHK 51) the Copernican theory can accommodate the vulgar's beliefs about the rising and setting of the sun.

2. The Argument from Perceptual Relativity

As already mentioned, Berkeley has Philonous apply three arguments in the opening section of the First Dialogue to convince the materialist, Hylas, that sensible qualities are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. These are the argument from perceptual relativity (APR), the argument from the indistinguishability of sensible qualities from hedonic sensations (IA), and an argument involving the causal theory of perception (CTA). Berkeley has Philonous apply one or more of these arguments to the series of sensible qualities he discusses with Hylas in the First Dialogue. The discussion of sensible qualities begins with the secondary qualities, and proceeds to a discussion of the primary qualities.[1] While all three of the arguments just mentioned are employed in the discussion of secondary qualities, only one, APR, is applied to every sensible quality which Hylas and Philonous discuss. APR is therefore an appropriate point at which to begin an examination of these three arguments.

The Argument from Perceptual Relativity (APR) takes as its key premise the Fact of Perceptual Relativity (FPR) and uses it as a basis on which to found some conclusion concerning either perception or the objects of perception. The fact of perceptual relativity can be formulated as follows:

> The immediate object of perception (a determinate sensible quality) varies with the conditions, both

internal and external to the perceiver, under which perception occurs.[2]

Hylas takes FPR to force a conclusion about sensible qualities, namely, that they are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. The most that can be concluded from the fact that Hylas takes FPR to be sufficient reason to draw the conclusion that sensible qualities are mind-dependent is that the materialist must consistently hold that sensible qualities are mind-dependent. But not even this much can be established from the fact that Hylas draws the conclusion that sensible qualities are mind-dependent, since there is the possibility that Berkeley intentionally allows Hylas to be stampeded into accepting a conclusion on the basis of FPR that FPR does not really force him to draw.

Despite the possibility of discrepancy between what Hylas takes to be the conclusion of APR and what Berkeley takes to be the conclusion of APR, many commentators have taken Berkeley to be making Philonous use APR to support the conclusion that Hylas draws from it, that sensible qualities, or at least immediately perceived sensible qualities, are mind-dependent. However, it is not clear that Philonous does use APR to establish the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception. On the one hand he is happy to let Hylas conclude that sensible qualities are mind-dependent, but on the other he never draws this conclusion on the basis of perceptual relativity himself. As Berkeley's primary goal in

the First Dialogue is to show that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, the question of whether APR has a role to play in achieving this goal is of considerable importance if the First Dialogue is to be properly understood. The proper interpretation of Philonous's use of APR is therefore of paramount importance. Does Philonous think that the conclusion of APR is that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, does he think that the materialist must accept that the immediate objects of perception are not qualities of material objects as the conclusion of APR, or does he take APR to have some other conclusion? I shall argue that Philonous, and thus Berkeley, takes the conclusion of APR to be that the perceiver does not know by sense which are the true qualities of physical objects.[3]

That the conclusion which Philonous is willing to draw on the basis of FPR cannot be assumed to be identical to the conclusion which Hylas reaches is indicated by the variety of uses to which FPR was put by those philosophers who had an immediate influence on Berkeley. Brief accounts of three of these philosophers' use of FPR will provide an indication of the range of conclusions drawn on the basis of FPR of which Berkeley was almost certainly aware, and so provide suggestions as to what Berkeley's own position might be on the appropriate use of FPR. The three philosophers to be considered are Locke, Bayle, and Malebranche.[4]

Commentators have most often focussed on the relationship between Locke's use of FPR in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*[5] at II.viii and Berkeley's use of it in PHK and DHP. At one point the accepted interpretation of this relationship went along the following lines. Locke uses FPR (at II.VIII.21) to reach the conclusion that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble any qualities in material objects, which themselves have only primary qualities. Berkeley, on the basis of the claim that FPR applies to ideas of primary as well as ideas of secondary qualities, extends Locke's conclusion that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in the external object to the conclusion that ideas of both primary and secondary qualities do not resemble the qualities of mind-independent objects. By this route Berkeley was seen to arrive at the conclusion that both primary and secondary qualities are no more than mind-dependent ideas.[6]

Later this interpretation was subjected to criticism, largely on the basis that Locke did not base the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on FPR, but rather on his corpuscularianism.[7] On this view, Locke draws the ontological conclusion that physical objects have only primary qualities on the basis of the scientific theory he deemed to be the most intelligible and the most powerful basis for explanations of events within the physical world. According to Locke's corpuscularianism (which, it is argued, displays

the influence of Boyle), physical objects are composed of variously arranged corpuscles, which themselves have only primary qualities ("Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number" (II.VIII.9)). Locke then develops a corpuscularian account of the production of ideas of both primary and secondary qualities in the perceiver's mind (this account is a version of the causal theory of perception). Physical objects produce ideas of both primary and secondary qualities in the understanding through their action on the sensory system.

> 11. The next thing to be consider'd, is how *Bodies* produce *Ideas* in us, and that is manifestly *by impulse*, the only way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.
> 12. If then external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce *Ideas* in it; and yet we perceive *these original Qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, 'tis evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation, there to *produce in our Minds the particular* Ideas *we have of them.* And since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance *by* the sight, 'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some *Motion*, which produces these *Ideas*, which we have of them in us.
> 13. After the same manner, that the *Ideas* of these original Qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the *Ideas of secondary Qualities* are also *produced*, viz. *by the operation of insensible particles on our Senses*....Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies, *v.g.* that a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their

> Motions, causes the *Ideas* of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of that Flower to be produced in our Minds. (II.VIII.11-13)

Ideas of primary qualities resemble the objects that cause them, while ideas of secondary qualities, since they are caused by various arrangements of corpuscles in physical objects, resemble nothing in the objects which cause them.[8] Secondary qualities, says Locke, are properly viewed as powers of physical objects, which are to be explained in terms of primary-qualities-only corpuscles, to cause ideas in perceivers' minds. Since, on this interpretation, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is driven by a corpuscularian ontology accepted independently of FPR, FPR is not a basis for Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

One result of this reinterpretation of Locke's argument for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that Berkeley has been accused of misinterpreting Locke.[9] Since Berkeley is still interpreted as holding that Locke based the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on FPR, as well as holding that FPR pertains to primary as well as secondary qualities (thus undercutting what Berkeley takes to be the basis of the distinction between them), he is interpreted as having misinterpreted Locke. In response to this accusation, Margaret D. Wilson[10] and Barry Stroud[11] have argued that Berkeley's interpretation of Locke should be reinterpreted along with the reinterpretation of Locke that is

recommended by, for example, Alexander. They both argue that Berkeley was less confused about the relationship of FPR to the primary/secondary quality distinction than he is represented to be by the likes of Mandelbaum, Mackie, and Alexander.[12] Another line of defense of Berkeley's handling of the relation between FPR and the primary/secondary quality distinction is explored by Arnold I. Davidson and Norbert Hornstein.[13] They argue that Locke does not in fact base the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on corpuscularianism, but rather draws the distinction on the basis of our sense experience.[14] They go on to argue that insofar as Berkeley undermines the differences in our sense experience of primary and secondary qualities, he is in fact successfully directing his attack. But before the issue of Berkeley's interpretation of Locke can be settled, both Berkeley's and Locke's use of FPR must be understood. Thus I shall allow this issue to hang until the end of the section. In the meantime I shall turn from this account of the history of interpretation of Locke's use of FPR to an interpretation of Locke's use of FPR.

As has been noted, the question relating to Locke's use of FPR is what relation there is between Locke's denial that ideas of secondary qualities resemble qualities of physical objects and his comments at II.VIII.19-21 concerning FPR. Does FPR have any relation to Locke's denial that ideas of secondary qualities resemble qualities of physical objects, or

has this denial some other basis? As I have said, current orthodoxy is that the basis for the denial lies in Locke's acceptance of a corpuscularian ontology rather than in Locke's use of FPR. While I think the current orthodoxy is largely on the mark, I shall argue that there is nonetheless a role for FPR to play in Locke's claim that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of physical objects.

Locke's claim that only ideas of primary qualities resemble qualities of physical objects is based on his ability to give a reductive account of secondary qualities. The reductive account of secondary qualities is in turn based on the intelligibility of accounting for events in the physical world in terms of the primary qualities of corpuscles.[15] Since the production of our ideas of secondary qualities can be accounted for by events in the physical world involving only corpuscles considered as having primary qualities, taking secondary qualities to be anything more than the corpuscles and the relations between them required to produce ideas of secondary qualities is redundant. Secondary qualities as modifications of physical objects that resemble ideas of secondary qualities are then eliminated by Ockham's Razor. Since primary qualities are required for these explanations, a reductive account is not available for them, and so they are viewed as real qualities of physical objects. This line of thought is what informs sections 9 and 10 of Chapter VIII, the sections in which Locke introduces and defends the distinction

between primary and secondary qualities.

In section 9, Locke argues that the primary qualities of "*Solidity, Extension, Figure,* and *Mobility*" are inseparable from body. First, no physical alteration to physical objects can remove these qualities. Second, these are qualities which are found by sense perception to belong to every physical object. Third, they also belong to physical objects that are too small to be sensed. This is so because reducing objects large enough to be sensed to objects that are too small to be sensed is just to make a physical alteration in the body, and it has already been established that physical alterations cannot remove primary qualities from objects. The upshot of these criteria is that it is impossible to perceive or conceive a physical object that does not have primary qualities ("Qualities...the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of Matter" (II.VIII.9)).[16] Locke then claims that it is solidity, extension, figure, and motion which meet these criteria.[17] However, it would seem that secondary as well as primary qualities would fit this set of criteria. If Locke is arguing that primary qualities are those on which the results of a certain sort of thought experiment--conceiving an image of a physical object that does not have these qualities--has a negative result, then Locke is stepping on to very unstable ground, since (for example) it seems to be just as impossible to conceive an image of a physical object that has no secondary qualities as it is to conceive an image of an

extensionless physical object.[18] A possible interpretation which would avoid this difficulty is that Locke meant by "inseparable" not only that we cannot conceive an image of a physical object without the quality, but also some further reason why we cannot conceive physical objects to be without primary qualities which would not apply to secondary qualities. The fact about primary qualities which would supply this additional reason and thus strengthen the notion of inseparability so that it would effectively discriminate between primary and secondary qualities is suggested in Locke's discussion of secondary qualities in section 10.

In section 10 Locke argues that a reductive explanation is available for secondary qualities: they are powers of physical objects, which can be described in terms of the primary qualities of those objects, to produce ideas in the minds of perceivers.

> *2ndly*, Such *Qualities*, which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us by their *Primary Qualities*, *i.e.* by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tasts, *etc.* These I call *secondary Qualities*. To these might be added a third sort which are allowed to be barely Powers though they are as much real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I to comply with the common way of speaking call *Qualities*, but for distinction *secondary Qualities*. For the power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or consistency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a quality in Fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new *Idea* or Sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary Qualities, *viz.* The Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its insensible parts.

Secondary qualities can be given a reductive explanation, and

so should not be considered real qualities of objects. Primary qualities, in terms of which the reductive explanation of secondary qualities is given, cannot be given a similar explanation. Not only are primary qualities the basis for the explanation of secondary qualities, they are the basis of all explanations of events within the physical world. Primary qualities are those that are used in explanations of physical events, and so cannot themselves be explained by physical events (i.e. they cannot be given reductive explanations). Since these qualities are required for explanations of physical events and cannot be given a reductive explanation, they are inseparable from physical objects. This, then, is a plausible candidate for a stronger notion of inseparability than that provided by the thought experiment mentioned above: for Locke, those qualities are inseparable from physical objects just in case they are required for intelligible explanations of physical events. We cannot conceive of physical objects without primary qualities because they cannot be explained away, and they cannot be explained away because they themselves are required for intelligible explanations of physical events.

That the four primary qualities which Locke mentions--solidity, extension, figure, and mobility--are those which are inseparable in this stronger sense is supported by what Locke has to say in section 11. There, Locke claims that impulse is the only way in which we can conceive bodies to operate.

Since these four qualities which Locke labels primary are required for impulse,[19] they will be required for explanations of physical events, and as such are inseparable from physical objects. Impulse is the only intelligible explanation of physical events, and the four primary qualities are required to make impulse intelligible. Thus Locke's identification of the primary qualities is connected to the unique intelligibility of corpuscularian explanations of physical events.

Moreover, it is important to observe that Locke does not attempt, in his discussion of the characteristics of secondary qualities in section 10, to argue that images of physical objects can be conceived which lack colour, or that we perceive physical objects which lack colour. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities drawn in sections 9 and 10 is a distinction between those qualities which can be given a reductive explanation in terms of other qualities, and those qualities which are required for this reductive explanation. This distinction, between those qualities which can be given a reductive explanation and those that have a role to play in this explanation, is drawn in terms of the corpuscular hypothesis, which has its basis in the unique intelligibility it provides for explanations of events in the natural world.[20]

Locke's next move, in sections 11-14 (quoted above), is to develop the reductive explanation of the secondary

qualities as powers described in terms of the primary qualities to produce ideas in perceivers' minds. If Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities hinges, as I have claimed, on the availability of such an explanation, he should be eager to provide it. So Locke's immediate concern to provide this explanation can be taken as a further indication that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is made on the basis of the distinction between which qualities can be given reductive explanations and which qualities are needed to carry out these explanations. It is important to note here that the availability of this explanation of secondary qualities in terms of primary qualities is not only a demonstration of the explanatory power of corpuscularianism, but is a key move in establishing the corpuscularian hypothesis itself. For this explanation is required if the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, a central tenet of corpuscularianism, is to be made successfully. It is also to be noted that whatever considerations Locke can muster which make this explanation more acceptable will themselves increase the acceptability of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.[21]

Locke proceeds to muster two considerations which he believes will show that there is no reason not to prefer, and good reason to prefer, his theory of perception over those which make ideas of secondary qualities resemblances of qualities of physical objects. First, he clearly expects some

resistance from common sense to the reduction of secondary qualities to powers, and the resultant relegation of these qualities as perceived to the perceiver's mind. He tries to counter this prejudice by drawing an analogy between the production of ideas of secondary qualities by corpuscles and the production of the ideas of pain and pleasure in the same fashion.

> And yet he, that will consider, that *the same Fire*, that at one distance *produces* in us the Sensation of *Warmth*, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different Sensation of *Pain*, ought to bethink himself, what Reason he has to say, That his *Idea of Warmth*, which was produced in him by the Fire, is actually *in the Fire*; and his *Idea* of *Pain*, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is *not* in the *Fire*. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other *Idea* in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its solid Parts? (II.VIII.16)

Locke's (*ad hominem*) point is that the production of ideas of secondary qualities by the primary qualities of corpuscular bodies is as intelligible as the production of hedonic sensations by the same means. Since those who hold that ideas of secondary qualities resemble qualities of physical objects take the production of hedonic sensations by physical objects that do not resemble these sensations to satisfy their standards of intelligibility, the explanation in terms of primary qualities of the production of ideas of secondary qualities themselves satisfy this standard of intelligibility. Thus Locke's account of ideas of secondary qualities is *at least* as intelligible as the view that ideas of secondary

qualities resemble qualities of physical objects, even for those who hold this rival view.

Secondly, Locke uses FPR as evidence that the corpuscularian version of the causal theory, with which he explains the production of ideas of secondary qualities in terms of the primary qualities of corpuscles, actually makes our sense experience of secondary qualities *more* intelligible than it is on the view that ideas of secondary qualities are resemblances of qualities of physical objects. In II.VIII.19-21, Locke argues that the relativity of our ideas of secondary qualities to the conditions under which they are perceived is perfectly intelligible on his causal theory of perception, and perfectly unintelligible on the rival account of secondary qualities. In effect, Locke argues that our ideas of secondary qualities vary as the conditions of perception, described in terms of primary qualities, vary. As his theory predicts just this--since the powers which cause ideas of secondary qualities are described in terms of primary qualities, these ideas will vary with the primary qualities which describe their causes--it makes this variation intelligible. On the other hand, those who hold the view that these secondary qualities resemble our ideas of them can make no sense of the variation of our ideas of secondary qualities with variation in the primary qualities which describe the conditions of perception. In section 19, Locke argues that our ideas of colour vary with the light corpuscles which

(according to Locke) are causally responsible for the production of these ideas in the perceiver. In section 20, he argues that the colour and taste of an almond vary with the texture of the nut. And in section 21, he argues that the degree of warmth of water varies with the "*sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves.*" Locke believes that these facts can only be intelligibly accounted for on a theory which reduces secondary qualities to powers in objects, described in terms of primary qualities, to produce ideas in the perceiver. Thus his causal theory of perception is to be preferred over the rival theory when ranked according to explanatory power.

The relation which exists between FPR and the assertion that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their physical causes is, according to Locke, this. What Locke takes to be important about FPR is that ideas of secondary qualities are relative to primary qualities, not just the bare fact that secondary qualities are relative to the conditions of perception. FPR is not used by Locke to show directly that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the physical objects which are their causes, but to show that ideas of secondary qualities are relative to primary qualities. FPR is used by Locke to show that his theory of perception, which predicts that ideas of secondary qualities will be relative to primary qualities, has greater explanatory power than, and so is to be preferred to, rival theories according to which ideas

of secondary qualities are relative to qualities of physical objects that resemble these ideas.[22] Since FPR shows that Locke's theory of perception, according to which there is no resemblance between secondary qualities and their ideas, makes our perceptual experience more intelligible than it would be on theories of perception which involve the claim that ideas of secondary qualities resemble qualities of physical objects, FPR *indirectly* provides a reason to accept the proposition that secondary qualities and their ideas are non-resembling.

To sum up: Locke bases the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on corpuscularianism, specifically on the unique intelligibility of corpuscularian explanations of events in the physical world. Secondary qualities are those which can be given reductive explanations in terms of primary qualities; primary qualities are those which are required for explanations of events within the physical world, including reductive explanations of other qualities. This reductive explanation takes the form of a corpuscularian causal theory of perception, according to which ideas of secondary qualities are the effects of the conditions of perception described in terms of primary qualities. Locke then provides a reason, based in sense experience, why this theory of perception is to be preferred to rival theories. This reason is that on his theory the relativity of ideas of secondary qualities to the conditions of perception is intelligible, whereas it is not on rival theories. So not only does Locke have the general

intelligibility of corpuscularian accounts of physical events in terms of impulse in which to ground his theory of perception, he also has an argument based on FPR that his theory makes features of our experience of macroscopic physical objects more intelligible than they are on rival theories, which shows that his theory of perception has greater explanatory power[23] than its rivals. Since FPR shows that Locke's theory of perception has greater explanatory power than its rivals, and his theory of perception involves the claim that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of physical objects, FPR indirectly shows that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of physical objects.[24] FPR is thus used by Locke to show, indirectly, that secondary qualities as they are perceived do not exist without the mind of the perceiver.

The uses made of FPR by both Malebranche and Bayle are more readily apparent than is Locke's. Malebranche, in accord with the overall strategy of *The Search after Truth*, uses FPR to reach an epistemological conclusion about the senses. Specifically, he uses FPR to support the conclusion that the senses do not supply the perceiver with information about physical objects as they are in themselves.[25] Rather, the senses supply the perceiver with information concerning the relation of physical objects to the perceiver's body. For example, Malebranche writes at 1.5[26] of *The Search after Truth* that

> We must follow this rule exactly. *Never judge by means of the senses as to what things are in themselves, but only as to the relation they have to the body* because, in fact, the senses were given to us, not to know the truth of things in themselves, but only for the preservation of our body.

FPR is used by Malebranche in his attempt to secure the conclusion that the senses inform us only of the relation that physical objects have to the body and not of the nature of these objects in themselves.

Malebranche, like Locke, distinguishes between those qualities which are really in physical objects and those qualities which are amenable to reductive corpuscularian explanations. Malebranche maintains that our awareness of qualities which are really in material objects is mediated by awareness of God's ideas. Thus we are never directly aware of material objects or their qualities, but rather of those ideas in God's mind which represent these objects. God reveals the appropriate idea to the human mind on the occasion of the appropriate modification occurring in the human sensory system.[27] On the other hand, those qualities which are not in objects are termed "sensations" by Malebranche, and are *modifications of our minds* produced by God whenever our sensory systems are modified in the appropriate way.[28] So, while both our awareness of ideas (at least so far as those involved in perception are concerned) and our sensations are nomologically dependent on the state of the sensory system, sensations are modifications of our minds while ideas are in

God's mind. Malebranche bases the ontological distinction between those qualities of which we have ideas and those qualities which are no more than modifications of our mind on the clear and distinct idea we have of material substance.

> The body is only extension in height, breadth, and depth, and all its properties consist only in (a) motion and rest, and (b) an infinity of different figures. For it is clear: (1) that my idea of extension represents a substance, since one can think of extension without thinking of anything else; (2) this idea can represent only successive or permanent relations of distance, i.e., instances of motion and figure, for one can perceive in extension only what it contains. If it be assumed that extension is divided into such parts as may be imagined, at rest or in motion near each other, the relations among these parts will be clearly conceived; but one will never conceive them to be relations of joy, pleasure, pain, heat, taste, color, or any of the other sensible qualities, although these qualities are sensed when a certain change occurs in the body. I feel pain, for example, when a thorn pricks my finger; but the hole it makes is not the pain. The hole is in the finger--it is clearly conceived--and the pain is in the soul, for the soul senses it keenly and is disagreeably modified by it (1.10).[29]

As our concept of extension does not include what Malebranche labels "sensations" these are not modifications of matter. Since sensations cannot be modifications of matter, the conclusion drawn is that they are modifications of soul.

Regardless of what qualities are real modifications of matter, Malebranche argues that the senses do not provide us with any information concerning the determinate modifications had by particular physical objects. To convince the reader that ideas revealed to us on the occasion of the appropriate modifications occurring in our sensory systems do not convey

information concerning the nature of material objects, Malebranche relies almost exclusively on considerations of perceptual relativity. We are not to conclude that the extension of bodies which our sense reveals to us is the extension which these bodies have in themselves, since to smaller creatures the same objects will appear larger (and to larger creatures, the same objects will appear smaller). As far as figure goes, circles can appear to be ellipses and squares parallelograms. While these appearances are to some extent corrected by what Malebranche calls natural judgements (which, for example, make us take what appears to be a parallelogram to be a square, and make us take the size of objects to remain constant as they approach or recede, even though the size of the visual appearance alters), these natural judgements can themselves be misleading.[30] These natural judgements are made relative to cues contained in the circumstances in which the object is perceived or relative to cues in the appearances of the object itself. If these cues are missing or are otherwise than what relates to the appropriate natural judgement, the natural judgement will mislead. So while these natural judgements correct for some of the conditions which are responsible for perceptual relativity, they themselves introduce their own specific conditions of operation which may vary independently of variation in the object perceived (thus introducing fresh instances of perceptual relativity). We are also subject to

error if we accept what the senses inform us about the motion of physical objects, since we are, as Malebranche has already argued, subject to error if we accept what the senses inform us about extension.[31] Also, Malebranche points out that which objects appear to be in motion and which appear to be at rest depends on the conditions under which these objects are perceived--specifically, on which objects are in motion or rest relative to our body. Moreover, motion cannot be accurately judged of unless the distance of the moving object from the perceiver's body is accurately known; and here Malebranche argues, we are liable to be misled by the senses. To establish this, Malebranche argues that we judge of distances by a number of cues (Malebranche's discussion of distance perception is a specific application of his theory of natural judgements), all of which he argues can be misleading. Again, each of these cues requires specific conditions for correct operation, and will mislead when these conditions are not met, and so our judgments that are based on these cues are relative to the conditions in which the cues operate. In summary, then, Malebranche argues that the ideas which God reveals to the perceiver on the occasion of the appropriate modifications in her sensory system are not ideas of physical objects as they are in themselves, but ideas of physical objects relative to the conditions under which the perceiver is aware of physical objects.

Perceptual relativity plays a much smaller role in

Malebranche's argument that sensations do not provide us with accurate information about the nature of physical objects. Malebranche rests his case that sensations do not inform us of the nature of physical objects largely on the contention that sensations are modifications of the soul rather than of body. His efforts concerning the mistakes we make that derive from taking sensations to inform us of the nature of physical objects are not so much directed at showing that they are mistakes, since this is quickly established by the argument (quoted above) that sensations cannot be modifications of material substance, but on explaining how we come to make these mistakes. What Malebranche is mainly concerned to show is how we come to mistake what are modifications of soul for modifications of matter. However, he does devote one section to arguing "That we are mistaken in thinking that everyone has the same sensations of the same objects" (1.13). This argument hinges on FPR. The argument is that each person's sensations are relative to the state of her sensory system, and as everyone's sensory system is not in the same state, everyone will have different sensations in the presence of the same physical object.

> Though the same motion of fibers terminating in the brain may be accompanied by the same sensations in all men, if the same objects happen not to produce the same motion in their brain, they consequently will not excite the same sensations in their soul. Now it seems to me beyond question that everyone's sense organs, not being disposed in the same way, cannot receive the same impressions from the same objects (1.13).

In this context Malebranche uses as one example the well known bucket of tepid water which Locke has been seen to use (II.VIII.21) and which Berkeley uses in DHP.[32]

Another similarity between Locke and Malebranche which this quotation serves to emphasize is the close relation between the use of FPR and the causal theory of perception. It was argued above that Locke uses FPR in support of his causal theory of perception. Malebranche, on the other hand, reverses this, premising his applications of FPR on the acceptance of the causal theory of perception. Malebranche tends to argue that since our ideas and sensations are occasioned by modifications in the sensory system, they are relative to the state of the sensory system. The above quote illustrates this with respect to sensations. Malebranche's use of this same line of argument in the case of ideas is illustrated by the following:

> [W]e must realize (1) that our own eyes are in effect only natural spectacles; (2) that their humors have the same effect as the lenses in spectacles; (3) that depending on the distance between them, the shape of the *crystalline lens*, and its distance from the *retina*, we see objects differently. As a result of this, we cannot be certain that there are two men in the world who see objects as having precisely the same size, or being composed of the same number of parts, since we cannot be certain that their eyes are altogether alike (1.6).[33]

For both Locke and Malebranche, the causal theory of perception is an account of the relativity of perception. This enables Malebranche to utilize the theory in order to ground his claims regarding the relativity of both ideas and

sensations.

It is clear, then, that Malebranche uses FPR to support a strictly epistemological conclusion--that we do not know by sense which are the true qualities of physical objects. He does not use FPR to help establish any ontological conclusions regarding the objects of perceptual awareness. He bases the claim that sensations are modifications of mind on his clear and distinct conception of material substance (1.10), and the claim that the ideas of which we are directly aware are God's is the upshot of his comparison of (what he apparently believes to be) all possible accounts of awareness of ideas (3.2.1-6). So, unlike Locke, Malebranche does not connect, even indirectly, the ontological status of the objects of perception to FPR.

Bayle, on the other hand, bases his conclusion concerning the ontological status of the objects of perception directly on FPR. In Remark G of the article "Zeno of Elea", Bayle presents the following argument:

> Add to this that all the means of suspending judgment that overthrow the reality of corporeal qualities also overthrow the reality of extension. Since the same bodies are sweet to some men and bitter to others, one is right in inferring that they are neither sweet nor bitter in themselves and absolutely speaking. The "new" philosophers, although they are not skeptics, have so well understood the bases of suspension of judgment with regard to sounds, smells, heat, cold, hardness, softness, heaviness and lightness, tastes, colors, and the like, that they teach that all these qualities are perceptions of our soul and that they do not exist at all in the objects of our senses. Why should we not say the same thing about extension? If an entity that has no color appears

> to us, however, with a determinate color with respect to its species, shape, and location, why could not an entity that had no extension be visible to us under the appearance of a determinate, shaped and located extension of a certain type? And notice carefully that the same body appears to us to be small or large, round or square, according to the place from which it is viewed; and let us have no doubts that a body that seems very small to us appears very large to a fly. It is not then by their own real or absolute extension that bodies present themselves to our minds. We can therefore conclude that they are not extended in themselves. Would you dare to reason in this way today, 'Since certain bodies appear sweet to one man, sour to another, bitter to a third, and so on, I ought to affirm in general that they are savory, though I do not know what savor belongs to them absolutely and in themselves?" All the "new" philosophers would hoot at you. Why then would you dare to say, "Since certain bodies appear large to one animal, medium to another, and very small to a third, I ought to affirm that in general they are extended, though I do not know their absolute extension?"[34]

It is clear that Bayle moves directly from FPR to the conclusion that the qualities usually attributed to physical objects are in fact "perceptions of our soul."[35] Additionally, he claims that all the "new" philosophers do in fact argue in this way. Bayle's point is that since the new philosophers draw the conclusion that secondary qualities exist in the perceiver's soul rather than in physical objects on the basis of the fact that ideas of these qualities are relative to the perceiver, they should draw the same ontological conclusion in the case of primary qualities, since ideas of these qualities are themselves relative to the conditions under which the perceiver is aware of them. Bayle, at the end of the section concerning perceptual relativity

from which I have just quoted, proceeds to refer the reader to Malebranche's discussion of the perceptual relativity of extension. Bayle is apparently greeting Malebranche as an example of a new philosopher who does in fact extend the use of FPR in the way that Bayle himself recommends. However, as has just been argued, Malebranche employs FPR for strictly epistemological purposes. In fact, Margaret D. Wilson, in "Did Berkeley completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?" is unsure as to who the targets of Bayle's argument might be. She believes that it is possible that Bayle's is "a piece of reasoning without a proper target."[36]

While Bayle may have inaccurately attributed a piece of reasoning to his predecessors, the majority of commentators who have addressed Berkeley's use of FPR are apparently guilty of a similar error: they attribute to Berkeley an argument that it is reasonably clear that he did not, in fact, use.[37] Berkeley, that is, has been viewed as using FPR in the First Dialogue as a basis for claiming that both secondary and primary qualities (in line with Bayle's recommendation) are not qualities of mind-independent material objects but are in fact existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. Berkeley has been taken to be arguing in a fashion similar to that in which Bayle has just been seen to argue: that the ontological status of the objects of immediate perception can be established directly on the basis of FPR. I shall argue[38]

that this view of Berkeley is mistaken, and that in fact Berkeley, in large part, views FPR as having the same use to which Malebranche put it: as a basis for establishing epistemological conclusions regarding the objects of immediate perception.[39]

While I shall argue that Berkeley does not himself accept that FPR can be used in direct support of the claim that immediately perceived qualities are existentially dependent on the perceiver's mind, he is quite pleased to help himself to Bayle's argument concerning the commitments of the new philosophers. Berkeley uses Bayle's contention that the corpuscularian materialists are committed to the mind-dependence of secondary qualities on the basis of considerations involving FPR. He is, accordingly, pleased to make use of Bayle's argument that the new philosophers are in fact (though unbeknownst to themselves) also committed to the mind-dependence of primary qualities since FPR applies to these qualities as well. Thus, in PHK 14, Berkeley makes the following observation:

> I shall farther add, that after the same manner, as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may likewise be proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand, seems warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or

> eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind?[40]

Now, while Berkeley may have believed that (some or all)[41] corpuscularian materialists did reason in this way about secondary qualities and so be committed to a similar line of reasoning concerning primary qualities, it clearly does not follow that Berkeley himself accepts the argument, or even that he thought that the materialists were justified in accepting it. Berkeley immediately indicates, in PHK 15, that he does in fact have reservations regarding this use of APR.

> In short, let anyone consider those arguments, which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find that they may with equal force, be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing doth not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object.

Four conclusions can be drawn from Berkeley's discussion in PHK 14 and 15 of the use of FPR.

(i) Berkeley takes the materialists to take FPR as the basis for drawing the conclusion that secondary qualities are mind-dependent. (PHK 14)

(ii) Whatever conclusions regarding secondary qualities which are drawn on the basis of FPR apply equally to primary qualities. (PHK 14)

(iii) Berkeley does not believe that FPR is a sufficient basis to prove the mind-dependence of sensible qualities. (PHK 15)

(iv) Berkeley believes that FPR can be used in an argument which proves that we do not know by sense which are the true qualities of physical objects. (PHK 15)

There are three conclusions of APR which are at least consistent with (i)-(iv).

(1) The epistemic conclusion. The perceiver does not know by sense which are the true qualities of physical objects.[42]

(2) The immaterialistic conclusion. Immediately perceived sensible qualities are not qualities of material objects.[43]

(3) The idealistic conclusion. Immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent.

While the epistemic conclusion is the obvious candidate for Berkeley's choice of conclusion, since it is contained in (iv), this does not eliminate the immaterialistic or idealistic conclusions, since either of them may be consistent with the epistemic conclusion. Furthermore, (iii) does not eliminate either the immaterialistic or idealistic conclusion. (iii) is the denial that APR can prove sensible qualities to be mind-dependent, while the immaterialistic and idealistic conclusions mention only *immediately perceived* sensible qualities.

An interpretation which claims that PHK 14 and 15 should be interpreted to be consistent with both the idealistic and epistemic conclusions has been developed by a number of commentators. They claim that the reservations Berkeley expresses in PHK 15 should be interpreted to mean that APR can

only show that the *immediate objects* of perception are mind-dependent; APR cannot be used to show that all sensible qualities are mind-dependent. Specifically, they claim that Berkeley believes that APR leaves open the possibility that there are sensible qualities that inhere in material objects, but that these qualities are never immediately perceived. The epistemic conclusion then follows for the materialist,[44] since the perceiver is never aware of the real qualities of physical objects.[45] One obvious objection to this interpretation of PHK 14 and 15 is that there is no positive evidence in either of these sections (or anywhere else in PHK, for that matter) that this interpretation is to be preferred. However, this does not overly concern those who have developed this interpretation, for their key motive for doing so is to make Berkeley's use of APR in PHK consistent with what they take Berkeley to be using APR to show in DHP. That is, they argue that Berkeley uses APR in the First Dialogue to draw the idealistic conclusion, and so they are led to interpret PHK 14 and 15 in light of the First Dialogue.[46] The evidence for the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation is to be found in DHP, not PHK. If this evidence is not forthcoming in DHP, then the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation must be rejected. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the First Dialogue applications of APR in order to decide whether Berkeley means to be forwarding the idealistic conclusion in addition to the epistemic conclusion, or whether Berkeley only

accepts the epistemic conclusion. I shall argue that the evidence in DHP strongly indicates that Berkeley only accepts the epistemic conclusion, and that the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation must therefore be rejected. I shall also argue that DHP is better interpreted as not containing Berkeley's endorsement of the immaterialistic conclusion, and so that Berkeley restricts himself to the epistemic conclusion--that is Berkeley only uses APR in the way in which Malebranche has been argued to have used it.

Berkeley's use of FPR is certainly more extensive in DHP than it is in PHK, where it is restricted to sections 14 and 15. In DHP, Berkeley continually has Philonous appeal to the facts of perceptual relativity in his discussion with Hylas regarding the immediately perceived sensible qualities. Nevertheless, while the use of APR is much more extensive in the First Dialogue, the dialectic of DHP and PHK are quite similar as far as APR is concerned. First, Hylas is just as continually brought to make the admission, on the basis of APR, that sensible qualities are mind-dependent. In this Hylas is acting in accord with Berkeley's Baylean characterization of the materialist in PHK 14, as there Berkeley paints the materialist as one who takes APR to show that qualities subject to FPR are mind-dependent. In light of this similarity between Hylas and the Baylean materialist of PHK 14, Hylas's admissions that sensible qualities are mind-dependent should not be taken as evidence that Berkeley

accepted the immaterialistic conclusion. In PHK 14 it is clear that Berkeley is attributing a line of argument to the materialist rather than endorsing this argument himself, and he is also seen in PHK 15 to have serious reservations about whether the materialist is warranted in endorsing this argument. Thus, just as in PHK 14 and 15 it would be unwise to assume that Berkeley believes the materialist's line of argument to be warranted, so too in DHP it is unwise to move from the fact that Berkeley allows Hylas to draw certain conclusions from APR to the conclusion that Berkeley believes that Hylas is actually warranted in drawing the conclusions that he does. In other words, Berkeley may be allowing Hylas to follow a line of argument that Berkeley believes that the materialist accepts, even though Berkeley neither accepts the line of argument himself nor thinks that the materialist is warranted in accepting it.[47] The fact that Hylas thinks that the conclusion of APR is that the objects of perception are mind-dependent is no reason to conclude that Berkeley accepts either the immaterialistic or idealistic conclusion.

Hylas and Philonous follow the pattern of dialectic sketched in PHK 14 even further, as can be seen from the following exchange:

> HYLAS. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word, all those termed *secondary qualities*, have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of matter or external objects, seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the

> farthest imaginable from denying matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into *primary* and *secondary*. The former are extension, figure, solidity, gravity, motion, and rest. And these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated; or briefly, all sensible qualities beside the primary, which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind....
> PHILONOUS. You are still then of opinion, that extension and figures are inherent in external unthinking substances.
> HYLAS. I am.
> PHILONOUS. But what if the same arguments which are brought against secondary qualities, will hold good against these also?
> HYLAS. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the mind. (DHP 187-8)

Philonous immediately goes on to apply APR to the primary qualities. Berkeley's procedure in DHP thus parallels that which he adopted from Bayle in PHK 14. The conclusion that Hylas draws from APR conforms to the reasoning of the corpuscularian materialist referred to by Berkeley in PHK 14, and Philonous extends the use of APR in the way that Berkeley had claimed could be done in PHK 14. Moreover, Philonous is careful to only elicit the admission from Hylas that sensible qualities are mind-dependent rather than to endorse this claim himself, and this conforms to Berkeley's reservations about APR stated in PHK 15.

While Philonous's care to conform to Berkeley's reservations concerning APR is discernable in the First Dialogue, what does seem to be missing from DHP is the confession found in PHK 15: "Though it must be confessed this method of arguing doth not so much prove that there is no

extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true colour or extension of the object." It might be claimed that if Berkeley meant this as a confession that APR does not even prove that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent, the First Dialogue discussion concerning the mind-dependence of immediately perceived sensible qualities would be the place where Berkeley would be expected to make the meaning of his confession clear. That Berkeley has Philonous makes no such clarification, or even reiteration, of the confession of PHK 15 should then be counted as evidence that Berkeley did not mean this as a confession that APR does not show the immediate objects of perception to be mind-dependent. On the other hand, however, if Berkeley's confession in PHK 15 is mean to imply that APR cannot be used to show that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, and yet he nonetheless wants to use the materialists' alleged belief that those sensible qualities subject to FPR are mind-dependent to help Philonous to convince Hylas that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, and in fact extend the materialists' APR to include primary qualities, Berkeley is not going to be able to reiterate the confession made at PHK 15. So the fact that the confession of PHK 15 is missing from the first dialogue is neither here nor there as far as determining whether Berkeley thought that APR showed that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent is

concerned.

Evidence that Berkeley thought that FPR can be used as a basis for a proof that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent will have to be found, if it is to be found at all, in the specific instances of APR which Berkeley has Philonous apply to the sensible qualities that he and Hylas discuss. The first sensible quality to which Philonous applies APR is heat. After Hylas balks at drawing the conclusion that moderate degrees of heat are identical to or inseparable from pain, and that therefore they are mind-dependent (IA), Philonous presents the following argument.[48]

> PHILONOUS. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise, than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?
> HYLAS. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.
> PHILONOUS. Those bodies therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them: and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.
> HYLAS. They must.
> PHILONOUS. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity?
> HYLAS. Without doubt it cannot.
> PHILONOUS. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?
> HYLAS. It is.
> PHILONOUS. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?

> HYLAS. It will.
> PHILONOUS. Ought we not therefore by your principles to conclude, it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity.
> HYLAS. I confess it seems so.
> PHILONOUS. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity. (DHP 178-9)

Hylas feels that the conclusion he believes he is forced to draw from this argument, "that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds," is absurd, but nonetheless sees no option but to draw it.[49] The most that Philonous himself is willing to say about this argument is that it shows Hylas's principles to be false. What principles are being referred to here? If Philonous is referring to the principle that immediately perceived sensible qualities are not mind-dependent, the case of those who believe that Berkeley takes APR to show that these qualities are mind-dependent would be established. But that this is not the principle which Philonous is referring to is clear, as can be seen from the following rendition of the argument.

(A) Whatever quality is perceived to be in a body, must be in that body.

(B) We perceive the same vessel of water to be both warm and cold at the same time (this is an instance of FPR).

(C) From (A) and (B), the same vessel of water is both cold and warm at the same time.

(D) The claim that the same object is both cold and warm at the same time is an absurdity.

(E) From (C) and (D), Hylas is committed to making an absurd claim.

Clearly, it is the combination of (A) and (B) that leads Hylas to the absurdity. Of these, (A) is a principle, while (B), an instance of FPR, is a straightforward report of sense-experience. Thus, the principle that Hylas accepts which leads to absurdity, and that therefore must be considered false, is (A). So, while Berkeley allows Hylas to commit himself to the mind-dependence of moderate heat and cold on the basis of APR, he does not commit Philonous to the same conclusion. He merely has Philonous draw the conclusion that (A) is false. The bodies referred to in (A) must be taken to be material bodies--bodies, that is composed of a substratum in which qualities inhere. On this conception of a body, a conception according to which physical bodies are natural unities, it is true that a body cannot have contrary qualities at the same time.[50] Besides allowing Hylas to draw the conclusion that heat and cold are mind-dependent, the use to which Berkeley puts APR is to convict the materialist who accepts (A) of absurdity. That is, he uses APR to show that not all temperatures an object is perceived to have are real temperatures of the object. This is a clear indication that Berkeley believes that only the epistemic conclusion follows from APR. For claiming that not all temperatures an object is perceived to have are real qualities of the object is equivalent to drawing the epistemic conclusion in the case of

temperature, given the assumption that there is no immediately perceived difference between real and apparent qualities. Note that the epistemic conclusion is not drawn as a corollary of the idealistic conclusion, as it must be if the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation is correct, but is taken to be the immediate consequence of FPR. This is strong evidence that Berkeley did not, in PHK 15, mean that the epistemic conclusion follows, for the materialist, from the idealistic conclusion, but that the epistemic conclusion is the only and the direct conclusion of APR. Thus, rather than providing support for their interpretation, as Tipton/Stroud/Winkler claim it does, so far the DHP application of APR rather serves to undermine it by providing evidence for the claim that Berkeley thought that only the epistemic conclusion is supported by APR. Moreover, Philonous shows no inclination to believe that the materialist is forced by APR to conclude that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, and so the use of APR in the case of heat and cold supplies no evidence for the claim that Berkeley took the immaterialistic conclusion to be the true conclusion of APR.

Hylas and Philonous go on to discuss other secondary qualities seriatim: taste, odour, sound, and colour. Relatively short shrift is given to taste and odour. Both of these qualities are seen to be subject to perceptual relativity. In the discussion of taste, Philonous is

restricted to making the following observation regarding APR:

> But for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall to a distempered palate appear bitter. And nothing can be plainer, than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food, since that which one man delights in, another abhors.[51] And how could this be, if taste was something really inherent in the food?

Once again, Philonous does not draw the conclusion that immediately perceived qualities are not in the mind-independent physical object, but merely challenges Hylas to explain how he can avoid drawing this conclusion. Hylas is not up to the challenge, and without further ado they pass on to consider smells. After concluding, on the basis of IA, that odours cannot exist in an unperceiving thing, APR is applied.

> PHILONOUS. Or can you imagine, that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them?
> HYLAS. By no means.
> PHILONOUS. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind?
> HYLAS. I think so. (DHP 181)

Here it seems possible to argue that it is Philonous who is claiming, on the basis of APR, that immediately perceived smells are mind-dependent. However, Philonous distances himself from the conclusion he mentions by phrasing it as a question addressed to Hylas, so that Hylas rather than Philonous actually draws the conclusion contained in Philonous's question. So while Philonous may here be

tottering on the line separating the admission that APR shows immediately perceived qualities to be mind-dependent from the use of APR to convince Hylas that immediately perceived qualities are mind-dependent, it is not clear that he actually crosses it. Thus, in the discussions of taste and smell. Philonous neither accepts the idealistic conclusion nor the immaterialistic conclusion on the basis of APR. The Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation derives no support from the discussions of taste and smell. On the other hand, as Philonous himself draws no conclusion from APR in these discussions, the claim that Berkeley believes that only the epistemic conclusion follows from APR does not itself receive any support from these discussions.

The discussions of sound and colour follow a different pattern than the discussions of the three previously considered sensory modes. Neither discussion includes an application of IA. And both discussions include a use of FPR that is not to be found in the three previous discussions. This use of FPR will be considered in the next section, which deals with CTA. It is to be understood, however, that this new use of FPR does not provide *direct* support for either the epistemic conclusion, the idealistic conclusion or the immaterialistic conclusion, and so is neutral as far as the question at issue here is concerned. This new use constitutes the entirety of the discussion of sound, and so I shall pass now to consider the discussion of colour, which includes more

than this new use of FPR.

The additional material to be found in the discussion of colour is a rather complex consideration of FPR as it relates to colour. This complexity is twofold. First, Hylas puts up more of a fight here: he resists with some tenacity drawing the conclusion that colour is mind-dependent. Secondly, Philonous applies a different version of the argument than is to be found in the discussion of heat and cold. Despite this complexity, this use of FPR is in large part similar to the use to which it was put in the discussions of heat and cold, taste, and odour.

At the outset of the discussion, Philonous tries to get Hylas to draw the same conclusion on the basis of FPR that he drew in the discussions of heat and cold, taste, and odour.

> PHILONOUS....Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see, exist in external bodies, or some other.
> HYLAS. The very same.
> PHILONOUS. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds, really in them? Or do you imagine that they have in themselves any other form, than that of a dark mist or vapour?

However, unlike the previous discussions, Hylas does not move from FPR to the conclusion that qualities are only sensations existing in minds, but rather attempts to draw a distinction between real and apparent qualities. While some of the perceived qualities must be admitted to be only apparent, this is no reason, says Hylas, to conclude that none of them are real. Philonous's response to Hylas's new tactic is to challenge him to provide a criterion for distinguishing

between the real and apparent colours of an object. Implicitly conceding that this cannot be done by sense alone,[52] Hylas proceeds, *with the assistance of reason*, to attempt to formulate a criterion specifying the conditions under which the real colour of an object may be perceived.

> PHILONOUS....how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?
> HYLAS. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent, which appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.
> PHILONOUS. And those I suppose are to be thought real, which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.
> HYLAS. Right.

After showing that Hylas's criterion commits him to the conclusion that all colours perceived by the naked eye are all only apparent (on the basis that a microscope affords a more near and exact survey of material objects than the naked eye), Philonous proceeds to convince Hylas that the criterion for distinguishing between real and apparent colours cannot be formulated. He procures Hylas's admission that the criterion cannot be formulated by presenting a deluge of instances of perceptual relativity: not only must Hylas specify the distance from which real colours are to be seen, but as the other instances of perceptual relativity have shown, there are numerous other variables which must be specified before a workable criterion can be formulated. After presenting the deluge of instances of FPR, Philonous says:

> And now tell me, whether you are still of the opinion, that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance

> and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones. (DHP 186)

Faced with this, Hylas owns himself "entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent." Note that once again, Philonous himself has not drawn either the idealistic or the immaterialistic conclusion; he has merely drawn the admission from Hylas that colours are not in the physical objects in which they appear to be. Indeed, Philonous does not even conclude that the criterion that Hylas is after cannot be formulated, he merely represents its formulation as a daunting task. So Philonous does not even commit himself to the conclusion that reason cannot be used to distinguish between the real and apparent colours of objects. Once again, he does not go beyond the epistemic conclusion.

In the midst of the deluge of instances of perceptual relativity that Philonous presents to Hylas in the discussion of colour, Philonous offers an argument that is a variant of the argument used in the discussion of heat and cold ((A)-(E) above).

> The point will be past all doubt,[53] if you consider, that in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration, without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but is it not evident from what hath been said, that upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? (DHP 185-6)

In order for the relation between this argument and the reductio argument used in the discussion of heat and cold to become apparent, I shall first restate the reductio argument.

(1) All temperatures an object is perceived to have are real temperatures of the object.

(2) An object can be perceived to have more than one temperature simultaneously.

(3) From (1) and (2), an object can have more than one temperature simultaneously.

(4) An object can have no more than one temperature simultaneously.

(5) From (3) and (4), (1) leads to an absurdity.

(6) From (5), Not all temperatures an object is perceived to have are real temperatures of the object.

This reductio argument can now be reformulated so that the same conclusion is directly proven:

(4) An object can have no more than one temperature simultaneously.

(2) An object can be perceived to have more than one temperature simultaneously.

(6) From (4) and (2), Not all temperatures an object is perceived to have are real temperatures of the object.

Now the new version of the argument, presented in the discussion of colour, can be laid out:

(4') An object can have no more than one colour over time unless the object itself undergoes some change during this time.[54]

(2') An object can be perceived to have more than one colour over time without having undergone any change during this time.

(6') From (4') and (2'), Not all colours an object is perceived to have are real colours of the object.[55]

This new argument can be seen to correspond to a direct version of the reductio argument Philonous had presented in the discussion of heat and cold. And though, as has been seen, it is used to help elicit the admission from Hylas that all perceived colours are equally apparent, Philonous himself does not draw this conclusion, nor any conclusion regarding the ontological status of the immediate objects of perception, on the basis of this argument. On the basis of its similarity to the argument used in the discussion of heat and cold, it is reasonable to assume that Berkeley believes that this new version of the argument only supports the epistemic conclusion.

Thus, in the applications of APR to the secondary qualities, there is little if any evidence that Berkeley takes the conclusion of APR to be either the idealistic conclusion or the immaterialistic conclusion. Indeed, there is strong evidence to support the claim that Berkeley takes the

conclusion of APR to be the epistemic conclusion only.

Philonous goes on to apply APR to the primary qualities of extension and figure, motion, and solidity. In each case the arguments involving FPR parallel those already used in the discussions of the secondary qualities of heat and cold, taste, odour, and colour. This is evident from the following quote taken from the discussion of extension and figure.

> PHILONOUS. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed, without some change in the thing itself?
> HYLAS. I have.
> PHILONOUS. But as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or an hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise, that it is not really inherent in the object?
> HYLAS. I own I am at a loss what to think.
> PHILONOUS. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality, as you have concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand, and cold to the other?
> HYLAS. It was.
> PHILONOUS. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and angular?
> HYLAS. The very same. But doth this latter fact ever happen?
> PHILONOUS. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope. (DHP 189)

As in the discussions of the secondary qualities, Hylas is led to conclude that sensible qualities are not in material objects, and Philonous again is not allowed to draw this conclusion himself. There is no evidence in the discussions of this or any of the other primary qualities that Berkeley

accepts either the idealistic or the immaterialistic conclusion.

This examination of Berkeley's use of FPR in the First Dialogue makes it abundantly clear that Berkeley does not take APR to show that the either the immaterialistic or the idealistic conclusion is justified. The only conclusion that Philonous is ever allowed to draw on the basis of APR is the epistemic conclusion. This is the conclusion of the arguments I have labelled (A)-(E) and (4')-(6'), and so these arguments must be taken to be the versions of APR that Berkeley accepts. Since the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation is premised on the claim that Berkeley uses APR in the First Dialogue to support the idealistic conclusion, this interpretation must be rejected. These arguments, ((A)-(E) and (4')-(6') above) are Berkeley's versions of APR.

Berkeley's use of FPR in DHP follows the dialectic of the discussion of FPR in PHK 14 and 15 to the letter. In DHP the materialist is allowed to conclude that FPR shows that the secondary qualities are mind-dependent, and is shown that the same argument applies to the primary qualities. This is just what Berkeley claimed the materialist's commitments to be in PHK 14. Further, Berkeley's representative, Philonous, will himself only conclude that APR shows that we cannot know by sense which are the true qualities of an object, which is just what Berkeley claimed in PHK 15. The motive for the Tipton/Stroud/Winkler interpretation of PHK 15, to make

Berkeley's use of FPR in DHP and PHK consistent, is satisfied without having to interpret PHK 15 in the way that they recommend. Berkeley uses FPR in a Malebranchean fashion in both of these works, to directly lead to an epistemic conclusion about sense-perception. The real benefit to Berkeley from the application of APR in the First Dialogue is that the epistemic conclusion shows that naive materialism is false, since the naive materialist claims that whatever qualities are perceived to belong to a physical object really belong to that physical object. Aside from this real benefit, Berkeley has Philonous ply APR as a rhetorical tool, in the fashion suggested by Bayle, to draw the materialist to admit what need not be admitted on the basis of APR, that sensible qualities are mind-dependent.

It should be made clear that even if it is admitted that Berkeley uses APR to establish the immaterialistic conclusion (which has been shown not to be the case), he would still not be committed to the idealistic conclusion. To move from the claim that immediately perceived sensible qualities are not real inherent qualities of material objects to the claim that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent requires a further claim:

(X) Sensible qualities must be existentially dependent on either material substances or minds.

While Berkeley takes the materialist to be committed to X (PHK 91), and so will be able to move from the immaterialistic

conclusion to the idealistic conclusion, it is clear that Berkeley is not himself committed to (X). Berkeley accepts (Z) rather than (X):

(Z) For any sensible quality, it either

(1) inheres in a material substance, or

(2) [(a) belongs to a mind-independent collection of sensible qualities, or

(b) belongs to a mind-dependent collection of sensible qualities].

The inclusion of (2a) as an option means that showing that immediately perceived sensible qualities are not qualities of material objects does not allow the conclusion to be drawn that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent. There is the possibility that they may not be supported by any substance whatsoever, whether material or mental. That Berkeley takes (2a) to be a live option is indicated by the following remark:

> HYLAS. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head, that the ground of all our mistakes lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But as several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may be supposed to exist without the mind. (DHP 199)

While Philonous immediately rejects this suggestion, the mere fact the suggestion is made and needs to be refuted shows that Berkeley took it to be a possibility. Thus if Berkeley, contrary to fact, took APR to show that immediately perceived

sensible qualities are not in material objects, he could not draw the conclusion, since (2a) remains a possibility, that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-independent.

Finally, a partial answer to the question of the relation between Berkeley and Locke regarding FPR can be offered. It has been argued that Locke does not argue in the way that Bayle, and Berkeley at PHK 14, claim the materialist argues. That is, Locke does not use FPR to directly support the conclusion that sensible qualities are mind-dependent. Furthermore, it has just been argued that Berkeley does not use FPR in this way himself. So as far as their uses of FPR go, thus far Locke and Berkeley are in agreement. Of course, this does not by itself settle the question of whether Berkeley *thought* that Locke used FPR for a purpose that he in fact did not. That is, it is a possibility that Berkeley took Locke to be one of the materialists he describes in PHK 14 as using FPR to draw the conclusion that secondary qualities are mind-dependent. While this question cannot be conclusively settled, it appears probable, as Margaret Wilson argues,[56] that at PHK 14 Berkeley is just taking over a line of argument that he found in Bayle's *Dictionary*. But even if Berkeley is just taking over this line of argument from Bayle, it may yet be that Berkeley took Bayle's description of the materialist to apply to Locke. However, if it appears that Berkeley understood the use to which Locke did put FPR (as reason to accept his causal theory of perception) and moreover employed

FPR in the same way himself, there is strong evidence that Berkeley would not have taken Locke to be one of Bayle's materialists. That such evidence exists will appear in the course of the next section, which concerns CTA.

NOTES

1. There is an obvious rhetorical motive for beginning with the secondary qualities, since representative realists such as Locke and Malebranche agreed with Berkeley that these qualities have no existence apart from the perceiver.

2. This formulation is adapted from Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 113.

3. See endnote 49, below, for an explanation of why Berkeley can accept this conclusion.

4. That Berkeley was aware of Bayle's treatment of perceptual relativity is argued by Richard H. Popkin in "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *The Review of Metaphysics* V.2 (December 1951). For evidence that Berkeley was aware of Malebranche's use of perceptual relativity in *The Search after Truth*, see Charles J. McCracken, *Malebranche and British Philosophy* (Oxford 1983), 217-36. As far as I know, no one has made a case that Berkeley had considered Locke's comments on perceptual relativity; I take it that it is assumed that no specific case need be made here since Berkeley's examination of the *Essay* is supposed to have been thorough. Key evidence that Berkeley had paid attention to what these three authors had to say about perceptual relativity is to be found in Berkeley's Notebooks, in entries 265 (on Malebranche and Locke), and two entries (358 and 424) concerning Malebranche and Bayle.

In addition to what he would have found in Locke, Malebranche, and Bayle, Berkeley may well have had first-hand knowledge of Sextus Empiricus's treatment of perceptual relativity in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. While Sextus Empiricus's collection of examples of perceptual relativity is, if anything, more thorough than those found in the authors which I shall discuss, his use of perceptual relativity is the same as that which I shall argue is found in Malebranche (see Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley Missed", *The Philosophical Review*, XCI:1 (January 1982), 2-40). Thus I shall not discuss Sextus Empiricus in addition to Malebranche.

5. References the *Essay* will be to Peter H. Nidditch's edition (Oxford, 1975) and will be cited by Book.chapter.section (e.g. II.vii.21).

6. Barry Stroud provides a list of commentators who have accepted this interpretation in the first and second footnotes to his "Berkeley *v.* Locke on Primary Qualities," *Philosophy* 55 (1980), 149-66.

7. For a list of the commentators who developed this interpretation, see Stroud, footnote 3.

8. As Locke points out in II.VIII.15.

9. Commentators to be included in this category are Maurice Mandelbaum, *Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception*

(Baltimore, 1964), Peter Alexander, "Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities," *Ratio* 16 (1974), 51-67, and J.L. Mackie, *Problems from Locke* (Oxford, 1976). Margaret D. Wilson provides some critical discussion of these accounts in "Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?," in Colin Turbayne (ed.) *Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, 108-123.

10. In "Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?"

11. In "Berkeley *v.* Locke on Primary Qualities."

12. Wilson concentrates on making a case that Berkeley perfectly understands Locke's basis for drawing the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, while Stroud focusses on arguing that Berkeley understands the relation between perceptual relativity and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Stroud allows that it is possible that Berkeley, while understanding this relation, misunderstood Locke's account of the relation (although he thinks it more likely that Berkeley got this right too).

13. In "The Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction: Berkeley, Locke, and the Foundations of Corpuscularian Science," *Dialogue* XXIII (1984) 281-303.

14. The key text for their interpretation of Locke is II.VIII.9, which they argue should be interpreted in light of Newton's third rule of the rules for reasoning in philosophy (from the end of Book II of the *Principia*).

15. M.R. Ayers, "Substance, Reality, and the Great, Dead, Philosophers," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 7:1 (January 1970) 38-49, agrees with Mandelbaum (*Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception*) in viewing Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities as an expression of corpuscularian physics, which (he argues) Locke takes to be uniquely intelligible. Ayers writes:

> Locke also tells us that, although we lack adequate ideas of particular physical substances, chiefly because of our ignorance of their minute parts, so that "a perfect science of natural bodies (not to mention spiritual beings)" is beyond us, yet the corpuscular hypothesis *approaches* this rationalistic ideal, affording some kind of general intelligibility, and mitigation of our ignorance of connections within the physical world....Locke's often expressed, quasi-Cartesian belief in the special intelligibility of mechanical explanations is enough to suggest that the primary/secondary distinction might very well be related to a conception of body as an ontologically independent substance, capable of being the subject of a demonstrative physics even if we are not fully capable of being demonstrative physicists. (45)

16. Davidson and Hornstein, "The Primary/Secondary Distinction: Berkeley, Locke, and the Foundations of Corpuscularian Science," write that "Primary qualities are those that are constant in sense perception and inseparable from the concept of body." (286)

17. Locke has this to say about solidity at *Essay* II.IV.1:

> This of all other, seems the *Idea* most intimately connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be found or imagin'd, but only in matter: and though our Senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of bulk sufficient to cause a Sensation in us; Yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from such grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter, that can exist; and finds it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified.

18. Berkeley seems to have this sort of criticism in mind at PHK 10 and DHP 193-4. Winkler, *Berkeley*, writes the following of PHK 10:

> [V]isible extension, the section tells us, cannot be conceived apart from colour. With regard to tangible extension the claim is similar: tangible extension cannot be conceived apart from the secondary properties proper to touch--resistance, heat and cold, and hard and soft.....[B]ecause the primary qualities cannot be conceived apart from all other secondary qualities, the distinction between them cannot have the ontological significance which Locke and others attach to it. (258)

19. That extension, figure, and mobility are required for impulse is clear from IV.III.13 (quoted in footnote 20). And in IV.III.14 Locke makes the following remark concerning the connection between solidity and impulse:

> Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities have a necessary dependence, and visible connexion one with another, as Figure necessarily presupposes Extension, receiving or communicating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity.

20. Thus the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not quite so simple as "primary qualities play a

role in corpuscular explanations, secondary qualities don't." The bare fact that corpuscularian explanations are intelligible does not of itself guarantee that such an explanation is forthcoming for secondary qualities. Thus the distinction must be in terms of *being able to provide* an intelligible (which turns out to be a corpuscularian) explanation of one set of qualities in terms of the other: primary qualities are those which must be used in the reductive explanation, secondary qualities are those which receive the reductive explanation. The distinction *is* based in the intelligibility of corpuscularianism, but this by itself will not allow the distinction to be drawn.

21. One well known reservation that Locke has regarding the reduction of secondary qualities to powers expressed in terms of primary qualities is that "there is no discoverable connection between any *secondary Quality, and those primary Qualities* that it depends on." (IV.III.12).

> That the size, figure, and motion of one Body should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the separation of Parts of one Body, upon the intrusion of another; and the change from rest to motion, upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some *connexion* one with another. And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any *connexion* betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules, of the Consequence or *Co-existence* of any secondary Qualities, though we could discover the size

> figure, or motion of those invisible parts, which immediately produce them. (IV.III.13).

Two things may be remarked about this passage. First, Locke does not doubt that corpuscles "immediately produce" ideas of secondary qualities. Secondly, it is unclear why Locke does not express the same doubts about the production of ideas of primary qualities that he expresses about the production of ideas of secondary qualities. The unintelligible connection seems to be between ideas or sensations and the action of corpuscles, not between this action and the content of ideas. Thus, there should be no distinction drawn here between ideas of primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities. It is also unclear why Locke apparently claims, at II.VIII.21, that only ideas of secondary qualities are subject to perceptual relativity. As ideas of primary qualities are produced in the same fashion as ideas of secondary qualities, there is no reason to think that they should be any less subject to perceptual relativity.

22. One way of viewing theories of perception which is suggestive in the context under discussion is as attempts to provide systematic accounts of FPR. Those factors to which ideas or sensations are relative, which may collectively be termed the conditions of perception, are taken by the proponents of causal theories of perception to be the causes of these ideas or sensations. As Locke emphasizes, these causal theories of perception treat perception as being of a

piece with other changes within the physical world. So, analogously, changes brought about in the qualitative states of physical objects by other physical objects may be termed the Fact of Quality Relativity, which is what is to be systematized by causal theories of changes within the physical world.

23. Peter Alexander argues in "Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities" that Locke's aim in the *Essay* is to provide support for the corpuscular hypothesis "by applying it to familiar, everyday phenomena" (54).

> I believe it is also the form of argument in which Locke was using the corpuscular hypothesis: if he could base a convincing and adequate account of our everyday experience and description of the world on the best available scientific hypothesis then this would provide powerful indirect support for the hypothesis. (53)

If this is so, then Locke's procedure in using FPR in sections 19-21 as support for his causal theory of perception is, in microcosm, the procedure of the *Essay* (as Alexander states on page 60).

Winkler, *Berkeley*, writes that "Locke's reason for accepting corpuscularianism is that it goes farther than other hypotheses in giving an intelligible account of the world and our place in it." (242) He goes on to say, "In the *Essay*, then, we find a very powerful defense of the two central doctrines of corpuscularianism [the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the existence of imperceptible corpuscles], a defence that avoids Cartesian

appeals to an idea of the essence of body, and uses perceptual relativity to illustrate the flexibility and power of an explanatory strategy." (254)

24. There seems to be no reason in principle why Locke couldn't have based the distinction between primary and secondary qualities *in the first instance* on the greater explanatory power of his corpuscularian version of the causal theory of perception as demonstrated by a consideration of FPR, and then used the intelligibility of corpuscularian accounts of physical change in general as a way of providing additional support for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and for his theory of perception. In other words, there seems to be no reason in principle why Locke should not have switched the roles he in fact allotted in his account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities to the intelligibility of corpuscular explanations and to the greater explanatory power of his theory of perception. Indeed, in light of his admission that the final link in the causal theory of perception, that between motion in the brain and idea in the mind, is unintelligible, Locke may well have been on firmer ground had he based the causal theory of perception primarily on its explanatory power rather than primarily on the general intelligibility of corpuscularianism.

25. This is not quite true. He thinks that the senses are reliable insofar as they inform us that physical objects are extended, figured, and mobile, although they deceive us about the determinate extension, figure, and motion of physical objects. (See 1.10)

26. All quotations from *The Search after Truth* are taken from the translation by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J.Olscamp (Columbus, 1980). Citations are by Book and Chapter (eg. 1.8), or by Book, Part, and Chapter (e.g. 3.2.1).

27. We also have access to God's idea of extension through pure understanding. It is this route to God's idea that we should take if our goal is knowledge rather than useful beliefs about the relation of physical objects to our body.

28. Thus Malebranche's account of the production of our sensations is a specific application of his occasionalism. Malebranche argues that all events within creation happen according to God's general prescriptions--that is, according to the laws of nature. These general divine prescriptions are all there is to an account of the order of nature; the activity of created objects plays no role in accounting for this order. This is because created objects are devoid of active power, and so cannot be causally efficacious. The belief that created objects are active is an incoherent delusion which Malebranche takes to be lurking behind original sin: Adam would not have eaten the forbidden fruit if he had

not believed that it had the active power to do him some good. For an illuminating account of Malebranche's view of nature, see Charles J. McCracken, *Malebranche and British Philosophy*, (Oxford, 1983), chapter 3 ("Two Concepts of Nature"). McCracken also reveals Berkeley's debt to Malebranche regarding his concept of nature (211-7).

29. Note that at the end of this passage Malebranche is relying not only on the argument that pain is not a conceivable modification of extension in order to locate pain in the soul, but also on the fact that the soul has a keen (and disagreeable) awareness of pain. This further consideration will be picked up when IA is examined.

30. These judgements are natural because they are performed unconsciously. In effect, the soul is hardwired to judge in these ways (i.e. God has enacted general prescriptions to the effect that these judgements will occur).

31. Moreover, we cannot know the exact magnitude of the duration of motions, since time, like extension, is infinitely divisible. Malebranche argues that the more attentive the perceiver is, the more instants the perceiver will be aware of, and so the longer the duration of the motion will appear.

32. It is to be noted that Malebranche intersperses these arguments concerning the inaccuracy of the senses regarding the nature of physical objects with observations as to the apt

design of the senses for informing the perceiver of the relation of physical objects to its body, and so for assisting the perceiver in maintaining its body in a world of heavy, fast, and sharp physical objects.

33. Malebranche ends 1.6 with the following note:

> *Those who are ignorant of the eye's structure and the principles of its construction would do well to read the appendix found at the end of this work before reading this chapter.*

34. Pierre Bayle, *Historical and Critical Dictionary (Selections)*, trans. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, 1991), 364-5.

35. "Perceptions of the soul" in itself is ambiguous: it need not necessarily be taken to mean that sensible qualities are modifications of the perceiver's soul. This ambiguity is removed by noting that Bayle contrasts qualities which are perceptions of the soul with qualities which exist in the objects of our senses. The same contrast with qualities which exist in the objects of our senses is to be found in Remark B of the article "Pyrrho", and here the contrast is explicitly with modifications of the soul. Bayle writes:

> Today the new philosophy speaks more positively. Heat, smells, colors, and the like, are not in the objects of our senses. They are modifications of my soul. I know that bodies are not at all as they appear to be. (197)

It is to be assumed that as both perceptions of the soul and modifications of the soul are contrasted with qualities which

are in objects of the senses, perceptions of the soul are taken by Bayle to be modifications of the soul.

36. Wilson's discussion is on pages 114-6 of *Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, ed. Colin M. Turbayne (Minneapolis, 1982).

Popkin ("Berkeley and Pyrrhonism"), on the other hand, apparently takes Bayle to be justified in attributing the argument, secondary qualities are not in physical objects since they are relative to the perceiver, to the new philosophers. He writes:

> Bayle's novel presentation of seventeenth century Pyrrhonism is original mainly in that the great sceptic had made all the "new" philosophers his allies in Pyrrhonism. The same sort of sceptical arguments that they accepted about secondary qualities applied to the allegedly real primary qualities as well, and hence the "new" philosophy, in spite of all its brave attempts was just a disguised form of that most extravagant scepticism--Pyrrhonism (231).

37. For a list of citations of those commentators who have offered interpretations of Berkeley's use of APR, see Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 150.

38. The following account of Berkeley's use of FPR is heavily indebted to the account to be found in Robert G. Muehlmann, "The Role of Perceptual Relativity in Berkeley's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29:3 (July 1991), and in chapters IV and V of his *Berkeley's Ontology*.

39. As I shall argue in the next section, an indirect use of FPR is to be found in DHP which is similar to Locke's employment of FPR: to provide support for the causal theory of perception.

40. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," argues that Berkeley is indebted to Bayle for this argument. Margaret Wilson, "Did Berkeley completely Misunderstand the Basis for the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?," suggests that Berkeley directly took over this argument from the passage quoted above from Bayle's *Dictionary*.

41. Berkeley does not specify his target, and as Margaret Wilson notes, Berkeley may well have just taken over Bayle's argument, and thus not necessarily have had any specific targets in mind. This argument need not be taken as being aimed at Locke.

42. This, as has been argued, is the use to which Malebranche puts FPR in the first book of *The Search after Truth*.

43. This is the conclusion that Berkeley would accept if he thought that the materialist but not the idealist was committed to the conclusion that sensible qualities are mind-dependent by APR. This is immaterialistic rather than idealistic since it will not allow Berkeley to draw the conclusion that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent, but only that a certain sort of materialism

(naive) cannot be sustained. Note that the material objects referred to are substances with qualities inhering in them; they are natural unities. Note also that the epistemic conclusion will allow Berkeley to reject naive materialism as effectively as the immaterialistic conclusion.

44. It might be objected that this interpretation must be mistaken since it attributes the epistemic conclusion to the materialist alone, whereas Berkeley's phrasing of the epistemic conclusion in PHK 15 clearly indicates that he thinks that it applies to himself, the idealist, as well. But it is open to those forwarding this interpretation to claim that the epistemic conclusion follows from APR for the idealist as well, but in a different manner than it follows for the materialist.

45. I.C. Tipton, *Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism* (London, 1974) takes Berkeley to be arguing in this way.

> If we ask what Berkeley thought the argument *did* prove we have to say, I think, that he thought it showed that when we take ourselves to be perceiving a quality of an outward object we are in fact aware only of a mind-dependent appearance....Why then did Berkeley express dissatisfaction with the argument when he wrote the *Principles*? The answer must be, not that he thought it proved nothing worth proving, but rather that it failed to make the point Berkeley wanted to make against the materialists. What it proved was that we are never aware of any quality in an external object. It did not prove that there are no external objects with qualities. The reason for this was that it left it open to the materialist to insist that there are external objects and that these objects have qualities *though we are never acquainted with them*, and in this way it had to be seen as merely making

> explicit what Berkeley took to be one of the most objectionable features of materialism (238-9).

Winkler (*Berkeley*, 167-75) adopts this view of PHK 14 and PHK 15, as does Barry Stroud, "Berkeley v. Locke on Primary Qualities."

46. The reason given that Berkeley is silent on APR's ability to show that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent in PHK is that Berkeley had no use for this conclusion in the context in which he expounds APR in PHK. Tipton writes:

> By means of [APR] Hylas is brought to the position Berkeley assumes at the opening of the *Principles* and into line with Berkeley *and the materialists* in holding that in sense-perception we are acquainted only with mind-dependent ideas. In the earlier work Berkeley felt he could just take this for granted. In the *Dialogues* he feels he has to persuade Hylas to share the common ground. (*Berkeley*, 239)

47. Berkeley allows Hylas to conclude that sensible qualities have no existence without the mind, not merely that immediately perceived sensible qualities have no existence without the mind. This is what Berkeley claimed that the materialist *erroneously* believed herself to be committed to in PHK 14 and 15. This is strong evidence that Berkeley is allowing Hylas to follow a line of reasoning to which Berkeley takes the materialist to believe to be sound, but (as Berkeley realizes) is in fact unsound.

48. This pattern of argument, IA followed by APR, is common to the discussions of heat and cold, taste, and odour.

49. Philonous, while he himself takes this conclusion that there is no heat in fire, to be absurd, tries to make it seem less absurd to Hylas by showing that this conclusion is similar to one he finds less absurd (I have placed Hylas's responses in square brackets):

> To make the point still clearer, tell me, whether in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment? [We ought.] When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh? [It doth.] And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more? [It doth not.] Since therefore you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, not anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire. (DHP 179)

This is exactly the strategy that Locke has been see to use at *Essay* II.VIII.18 to show that his claim that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble qualities of physical objects is not absurd. (However, the comparison that Berkeley makes, between the picking of a pin and the burning of the body by a coal, is apparently drawn from *The Search after Truth*, 1.11.)

The fact that Berkeley is willing to allow Philonous to use this argument, which he himself does not accept, to convince Hylas that heat is mind-dependent is evidence that Berkeley would be willing to employ APR in the same way.

50. However, if bodies are taken to be merely collections of sensible qualities which have no unity apart from that imposed by the collector, it is perfectly possible to accept (A) without committing oneself to an absurdity. Berkeley, for instance, will himself eventually accept (A) and be able to avoid absurdity by holding that physical objects are collections of sensible qualities. Further, Berkeley can assert (A) and still maintain that we do not know which are the true qualities of any physical object based strictly on sense. This is so because Berkeley, while he claims (as has been argued in the first section) that whatever quality we immediately perceive belongs to a physical object, we cannot specify on the basis of the perception of the quality alone just what the object is that the quality belongs to. Thus, we cannot know by sense which are the true qualities of physical objects not because we do not know that the quality we are perceiving is a real quality of a physical object, but because we do not know which object the quality belongs to.

51. This is the method by which Malebranche argues that sensations are different in every person: what one person likes, another dislikes (*The Search after Truth*, 1.13).

52. And thus implicitly conceding the epistemic conclusion.

53. The point that "will be past all doubt" is to be found in the last sentence of Philonous's preceding speech. "From all which, should it not seem to follow, that all colours are

equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?" Now, it may seem that Berkeley is here accepting the immaterialistic conclusion, since he is apparently claiming that it is past all doubt that no colours inhere in outward (i.e. material) objects. But what Berkeley believes will be past all doubt is that this conclusion *seems* to follow; Hylas, of course, will take it to be past all doubt that this conclusion really does follow. That Berkeley thinks that the conclusion will still only seem to follow, is indicated by Philonous's reiteration, soon after claiming that the point will be past all doubt, of the challenge to Hylas to specify a criterion for distinguishing between real and apparent colours of objects. This challenge would be meaningless if Berkeley believed that the point past all doubt is that no perceived quality is really inherent in an outward object. Moreover, Berkeley would never let Philonous draw the conclusion that all colours are equally apparent (i.e. equally unreal), but this is obviously what he would be taken to be committing Philonous to if Philonous is interpreted as asserting that it really does follow (rather than it being past all doubt that it seems to follow) "that all colours are equally apparent."

54. Assuming, of course, that the object is completely covered by one colour.

55. This conclusion is not explicitly drawn; however, it is reasonable to suppose, on the basis of the similarity between this argument and the argument from the discussion of heat and cold that his is the conclusion that Berkeley would draw from the argument.

56. "Did Berkeley completely misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?," (114-6).

3. The Argument from the Causal Theory of Perception

Since Berkeley gives APR no role to play in the main project of the First Dialogue, establishing the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception, other arguments must be looked to in order to discover how he carries out this project. In the discussions of the specific sensible qualities which constitute the first part of the First Dialogue, there are two candidate arguments, one or both of which Berkeley might be using in this project.[1] These arguments, CTA and IA, are used in the discussions of the secondary qualities, but are ignored in the discussion of the primary qualities.[2] Neither is applied to all five secondary qualities discussed by Hylas and Philonous. In fact, Berkeley's use of these two arguments does not overlap: IA is used only when discussing heat and cold, taste, and odour, while CTA is used only in the discussions of sound and colour. This lack of overlap provides at least *prima facie* evidence that Berkeley intended *both* CTA and IA to bear the burden of showing that immediately perceived sensible qualities are mind-dependent, rather than banking on either one of these arguments to establish his conclusion on its own. Furthermore, there are reasons, which will be presented in the section on IA, which block Berkeley from applying IA to sound and colour, thereby leaving Berkeley with no argument but CTA to fall back on in these two cases. Thus there is good reason to examine CTA in some detail.[3] As CTA, like APR but unlike

IA, involves FPR, I shall move from the discussion of APR in the last section to consider CTA in this section, and shall reserve IA for the next section. I shall argue that Berkeley *does* intend CTA to support the claim that sensible qualities are mind-dependent. At the end of the section I shall consider how well the causal theory of perception (CTP) fits within Berkeley's system. While it turns out that Berkeley can consistently adopt one version of CTP, it also turns out that this version leaves Berkeley at serious odds with common sense.

CTA not only resembles APR in that both involve FPR, but also in that it is not entirely clear, at least at first glance, whether Berkeley intends the argument merely to undermine materialism or whether he means the argument to establish the mind-dependence of the objects of immediate perception.[4] As I have just indicated, there is *prima facie* evidence that Berkeley does use CTA to establish the mind-dependence of the sensible qualities to which it is applied, since otherwise sound and colour would be left dangling (as he does not apply IA to them, and does not use APR to establish the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception). To make a case that Berkeley does in fact use CTA in his case for the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception, this *prima facie* evidence will have to be backed up by an examination of the First Dialogue discussions of sound and colour. However, since CTA centres on the causal

theory of perception (CTP), a necessary preface to the examination of Berkeley's discussion of sound and colour is an examination of Berkeley's attitude to CTP. If Berkeley rejects all versions of CTP, then he himself will be unable to endorse the use, and so the conclusion established by the use, of CTA. If, however, it turns out that Berkeley does accept some version of CTP, the fact that CTA involves CTP will not of itself be reason to hold that Berkeley does not endorse the use of CTA (although this will not of itself prove that Berkeley does endorse the use of CTA). Thus, before examining CTA, it is necessary to determine whether Berkeley does in fact accept some version of CTP.

CTP was in its various versions the generally accepted theory of perception in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In general, the causal theory of perception involves the claim that physical objects are related mechanistically to the production of motions in the perceiver's brain, which are in turn correlated to the production of ideas, sensations, or perceptions in the perceiver's mind. These sensations are taken to be the immediate objects of perception. Representative realists included the claim that the immediate perception of sensations or ideas provides for the mediate perception of physical objects, since sensations represent by resembling (at least some of the qualities of) those physical objects which are related to their production.[5] Due to its generality, this

sketch leaves out significant variations, and so leaves out the fact that there were different versions of the theory. For example, one of these variations involves the interpretation made of the correlations described in CTP. According to Locke's version of CTP, (discussed in the last section), physical objects are the real efficient causes of our perceptions, which they produce through mechanistic action on the perceiver's sensory system. Malebranche was also seen, in the last section, to offer a version of CTP, which, like Locke's, is in terms of mechanism, but unlike Locke's, does not involve the claim that the physical objects related mechanistically to the production of sensations are the active agents responsible for the production of sensations. Rather, Malebranche takes God to be the only agent, and so while sensations are produced in accord with divinely prescribed mechanistic laws of nature, they are produced by God acting in accord with the laws of nature.[6] Thus the two philosophers who exerted the greatest influence on Berkeley both endorsed versions of CTP. It would be surprising, then, if Berkeley did not address himself to CTP.

Berkeley does in fact comment on CTP in many of his works. The puzzle is that his comments seem to be both positive and negative; that is, he seems in some places to reject CTP while in other places he seems to endorse CTP. One possibility which would resolve this apparent conflict is that Berkeley's negative comments are directed at some specific

version(s) of CTP, while his positive comments are in support of some other version of CTP which does not include the element(s) which Berkeley objects to in other versions of the theory. That this is in fact the case is borne out by an examination of the texts in which Berkeley refers to or employs CTP.

I shall begin by considering Berkeley's negative comments on CTP in order to compile a list of criteria which a Berkeleian version of CTP must meet. Both PHK and DHP contain criticisms of CTP, some of which are patterned on Notebooks entry 476.

> The sillyness of the Currant Doctrine makes much for me. they commonly suppose a material world, figures, motions, bulk of various sizes etc according to their own confession to no purpose, all sensations may be & sometimes actually are without them. nor can men so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any wise to the production of them.

Here CTP is criticized on two grounds. (1) The fact that perceivers are affected with sensations or ideas is no evidence that they are produced by mind-independent material objects, for there can be and are sensations which have no relation to such objects. (2) The production of sensations by material objects is, as the materialists themselves acknowledge, unintelligible.[7] These lines of criticism are developed at PHK 18 and 19:

> I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them. Hence it is

> evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas: since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present, without their concurrence. But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than other wise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said, for though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind.[8]

Berkeley is here arguing that it is highly improbable that material objects give rise to ideas in the perceiver's mind, and so the fact that ideas are produced in perceivers is no reason to suppose that material objects exist. While the arguments target materialism, they do so through undermining a materialist version of CTP by showing that the action of material objects is not needed in the production of ideas and that the action of material objects could not be the basis for an intelligible account of the production of ideas. So one rather obvious criterion for a Berkeleian version of CTP is that it cannot rest on the activity of material objects.[9]

There is a further criterion that a Berkeleian version of CTP must meet. Berkeley believes that it can be shown that it is impossible for our ideas or sensations to be produced by physical objects, regardless of whether these physical objects are construed materialistically. This argument is most

clearly stated at PHK 25.

> But whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is therefore no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from *Sect.* 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure and motion, cannot be the cause of our ideas. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.[10]

This argument is based on what Cummins has labelled Berkeley's "Manifest Qualities Thesis."[11] Since ideas exist only in the mind, there is nothing in them which is not perceived. Since ideas are "visibly inactive" they cannot be responsible for the production of anything, including ideas. If physical objects are taken to be collections of ideas, physical objects cannot produce ideas. Nor is it possible for qualities which resemble our ideas to produce ideas, since qualities which resemble ideas will be, like the ideas they resemble, inactive. If physical objects are mind-independent collections of qualities, they will not be able to produce ideas. (Berkeley goes on in section 26 to reinforce the conclusion of sections 18 and 19 that material substance can play no role in the production of ideas on the basis that "it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance.") So there are two criteria that Berkeley's version of CTP must meet. (1) Unlike both Malebranche's and

Locke's versions of CTP, the production of our sensations cannot be produced in accord with laws of nature which mention materialistically construed physical objects. (2) Like Malebranche's version of the theory but unlike Locke's version, physical objects cannot be the efficient cause of our ideas. If Berkeley is to offer a version of CTP, it must be a version in which ideas are produced according to laws of nature which mention only idealistically construed physical objects which are not the efficient causes of our ideas.

Another similarity between Berkeley's and Malebranche's versions of CTP is that in both God rather than physical objects is taken to be the true efficient cause of sensations. After arguing in PHK 25 that sensible qualities cannot be the true causes of our perception, Berkeley reveals in PHK 26 what the cause is:

> We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.

There remains, of course, the question of which spirit causes our ideas. Berkeley first argues that he is not the cause of his own ideas of perception.

> [W]hatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will....There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them. (PHK

29)

At this point Berkeley is content to identify this other will or spirit with the "Author of Nature." But at PHK 146 Berkeley picks up the question once more.

> [I]f we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all, the never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid spirit, *who works all in all*, and *by whom all things consist*.

Berkeley's God, then, is the cause behind all our sensations or ideas of perception.

A third criterion which must be placed on any Berkeleian version of CTP is that it not (with Locke) be viewed as explaining away secondary qualities. Berkeley rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in any form which leads to or involves a distinction in the ontological status of the two types of quality.[12] Berkeley claims that one great advantage of his idealism is that unlike materialism, it leaves secondary qualities "on" physical objects.

> It is likewise my opinion, that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that *snow* is white, and *fire* hot. You indeed, who by *snow* and *fire* mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving

> substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat, to be affections inherent in them. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. (DHP 229-30)

Berkeley exploits Locke's use of CTP to explain away secondary qualities at DHP 182 and 187, where he accuses Hylas of absurdity on the basis of Hylas's claim that real sounds and colours are no more than motions in (respectively) air and light, a claim which Hylas is led to make (as is Locke) due to his endorsement of a Lockean version of CTP. So we have criterion (3): Unlike Locke, Berkeley does not take CTP to be a way to explain away secondary qualities.

There is a passage at the beginning of the Second Dialogue, at DHP 208-10, which might be interpreted as being a dismissal of *any* version of CTP. A close examination of this passage reveals that this interpretation cannot be sustained. In this well-known passage, Hylas introduces a Lockean version of CTP, according to which physical objects are the efficient causes of ideas or sensations. Hylas claims that even though he is unable to fault the First Dialogue arguments which led him to the conclusion that sensible qualities are mind-dependent, he still views the Lockean version of CTP as "so natural and intelligible" that he professes that he knows "not how to reject it" (DHP 208).[13] Berkeley puts the following version of CTP into Hylas's mouth:

> It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body: and that outward objects by the different

> impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits, propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which according to the various impressions or traces made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas. (DHP 208-9)

Berkeley has Philonous develop two objections to this account, both of which are based on the problems associated with the supposition that physical objects are the efficient causes of our ideas. The first objection takes as its starting point the conclusion, reached in the First Dialogue, that "Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable, are ideas; and these exist only in the mind' (DHP 209). Berkeley proceeds to have Philonous infer absurdities from Hylas's theory that sensible things thus construed are the efficient causes of our ideas. The first such absurdity is:

> The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose, that one idea or thing existing in the mind, occasions all other ideas. And if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself? (DHP 209)

And if Hylas tries to account for this primary idea, a further absurdity follows:

> Beside spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When therefore you say, all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea, causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis. (DHP 210)[14]

The upshot of this argument is that physical objects,

construed idealistically, cannot be the causes of our ideas (even if, for the sake of argument, they are allowed to be active). Berkeley is here developing an argument for the second criterion that an acceptable version of CTP must meet: physical objects cannot be taken to be the efficient cause of our ideas. This objection, then, cannot be taken to be against *any* version of the causal theory of perception, but only against those which do not meet the second criterion.

Berkeley's second objection, while like the first in rejecting physical objects as causes of our ideas, is unlike the first in that it is not based on any particular interpretation of the ontological status of physical objects. According to this objection, however physical objects are viewed, idealistically, immaterialistically, or materialistically, the version of CTP according to which physical objects cause ideas or sensations is unintelligible, because there is no intelligible connection between motion and sensations.

> [A]fter all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound and colour in the mind? or how is it possible that these should be the effect of that? (DHP 210)

This objection, like the first, is in effect an argument in support of Berkeley's second criterion.[15] Like the first objection, this objection eliminates only those versions of CTP which do not measure up to the second criterion. DHP 208-10 should not be read as a rejection of CTP, but only as a

rejection of any version of CTP that does not meet the second criterion.

The conclusion to be drawn from this examination of Berkeley's negative remarks concerning CTP is that they should be seen as a rejection of certain versions of CTP, namely those versions which do not meet criteria (1)-(3). This leaves room for the possibility that Berkeley endorses a version of CTP which satisfies the three criteria. This possibility is substantiated by the presence of positive references to CTP in Berkeley's writings, as well as by passages in which Berkeley is apparently presupposing some version of CTP. An examination of some of these positive references will show that this possibility is actually embraced by Berkeley.

There are positive references to CTP in many of Berkeley's works. Explicit examples can be found in DHP (241), *De Motu* (13), TVVE (37, 43), *Siris* (86, 102, 104, 153), and in the 1729 correspondence with Johnson. Moreover, *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (hereafter NTV) and TVVE seem to be built on the presupposition that some version of CTP is true (see for example NTV 33-6). I shall focus on the discussions of CTP found in DHP 241 and the 1729 correspondence with Johnson. In both passages, CTP is discussed in connection with the question of the perceiver's relation to the physical world. Johnson asks Berkeley two questions regarding the relation of sensations to the sense

organs in sections 5 and 6 in his letter of 10 September. In section 5 he inquires about the relation between the structure of our sense organs and our sensations.

> The curious structure of the eye, what can it be more than merely a fine show, if there be no connection more than you admit of, between that and vision? It seems from the make of it to be designed for an instrument or means of conveying the images of external things to the perceptive faculty within; and if it be not so, if it be really of no use in conveying visible objects to our minds, and if our visible ideas are immediately created in them by the will of the Almighty, why should it be made to seem to be an instrument or medium as much as if indeed it really were so? It is evident, from the conveying of images into a dark room thro' a lens, that the eye is a lens, and that the images of things are painted on the bottom of it. But to what purpose is all this, if there be no connection between this fine apparatus and the act of vision; can it be thought a sufficient argument that there is no connection between them because we can't discover it, or conceive how it should be?

In the last half of the last sentence (after the semi-colon), Johnson seems to be referring to the sort of objections that, as has just been shown, Berkeley levels against the causal theory of perception, particularly in PHK and DHP. Johnson takes the argument Berkeley uses at PHK 18 ("But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?") to imply that there is *no connection whatsoever* between "the curious structure of the eye" and vision. And he takes the argument of DHP 210 or PHK 19 ("though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the

nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they themselves are unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind") to imply the same conclusion.

Berkeley responds to this question in section 5 of his letter to Johnson of 25 November. In effect, Berkeley's response is that even though God immediately produces all sensations in our minds, the conclusion that there is no connection whatsoever between the structure of the eye and vision does not follow.

> As to the art and contrivance in the parts of animals, &c., I have considered that matter in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and, if I mistake not, sufficiently shewn the wisdom and use thereof, considered as signs and means of information.

Berkeley is here referring Johnson to PHK 60-6, in which he considers the following objection to his principles:

> [I]t will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the admirable mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their motions, as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together, which being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them, not have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a spirit that immediately produces every effect by a *fiat*, or act of his will, we must think that all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or Nature, to be made in vain. (PHK 60)

Berkeley indicates to Johnson that his answer to the objection stated at PHK 60 contains the answer to Johnson's question. Berkeley's answer to this objection is that while "curious organization" is not *causally* related to the production of any

effect, the organization of parts of physical objects is *nomologically* related to the production of the effects ascribed to them. Physical objects are organized as they are so that the production of effects ascribed to them may be produced in accord with the Laws of Nature.

> [I]t must be observed, that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a constant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of Nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life, as to the explaining the various *phenomena*: which explication consists only in showing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or which is the same thing, in discovering the *uniformity* there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances, wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent, hath been shewn in *Sect.* 31. And it is no less visible, that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to producing it according to the standing mechanical Laws of Nature. (PHK 62)

Just as the purpose of the organization of Nature is that natural effects be produced according to "certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects," it is also the case that these general laws themselves, which are prescribed by the "Supreme Agent", have a purpose.

> [T]he reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it

> is necessary they be variously combined together: and to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by *rule*, and with *wise contrivance*. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such ideas: which is in effect all that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. (PHK 65)

Berkeley's position is this: Physical objects exhibit arrangement of parts so that all elements of the physical world will be nomologically interrelated (physical objects must be organized so that all physical events can be produced according to fixed general laws of nature by God); and God works according to fixed general laws so that finite minds may be informed as to how to manipulate physical objects for the "use and ornament of life."

Thus Berkeley's response to Johnson's question regarding the organization of the eye is that the relation between the organization of the eye and vision is a nomological relation. Vision is nomologically dependent on the arrangement of the parts of the eye, and so while there is no causal relation between the eye and vision (since God produces all immediate objects of vision directly), there is nonetheless a relation between the eye's structure and the immediate objects of vision. Moreover this relation, like all relations determined by laws of nature, has a definite function to serve: it exists to allow finite minds to manipulate the natural world. In

fact, at TVVE 43 Berkeley indicates how this nomological relation can be exploited for the "use and ornament of life."

> To explain how the mind or soul of man simply sees is one thing, and belongs to philosophy. To consider particles as moving in certain lines, rays of light as refracted or reflected, or crossing, or including angles, is quite another thing, and appertaineth to geometry. To account for the sense of vision by the mechanism of the eye is a third thing, which appertaineth to anatomy and experiments. These two latter speculations are of use in practice, to assist the defects and remedy the distempers of sight, agreeably to the natural laws obtaining in this mundane system.

Berkeley's answer to Johnson's query clearly involves the endorsement of a version of CTP. In Berkeley's version visual ideas are nomologically dependent on the eye's mechanism, and are causally dependent on God's will. Thus Berkeley's version of CTP bears some resemblance to Malebranche's. The difference between them is that Berkeley does not construe the physical objects involved (e.g. the eye) materialistically, but rather as collections of ideas. Thus a version of CTP which is designed to meet criteria (1) and (2), and which is consistent with criterion (3), is endorsed by Berkeley.

This conclusion is reinforced by Berkeley's answer to Johnson's next question. Johnson asks the following in section 6 of his 10 September letter:

> There are some who say, that if our sensations don't depend on any bodily organs--they don't see how death can be supposed to make any alteration in our manner of perception, or indeed how there should be (properly speaking) any separate state of the soul at all. For if our bodies are nothing but ideas, and if our having ideas in this present state does not depend on what are thought to be organs of sense, and lastly, if we are supposed (as

> doubtless we must) to have ideas in that state; it should seem that immediately upon our remove from our present situation, we should still be attended with the same ideas of bodies as we have now, and consequently with the same bodies or at least with bodies however different, and if so, what room is there left for any resurrection, properly so-called? (274)

Berkeley's answer, in section 6 of the 25 November letter, is that "in our present state" our ideas are nomologically dependent on the mechanism of the sense organs, but "in our separate state" our ideas will not be so dependent. Thus there is a perfectly good sense to be attached to the doctrine of resurrection.

> I see no difficulty in conceiving a change of state, such as is vulgarly called Death, as well without as with material substance. It is sufficient for that purpose that we allow sensible bodies, *i.e.* such as are immediately perceived by sight and touch; the existence of which I am so far from questioning (as philosophers are used to do), that I establish it, I think, on evident principles. Now, it seems very easy to conceive the soul to exist in a separate state (*i.e.* divested of those limits and laws of motion and perception with which she is embarrassed here), and to exercise herself on new ideas, without those tangible things we call bodies. It is even very possible to apprehend how the soul may have ideas of colour without an eye, or of sounds without an ear. (282)

For Berkeley, embodiment just is to be a perceiver subject to Berkeley's version of CTP on the one hand,[16] and to be an agent embarrassed by limits and laws of motion on the other. CTP isn't just any part of the system of nomological inter-relations which ties the physical world together, but is that key part of the system which ties perceivers to the physical world. It is the nomological relations described in

Berkeley's version which define the perceiver's situation within the physical world. Given that anything's place within the physical world is a matter of the nomological relations in which the thing stands to other things within the physical world, some account of nomological relations between the perceiver and other things within the physical world is necessary in order for the perceiver to be situated within the physical world. And as the nomological relations which account for the perceiver's place within the physical world involve the perceiver's bodily sensory system, Berkeley's version of CTP is an account of the perceiver's embodiment.

In case Berkeley's use of CTP in his letter to Johnson is taken to be merely an *ad hoc* addition to his system prompted, perhaps too hastily, by Johnson's questions, it is worthwhile to look at a similar use of CTP at DHP 240-1. At DHP 240 Hylas reminds Philonous that he has just asserted that "whatever ideas we perceive from without, are in the mind which affects us." As we are "sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other being," and to "suffer pain is an imperfection," it would seem to follow that the mind which affects us suffers pain, and so is imperfect. As Berkeley, of course, holds that the mind which affects us is his all-perfect Christian God, he must find this result unacceptable. To avoid this result, Berkeley draws a distinction between the way in which finite human minds perceive, and the way in which God perceives.

> We who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the Law of our Nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body: which sensible body rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas, as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind: so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions, means no more than a correspondence in the order of Nature between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in his mind. To know everything knowable certainly is a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows or hath ideas; but His ideas are not convey'd to Him by sense, as ours are. (DHP 240-1)

As in his response to Johnson's query, Berkeley holds that being chained to our bodies is to have our perceptions connected to corporeal motions, and the relevant corporeal motions are those of the nervous parts of our sensible body. Once again Berkeley appeals to a version of CTP in order to supply the account of embodiment which will distinguish our perceptions from God's. To be an embodied perceiver just is to have one's perceptions produced according to CTP.

Berkeley's letter to Johnson and his account of embodiment at DHP 241 should make it clear that Berkeley

accepts a version of CTP which meets criteria (1)-(3). Our sensations are *nomologically* dependent on the mechanism of the sensory system (which is construed idealistically), which is itself related, through the "general laws which run through the whole chain of natural effects," to the mechanism of other physical objects. Our sensations are *causally* dependent on God's will, which directly produces all ideas of sensation in the perceiver's mind. Berkeley thus splits Locke's version of the causal theory of perception into two halves. Where Locke has the relations between the mechanism of the sensory system and sensations to be causal (just as are the relations between the mechanism of the sensory system and other physical objects), Berkeley takes these relations to be merely nomological, since he distinguishes the efficient cause of our perceptions, God, from physical objects.

Having ascertained Berkeley's endorsement of a version of CTP, Berkeley's use of CTP in an argument in his First Dialogue case that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent can be examined. Berkeley uses CTA in the discussions of sound and colour. In both, Hylas moves from a consideration of FPR to an endorsement of CTP, which he takes to entail the mind-dependence of sound and colour as immediately perceived sensations. Hylas continues on to distinguish these immediately perceived sensations from *real* sound and colour as motion in the media which affects the ears and eyes. Philonous (in accordance with criterion (3)) then

ridicules Hylas's claim that real sound and real colour are motions in air and light, and so Hylas is left with the conclusion that sound and colour are the mind-dependent sensations which are, according to CTP, the immediate objects of perception.

While this sketch of CTA indicates that Berkeley thinks that the materialist will accept it as a proof that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, a closer examination is required before what Berkeley takes to be the proper idealistic attitude towards CTA can be discerned. Here is the argumentative pattern as it unfolds in the discussion of sound. First, Hylas takes FPR to be a reason to reject the claim that sound is in sonorous bodies (by which Hylas means the bodies which common sense takes to be the subject of sound), since alterations in sound are not directly correlated to changes in these bodies.

> PHILONOUS. Then as to sounds, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?
> HYLAS. That they inhere not in sonorous bodies, is plain from hence; because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air pump, sends forth no sound.[17] The air therefore must be thought the subject of sound. (DHP 181)

Hylas's reason for placing sound in the air is that our perceptions of sound are correlated to changes in the air, as indicated by his response to Philonous's request for clarification on this point.

> Because when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, in proportion to the air's motion; but without some motion in the

> air, we never hear any sound at all. (DHP 181)

Upon being asked by Philonous why the correlation between motion of the air and perception of sound should be reason for taking sound to be in the air, Hylas provides Philonous with an account of CTP specific to the sense of hearing.

> It is this very motion in the external air, that produces in the mind the sensation of *sound*. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called *sound*. (DHP 181)

Hylas takes the relativity of the perception of sound to motion of the air to be a reason for embracing a version of CTP, according to which the immediate object of perception is a mind-dependent sensation. Philonous is eager to emphasize this aspect of CTP, as is clear in the following exchange.

> PHILONOUS. What! is sound then a sensation?
> HYLAS. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind.
> PHILONOUS.And can any sensation exist without the mind?
> HYLAS. No certainly. (DHP 181)

Philonous then asks, since Hylas has identified the sensation of sound with a mind-dependent sensation, how he can support his claim that sound is really in the air.

> HYLAS. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former indeed is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air.
>
> (DHP 181-2)

Hylas has just arrived at a position which is

indistinguishable from that which was seen, in the last section, to be endorsed by Locke at *Essay* II.VIII. Sound as perceived is just a mind-dependent sensation, which is caused by powers of mind-independent physical objects. These powers are accounted for in terms of the primary qualities of physical objects. Thus the sensation or idea of sound does not resemble qualities of physical objects. Moreover, Hylas's argument, which results in the conclusion that sound is a mind-dependent sensation caused by non-resembling powers in physical objects, is virtually identical to that which Locke has been seen to use in II.VIII.19-21. From a consideration of FPR the conclusion is drawn that sensations of sound are relative to primary qualities of physical objects (in this case, motion in the air); and on this basis the conclusion is drawn that the sensation or idea of sound is a mind-dependent entity caused by the non-resembling qualities of physical objects to which it is correlated. Far from misunderstanding Locke's use of FPR, Berkeley here reproduces the same argument in which Locke uses FPR. FPR is taken as reason to accept a version of CTP, according to which secondary qualities are mind-dependent entities which do not resemble the powers of physical objects which cause them. The indirect link between FPR and the mind-dependence of sound is the same in Locke's *Essay* and in Hylas's argument.[18]

While Philonous does not challenge Hylas's identification of sound as perceived with the mind-dependent sensation

produced according to CTP, he is not willing to let Hylas's distinction between this sensation of sound and real sound stand. Philonous argues that to accept that real sound is nothing but motion in the air commits Hylas to absurdities. First, Philonous claims that in taking real sound to be motion in the air Hylas is committed to maintaining that it is "good sense to speak of *motion*, as of a thing that is *loud, sweet, acute*, or *grave*, " and to the conclusion that "real sounds may possibly be *seen* or *felt*, but never *heard*" (DHP 182). These charges lead to the following exchange:

> HYLAS. Look you, Philonous, you may if you please make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own indeed, the inferences you draw me into, sound something oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder, if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions, seem uncouth and out of the way.
> PHILONOUS. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of separating from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the sense of the world. But can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that *real sounds are never heard*, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense. And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?
> HYLAS. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And after the concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind. (DHP 182-3)

After having based a distinction between sound as a mind-dependent, immediately perceived sensation and real sound as a motion in the air on his version of CTP, Hylas is led to abandon the idea that real sound is nothing but motion in the

air, and so is left with the conclusion that real sound is a mind-dependent sensation.

While Philonous does not agree with the distinction between real and sensed sound which Hylas tries to erect on CTP, does he nonetheless agree with the line of argument which led Hylas to conclude that sound as perceived is a mind-dependent sensation? To begin with, can Philonous follow Hylas in the first step of his argument, from a consideration of FPR to the endorsement of CTP? To decide this question, the move from FPR to CTP must be understood. What underlies this move? It is to be recalled that it is not the bare fact of perceptual variation which is of interest to either Locke or Hylas, but the fact that perceptual variation is correlated to variation in the conditions under which perception occurs, specifically variation in the sensory system, which is itself correlated to variation in physical objects. Moreover, these correlations are orderly, and so can be described by a theory in which the correlations are taken to be due to laws. In effect, then, what an examination of FPR shows Hylas (and Locke) is that the production of perception is part of the order of nature, and is governed by laws of nature. The theory in which these law-governed relations are described is CTP. In this way FPR, since the relativity involved is amenable to theoretical description, points the way to CTP. (As was indicated in the last section, one profitable way of viewing CTP is as an account of FPR.) Moreover, since both

Hylas and Locke take natural relations between physical objects to be grounded in the causal powers of these physical objects, they take the relations described in CTP to be grounded in the causal powers of the physical objects which are correlated to perceptions.

Philonous follows Hylas in moving from an examination of FPR to CTP. Philonous, like Hylas, takes an examination of the correlations underlying FPR to reveal that they are ordered according to laws of nature, and so capable of theoretical description.[19] The theory in which the natural laws governing these correlations are described is, of course, Berkeley's version of CTP. In this way a consideration of the correlations involved in FPR leads Philonous, just as Hylas was led, to CTP.[20] Where he will part company with both Hylas and Locke is in his interpretation of these law-governed correlations: where Hylas and Locke take natural relations to be grounded in the causal powers of physical objects, Philonous believes that the laws governing these relations, and the power which forces physical objects to follow these laws, are grounded in God. So while Hylas and Locke take the relations described in CTP to be causal, Philonous (and Berkeley of course) take the same relations to be nomological. But these different interpretations of the relations involved in CTP are irrelevant to the first step of the argument, from FPR to CTP, and as Philonous accepts that the correlations underlying FPR are orderly, he should be seen as following

Hylas in taking this step.

The underlying reason for the move from FPR to CTP is clear, but what is not so clear is why Hylas takes CTP to involve the claim that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent sensations. Hylas seems to move directly from the claim that the mind is affected consequent to the appropriate modification of the sensory system to the claim that what the mind is affected with is the immediate object of perception, the sensation of sound.

> It is this very motion in the external air, that produces in the mind the sensation of *sound*. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called *sound*. (DHP 181)

What his reason is for claiming that what the mind is affected with is the immediate object of perception is unclear. Pitcher offers the following suggestion as to the line of reasoning that someone like Hylas is following:

> He starts with the natural assumption that if one event immediately causes another, the latter must occur at a place contiguous to the former. Applying this principle to the event *x* (the observer's brain stimulation), he imagines that since *x* immediately causes the occurrence of some object of awareness *O*, *O* must occupy a spatial position contiguous to *x*. But only an idea of sense is close enough to *x* to be able to fulfill the requirement placed on *O*: the object that figures in event *y* (the emitting or reflecting of light rays toward the observer) is too far away. (*Berkeley*, 107)

Pitcher has the following criticism to make of this line of reasoning:

> Imagining that *x* immediately causes *the occurren*

> *of some object of awareness O*, makes it look as though *x* directly causes some *thing*, some *object*, which then must be (at least) quite close to *x*. Well, even if one were to grant the legitimacy of this way of putting things, it would still be false, or senseless rather, to say that an idea of sense satisfies the requirements placed on *O*--because an idea of sense occupies no place in (real physical) space and hence is not at, or quite close to, or yet any distance from, the spatial position occupied by *x*. But, in fact, we cannot allow this way of putting things: for *x* is not the direct cause of *the occurrence of some object of awareness O*, but is rather the direct cause of *the observer's state (or act) of awareness of something, O*. And as soon as we put the matter in this correct way, we see that there is no evident reason to think that *O cannot* be (identical with) the physical object from which light rays are being emitted or reflected....So a direct realist need have no qualms about admitting all the physiological, and other physical, facts involved in the causation of sense perception. (107-8)[21]

Pitcher believes that the principle of "no action at a distance" is being misapplied, since it is senseless to maintain that ideas of sense occupy some spatial location. The "no action at a distance" principle was widely accepted during this period, and it was applied by some to the case of perceptual awareness. A clear application of "no action at a distance" to perception is to be found in Clarke's "Second Reply" in *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* (ed. H.G. Alexander, Manchester 1956). Clarke writes:

> Any inanimate substance, tho' present, perceives nothing: and a living substance can only there perceive, where it is present either to the things themselves, (as the omnipresent God is to the whole universe;) or to the images of things, (as the soul of man in its proper sensory.) Nothing can any more act, or be acted upon, where it is not present; than it can be, where it is not. (21-2)

Hylas is not unaware of this principle, as he demonstrates in

his application of CTA to colour:

> Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it act first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye, nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows, that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which operating on the eye occasions a perception of colours: and such is light. (DHP 186)

Note that here Hylas is not saying that the soul cannot perceive what is not contiguous to it, but only that since the soul only perceives when the sense organs have been affected, and coloured objects which affect it are at a distance, there must be some medium between the coloured object and the sense organ for sight to take place. The contiguity with which Hylas is concerned is between the sense organ and the physical object said to affect the sense organ, not between the object perceived and the perceiving mind. Thus Hylas is not giving the sort of argument which Pitcher believes leads to the false conclusion that the immediate object of perception is mind-dependent.[22] It is therefore not clear that Pitcher's reconstruction of Hylas's line of reasoning involving the "no action at a distance" principle actually fits the text.

Be that as it may, Pitcher's most fundamental objection is that taking the causal theory of perception to entail that the immediate object of perception is a mind-dependent sensation is to mistakenly believe that what the causal process produces is an object of awareness rather than

awareness of an object. And if what is produced is awareness of an object, there is no reason to identify the object of awareness with a mind-dependent sensation. CTP, even though on Hylas's version it contains the claim that what is produced is a mind-dependent object of awareness (a sensation), does not by itself force one to accept that what is produced in the mind is a sensation rather than an act of perception. While I take Pitcher's objection to be sound, it should, perhaps, be reformulated somewhat, as what Hylas seems to be doing is not viewing the result of the causal process to be just an object of awareness, but *also* an awareness of an object. Hylas apparently takes it that the object of awareness produced in the perceiver's mind is of such a nature that its production in the mind is by itself a sufficient condition for the mind's awareness of it (the fact that Philonous eagerly emphasizes this aspect of Hylas's account of CTP indicates that he agrees with this characterization of what is produced in the mind).[23] This is indicated by Hylas's freely moving, in the discussion of sound, between the claims that the *perceived sound* varies with variation in the air, that the *perception of sound* is correlated to the motion of the air, and that what is produced in the mind by the motion in the air is the *sensation called sound.* However, if CTP provides no reason to think that what is produced in the mind is an object of awareness rather than awareness of an object, then neither does it provide reason to think that what is produced in the mind is

an object of awareness of such a nature that its production in the mind is sufficient to account for the mind's awareness of it. So, while CTP gives reason to think that something is produced in the mind in accordance with a particular process, so far no reason has been given which would show that CTP places sufficient restrictions on the nature of what can be produced in this way to allow for its identification as either an act of awareness, an object of awareness, or some hybrid of the two.

To sum up: An examination of FPR shows that the variations in perception are correlated in a law-like way with the conditions of perception. This indicates that perception is a process governed by laws of nature, and so is a process amenable to theoretical description. The theory which contains the description of the natural process of perception is CTP. Both Hylas and Philonous accept this line of reasoning, although they disagree on the interpretation to be put on the relations described in the theory: Hylas takes them to be causal, while Philonous takes them to be nomological relations. But just as CTP does not itself determine which of these interpretations is to be placed on these relations, Berkeley does not here show that CTP contains the resources to determine what interpretation is to be placed on what is produced in the perceiver's mind in accordance with these natural laws. Nonetheless, both Hylas and Philonous take this product to be an object of awareness, which they term a

sensation, the occurrence of which is sufficient to account for the awareness of this object. Thus both conclude on the basis of CTP, since they assume that this claim is part of CTP, that the immediate object of awareness is a mind-dependent entity. CTA can thus be formulated in the following way: CTP is accepted as the result of a consideration of FPR, and as the claim that the immediate object of perception is a mind-dependent sensation is taken to be included in CTP, the conclusion is drawn that the immediate object of perception is indeed a mind-dependent sensation.

As has been seen, both Hylas and Philonous apparently accept that CTP must involve the claim that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent because they both assume that there is no distinction between the object of awareness and the awareness of an object. Since making the assumption that, in immediate perception, there is no distinction between the object of awareness and the awareness of an object is to assume that the object of immediate perception is mind-dependent, CTA, as it stands, involves circularity. Unless some support is eventually given for making the assumption that there is no distinction in immediate perception between the awareness of an object and the object of awareness, CTA must be deemed inadequate to support the conclusion that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent sensations. What is required is some reason to interpret what is produced in the mind as

described in CTP as a mind-dependent sensation. Hylas recognizes the need for this to be shown, for at DHP 194 he claims that he "did not sufficiently distinguish the *object* from the *sensation* [i.e. the act of awareness from the object of awareness]."[24] Berkeley's response is to give Philonous an argument, which I shall call the Flower Argument, to show that Hylas's distinction between act and object is untenable. The argument that Berkeley gives to Philonous to reject this distinction has the implication that, for Berkeley, the production in a passive mind of an object of perception constitutes perception of that object by that mind. Thus the Flower Argument is what is required to save CTA from circularity.

Before Berkeley's attempt to ground his denial of the distinction between act and object is examined, the distinction itself must be clarified. What did Berkeley's contemporaries take mental acts to be, and in what did their distinction from, and relation to, objects of awareness consist? As Muehlmann points out, the contemporary form of the act-object distinction was Cartesian. This form of the distinction itself derives from Scholastic sources, and is expressed in Scholastic terminology.

> According to the Scholastics, the object of perception possesses a *formal* reality that is "transmitted to" and thus "contained in," the perception by way of *objective* reality. On this neo-Aristotelian account, an episode of perception involves, in addition to its sensational nature, an *actualizing* of the capacities of the "higher" substantial form exemplified by the person. For

> this reason, the perception is said to be an *act* of the mind, an item weakly distinct from its sensational nature, but sharply distinct from its object.... Descartes employs the language of this formal-objective reality distinction along with the act terminology, but holds, in contrast, that an object's existence in the mind of a perceiver consists only in the perceptual idea's object-directedness. It consists only, in other words, of the intrinsic intentionality of the idea: the idea is an *act* in the sense, first, that it is a mode (a manifest episode) of thought and, secondly, that it is about, though distinct from, its object. Descartes holds, furthermore, that this act is *not* an activity of the mind: it is not a *volition*. (*Berkeley's Ontology*, 194-5)

Cartesian mental acts are, like their Scholastic counterparts, actualizations of the perceiver's capacity, but unlike their Scholastic counterparts, are not actualizations of the mind's capacity to assume (objectively) the form of the object perceived, but are rather actualizations of the mind's capacity for object-directedness (which capacity is not further analyzed, nor, according to this view, analyzable). In neither account of mental acts is the mind active in the sense of being itself the source of the actualization of its capacities. On both theories the mind's capacities are actualized by the action of some outside agent; the mind itself is passive.

Against this background Berkeley's argument against the act-object distinction (the Flower Argument) can be seen to miss its mark. Berkeley's argument proceeds in the following way. Hylas draws the distinction he wishes to defend in this way:

> The sensation I take to be an act of the mind

> perceiving; beside which, there is something perceived; and this I call the *object*. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip. (DHP 195)

Philonous's strategy is to get Hylas to admit that there is no act involved in perception, and then to use this admission to convince Hylas both that the distinction between act and object must be abandoned and that the object of perception must be mind-dependent. Philonous's first move in carrying out this strategy is to get Hylas to accept that the distinction between act and object is a distinction between action and object.

> PHILONOUS. [I]f I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.
> HYLAS. True. (DHP 195)

Philonous then goes on to convince Hylas that the mind is "to be accounted active in its perceptions, so far forth as volition is included in them" (DHP 196), and that volition is an act of the will. Using a pair of examples involving the seeing and smelling of a flower, Philonous then convinces Hylas that the will is not involved in perception, so that the mind is entirely passive during perception.

Now, Philonous has already led Hylas through the following chain of reasoning:

> PHILONOUS. To return then to your distinction between *sensation* and *object*; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.
> HYLAS. True.
> PHILONOUS. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to any unthinking thing; but whatever beside

> is implied in perception, may.
> HYLAS. That is my meaning.
> PHILONOUS. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance.
> HYLAS. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception. (DHP 195-6).

Since Hylas, as we have just seen, subsequently admits that there is no act (i.e. voluntary action) in perception, he has to concede that on his account (according to which there is a distinction between act and object), perception can exist in an unthinking thing. Since Hylas has admitted that this is an absurdity, he must abandon his proposed distinction between act of perception and object of perception.

It is important to note that Philonous has not only led Hylas to abandon the proposed distinction between act of perception and object of perception, but that he has done so by, in effect, identifying perception and the object of perception. Philonous takes Hylas to be claiming that perception consists of two components, act and object; in rejecting the act component, then, perception comes to be identified with the object of perception. And as Hylas agrees with Philonous that perception can only occur in a mind, the object of perception, since it is the only component of perception, must be mind-dependent. Moreover, it is not only Hylas who accepts the identification of perception with the object of perception: Philonous too rejects the claim that there is an act of perception, and so he, like Hylas, is left with the object of perception as the only component of

perception. In failing to establish the distinction between act and object, Hylas has failed to make Philonous "understand the difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation" (DHP 195). So Philonous takes his demonstration of the mind's passivity in perception to not only undermine the act-object distinction, but to show that objects of perception, since they are the only components of perception, to be mind-dependent. What emerges is that for Berkeley, the production in a passive mind of an object of perception constitutes perception of that object by that mind.[25]

However, it is clear that Berkeley's Flower Argument misses its mark, since neither the Cartesian nor the Scholastic version of the act-object distinction is inconsistent with the claim that the mind is passive in perception. Thus Berkeley's argument that the mind is passive during perception cannot show that these versions of the act-object distinction are false. Berkeley's Flower Argument involves a conflation of mental acts and mental actions, and only if this conflation is accepted can the argument overturn the act-object distinction.[26] Nonetheless, Berkeley takes the Flower Argument to be a satisfactory justification of the assumption that was at work earlier in CTA, that what is produced in the mind during perception is a mind-dependent object of awareness (i.e. a sensation).

The relationship between CTA and the argument supporting the denial of the act-object distinction (i.e. the Flower

Argument) requires some comment. First, the argument against the act-object (or sensation-object) distinction is introduced in a way which indicates that an assumption of the prior discussions had been that there is no distinction between the sensation and the object. This means, of course, that an assumption of CTA is that there is no distinction between act and object. On this assumption, the conclusion drawn from CTA, that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent sensations, does in fact follow from CTA. So, on the terms in which Berkeley presents CTA, it does in fact support the conclusion drawn from it. Secondly, the Flower Argument is grounded on a premise that is included in CTP. This is that the mind is passive in immediate perception. As was seen above, an examination of FPR reveals that perception is produced in accordance with laws of nature, and as such is independent of the will of the perceiver. Thus the mind, according to CTP, is passive in immediate perception. Berkeley takes this result of CTP and uses it as the basis for his argument that there is no distinction between the act of perception and the object of perception. Thus, it turns out that Berkeley does think that accepting CTP forces what is produced in the mind according to the process described in CTP to be interpreted as the immediate object of perception, since CTP involves the claim that the mind is passive in immediate perception, and Berkeley takes the mind's passivity to entail that there is no act of awareness. So, while it is assumed in

CTA that what is produced in the mind according to CTP is a mind-dependent object of awareness, it is also the case that Berkeley thinks that CTP contains within itself the resources to justify this assumption.

It is clear, then, that Berkeley does mean CTA to do some positive work in his case that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent sensations. Philonous accepts a version of CTP, and he can accept Hylas's reason for accepting CTP (the realization that FPR is governed by laws of nature). So both Hylas and Philonous accept that perception occurs when the mind is affected according to the laws of nature which determine the relations described in CTP. While Philonous gives a different interpretation of the relations involved in CTP than is given by Hylas, this, as has been argued, is irrelevant to CTA. Both Hylas and Philonous assume in the context of CTA that what is produced in the mind according to the process described in CTP is a sensation, a mind-dependent object of immediate awareness. Berkeley later provides Philonous with an argument with which to justify this assumption, the Flower Argument, with which he convinces Hylas that there is no distinction between act and object. Berkeley rejects the act/object distinction because he rejects one of the terms of the distinction: he rejects the claim that perception involves an act of the mind. He concludes that what is produced in the mind is the object of perception, and that the production of such an object (a sensation) is

sufficient to explain the mind's awareness of this object. Moreover, Berkeley's argument that there is no act of perception is based on a premise which is found to be a claim which is embedded in CTP, that the mind is passive in perception. So it turns out that accepting CTP, regardless of the interpretation made of the relations which the theory describes, is sufficient to commit one to accepting that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent sensations.

I shall end this section by offering some reflections on the restrictions which Berkeley's account of physical objects places on the relations which he can include in his version of CTP. I shall first explain what these restrictions are, and then explain how these restrictions affect the coherence of Berkeley's system as viewed from the perspective of common sense. It will be seen that the usual criticism which is brought against Berkeley's system from the perspective of common sense, that he cannot accommodate the common sense realist's criterion for the reality of physical objects, is twinned by problems concerning Berkeley's ability to accommodate what common sense takes to be the perceiving subject's relation to the physical world. That is, I shall argue that not only does Berkeley's collapse of the distinction between constituents of physical objects and ideas lead to difficulties with the common sense conception of the relation of physical objects to the perceiver (apparently denying them independent existence from the perceiver), but

also to difficulties with the common sense conception of the relation of the perceiver to physical objects (apparently denying that the perceiver is situated within a body within the physical world).

Berkeley's difficulties with the perceiver's[27] embodiment stem from his account of the relation between ideas and physical objects. As he makes ideas, which are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them, constituents of physical objects, he must show how these ideas can be objective things rather than merely subjective appearances. In other words, Berkeley has to make good the response he has Philonous make to Hylas in the third dialogue:

> I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves. (DHP 244)

Since Berkeley takes all our perceived ideas to be constituents of physical objects, the way physical objects appear to perceivers is the way they really are. Thus, variation in the appearance of physical objects must be variation in physical objects themselves

Such an account of physical objects is contained in the following exchange between Hylas and Philonous:

> HYLAS. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope, the better to discover the true

> nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?
> PHILONOUS. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope, which was perceived by the naked eye....[M]en combine together several ideas, apprehended at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed to have some connexion in Nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine by my other senses a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes, the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But in both cases my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What therefore if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence follow, they are not to be trusted, or that they are inconsistent with themselves or anything else, except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real nature, marked by each name. (DHP 245-6)

The picture which emerges is of physical objects which are composed of an indefinitely large collection of ideas. We collect ideas into groups to which we apply an individual or specific name. This collection of ideas is not, however, made at random. The ideas that go to make up a physical object are "observed to have some connexion in Nature."[28] Since Nature is ordered, these connexions in Nature can be described as being determined by what Berkeley elsewhere[29] calls the Laws of Nature: physical objects are composed of ideas that are connected according to the Laws of Nature. For Berkeley, the

physical world is nothing but the collection of these collections of ideas.[30] Moreover, for Berkeley, *all* ideas perceived by sense are constituents of the physical world.[31] Thus *all* natural relations (i.e. those relations determined by laws of nature) holding between ideas perceived by sense are relations between objective constituents of the physical world. The key thing to note here is that since all natural relations between ideas are relations between objective constituents of the physical world, no natural relations between ideas can be relations involving the perceiving subject. For Berkeley, natural relations between ideas are natural relations between objective constituents of the physical world, not natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world.[32] So natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world cannot be a matter of natural relations between ideas of which the perceiver is aware and the physical world.

Nor can natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world be a matter of relations between the perceiver's awareness of an idea and the idea of which the perceiver is aware. For Berkeley, the perceiver's awareness of an idea cannot be dependent on any natural relation between the perceiver and the idea of which the perceiver is aware, since this would imply a distinction between the immediate object of awareness and the awareness of that object, and Berkeley rejects this distinction at DHP 194-7. Moreover, if

our awareness of an idea did depend on natural relations between that idea and the awareness of it, it would become unclear why the existence of the idea must depend on the perceiver's awareness of it. So: since natural relations between the ideas of which the perceiver is aware and other constituents of the physical world cannot be natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world, and since there can be no natural relations between ideas of which the perceiver is aware and the perceiver's awareness of them, Berkeley's ontology requires that there be no natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world.

Not only does Berkeley's ontology require that there be no natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world, Berkeley's epistemological commitments also demand that there be no natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world. Berkeley's account of physical objects is designed to eliminate the distinction between how things appear and how things are which he sees to be contained in the hypothesis that an unchanged physical object lies behind the varying ideas that constitute the appearance that object presents to us. On this hypothesis, the variation in ideas is due in large part to the variation in relations between the perceiving subject and physical objects, rather than being directly and entirely due to variation in the constituents of perceived physical objects. As the relations between the perceiver and physical objects can change without there being

any change in the perceived physical object, ideas can vary without there being any change in this object, thereby opening up the distinction between appearance and reality which Berkeley took to be so pernicious.[33] Thus, to eliminate the distinction between appearance and reality, Berkeley must eliminate the distinction between nomological relations within the physical world that are determined by Laws of Nature and relations among our ideas.[34] Variations in ideas and variations in the physical world will then correspond. To eliminate the distinction between relations among our ideas and relations determined by the laws of nature, Berkeley must eliminate all relations other than those pertaining to physical objects from his account of the variations we observe in our ideas. The relations that are thus eliminated are those between physical objects and the perceiver. As seen in the previous paragraph, this is just what Berkeley accomplishes with his account of physical objects. Since all our ideas are constituents of physical objects, variations in our ideas will be variations within the physical world. But in making all variations in our ideas objective, Berkeley must necessarily eliminate all nomological relations between the perceiver and the physical world.

As was indicated in the above discussion of Berkeley's version of the causal theory of perception, Berkeley accounts for the perceiver's place within the physical world (that is, its being situated within a particular physical body) in terms

of the natural nomological relations described in his version of CTP. According to that version, the perceiver, being nomologically dependent on the appropriate changes in its sensory system for its perceptions, is nomologically tied to the human body of which that sensory system forms a part. The natural nomological relations between the perceiver and physical objects (described in CTP) are determined by the laws of nature "that run through the whole chain of natural effects" (PHK 62), thereby subjecting the perceiver to the laws of nature in the production of its sensations or ideas, and as the perceiver is subject to the laws of nature, it is situated within the physical world. And since the procedure according to which sensations are produced always involves the human body, the perceiver is naturally related to this body; in other words, the perceiver is embodied. That Berkeley's account of the perceiver's embodiment is in terms of CTP should be no surprise. Given that his account of what it is to be within the physical world is in terms of being subject to the Laws of Nature, Berkeley has no choice but to explain the perceiver's embodiment in terms of natural nomological relations holding between the perceiver and the human body.

Perhaps it is apparent by now that Berkeley's account of physical objects and his account of the perceiver's place in the physical world pull in opposite directions. It has been argued that for Berkeley, to be within the physical world is to be subject to the Laws of Nature. As a result, Berkeley

must allow natural nomological relations between the perceiver and perceived objects--such as those described in the causal theory of perception--if he is to be able to provide an account of the perceiver's situation within the physical world. But Berkeley can allow no nomological relations between the perceiver and perceived physical objects if his account of physical objects is to succeed. This means that Berkeley's account of physical objects, since it necessarily requires that there be no nomological relations between physical objects and perceivers, requires that perceivers not be situated within the physical world.

Despite the fact that his account of physical objects necessitates that there be no nomological relations between perceivers and physical objects, the version of CTP which Berkeley provides contains a description of the perceiver's nomological dependence on physical objects for its ideas. Thus Berkeley's version of CTP is inconsistent with his account of physical objects.[35] In order to underscore the difficulties caused by the constraint that there be no natural nomological relations between the physical world and the perceiver, I shall describe the version of CTP which is in fact consistent with Berkeley's account of physical objects.

The version of the causal theory of perception which is consistent with Berkeley's account of physical objects must include an additional criterion not mentioned by Berkeley, and so not included in criteria (1)-(3) listed above. Criterion

(4) is that an acceptable version of CTP cannot include natural nomological relations between the perceiver and physical objects. Thus this version of the theory will not be an account of natural nomological relations according to which the perceiver is situated within the physical world. Rather, the nomological relations described in any version of CTP consistent with the Berkeleian account of physical objects must be, like all the natural nomological relations that Berkeley can consistently allow, between constituents of physical objects. These relations are those between states of physical objects which may be collectively termed the conditions of perception (including, of course, the state of the sensory system) and perceived constituents of physical objects. Constituents of physical objects are thus nomologically dependent on the conditions of their perception, including the state of the sensory system.[36] This leads to the outcome that constituents of physical objects are not part of the conditions under which they are perceived but rather the nomological result of the conditions of their perception. The version of CTP which is consistent with the constraint that there be no natural relations between the physical world and perceivers is not only not an account of relations which situate the perceiver within the physical world, it is an account according to which perceived constituents of physical objects are nomologically dependent on states of the sensory system.[37]

It might be objected that for all that has been said so far, the Berkeleian perceiver is nonetheless situated within the physical world. After all, each finite perceiver has its own unique perspective on the physical world, all the more so for Berkeley since all the constituents of the physical world of which the perceiver is aware are existentially dependent on that perceiver. Isn't this to situate the perceiver within the physical world with a vengeance? Consideration of this objection will show the limited extent to which Berkeley can consistently allow that the perceiver is situated with respect to the physical world. To begin with, we have seen that the situation of the perceiver with respect to the physical world can have nothing to do with natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world, since Berkeley's conception of the physical world bars such relations. Rather, the only relation between the perceiver and the physical world is the metaphysical relation of existential dependence in which constituents of the physical world stand to the mind perceiving them. Since the perceiver stands in this metaphysical relation to (and is thereby aware of) only a *certain* (tiny) *portion* of the physical world, the perceiver is situated with respect to the physical world. And, as a sizable proportion of the constituents of the physical world of which the perceiver is aware--including hedonic sensations--will be constituents of the human body, the perceiver in a limited sense has a body.

While the limitation on the range of constituents of the physical world to which the perceiver stands in this metaphysical relation does serve to relate the perceiver to a specific part of the physical world, it does not serve to situate the perceiver *within* the physical world. This is so because the relations between the Berkeleian perceiver and the physical world are exclusively metaphysical relations rather than being natural relations. Since there can be no natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world, the perceiver's perception of physical objects is not subject to the Laws of Nature.[38] While the objects perceived are governed by the Laws of Nature, the perceiver's awareness of these objects is not so governed.[39] As the perceptual process is not part of the natural order, the perceiver is not situated within the physical world. Moreover, since to make ideas nomologically dependent on a human body is, for Berkeley, to embody those constituents of the physical world of which the perceiver is aware, unless Berkeley is willing to embrace this absurdity he cannot hold that the perceiver's perceptions are dependent on a human body. So it turns out that Berkeley cannot provide a satisfactory answer to Johnson's queries about death and the future state of the soul. The soul can be no more dependent on the natural order for its awareness of the physical world prior to death than it is afterwards; nor are its [illegible] any more nomologically dependent on a human body before death than after.

If Berkeley is to be able to account for embodiment, he must allow that some class of perceived ideas is not part of, nor taken to represent, the physical world. He could then allow that this class of ideas is produced in the perceiver according to natural nomological relations without introducing the threat that ideas of the physical world vary indeperdently of changes in the physical world. That is, he could allow natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world without introducing the possibility of the pernicious distinction between appearance and reality, since the class of ideas which are produced according to the laws of nature which determine these relations would not be part of nor be taken to represent the physical world. The class of ideas which might be selected for this role is hedonic sensations. While this would mean that Berkeley must give up the claim that hedonic sensations are located in various parts of the human body, a claim which Berkeley clearly takes to be part of common sense, it would secure the perceiver's embodiment since the perceiver would be tied to the physical world by the natural relations between hedonic sensations and bodily states. Even if Berkeley were to take this route in order to secure the perceiver's embodiment, the problem he faces would not be completely solved, for Berkeley would still not be able to account for the production of any of the perceiver's other ideas by natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world. So, even though the perceiver would be

embodied, the perceiver's sensory system could play no role in the perceiver's perception of the physical world. Moreover, the selection of the class of ideas to be removed from the physical world would be, in the end, arbitrary. As Berkeley's criterion for being part of the physical world is to be an idea that is subject to the laws of nature, and all ideas which we perceive (including hedonic sensations) meet this criterion, he has no good reason for removing any of them from the physical world,[40] and *a fortiori* no good reason to choose to remove one class of ideas rather than another. So while there is a possible way in which Berkeley might account for the perceiver's embodiment, this account does not solve all the problems which Berkeley faces concerning the perceiver's relation to the physical world, and, moreover, the account is *ad hoc*.

It is clear that Berkeley faces difficulties in reconciling the need to situate the perceiver within the physical world with the requirement that the order of that of which the perceiver is aware be identical to the order of the physical world. These difficulties can be summed up in terms of the problem of combining the objectivity of the perceiver's awareness of the physical world with the existence of natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world. On the one hand, the demands of objectivity bar natural relations between the perceiver and the physical world, while on the other hand the natural relations between the perceiver and the

physical world required to situate the perceiver within the physical world undermine the objectivity of the perceiver's awareness. When the perceiver is viewed as standing in natural relations to the physical world, how the physical world appears to the perceiver will be determined by these relations. The perceiver will not have a fully objective perspective on the physical world. On the other hand, when viewed as having an objective perspective on the physical world, the perceiver cannot be naturally related to the physical world. These two views of the perceiver's perspective on the physical world are reflected in the Cartesian distinction between pure understanding and sensory awareness, and in particular in the related distinction made by Malebranche between ideas and sensations. Crudely put, Malebranche's God directly reveals His ideas to finite minds, but produces sensations in these minds in accord with the Laws of Nature which describe the relations between the embodied perceiver and physical objects. Ideas are objective representations of the physical world, while the information borne by sensations concerns the relation of the perceiver's body to other physical objects. McCracken's suggestion that Berkeleian ideas are an amalgam of the characteristics of Malebranchean ideas and sensations[41] sheds some light on the demands Berkeley makes on ideas: they must carry both wholly objective information about the physical world and information which is determined by the natural relations between the

perceive and the physical world. They must be both constituents of the physical world and produced according to the Laws of Nature which determine the relations between the human perceiver and the physical world. That Berkeleian ideas cannot consistently be both of these at once has been argued. If the argument is sound, Berkeley cannot combine his account of physical objects with an account of the perceiver's situation within the physical world. Berkeley's idealism is in potential conflict with common sense not only because of the dependence of the constituents of physical objects on perceivers, but also because of the independence of perceivers from the physical world.

The problems Berkeley faces in providing the perceiving subject with a place within the physical world parallel the difficulties he faces in providing an account of the objectivity of physical objects which satisfies common sense realism. Berkeley, in collapsing the distinction between subjective ideas and objective constituents of physical objects not only leaves precious little space for the objectivity demanded by common sense, he also leaves precious little space for the subject within the physical world. The conflict which S.A. Grave and others have noted between Berkeley's affirmation of both the "distinction principle" and the "identity principle" in his account of the relation between ideas and the perceiver,[42] is paralleled by the conflict found between Berkeley's claim that natural

nomological relations exist between the perceiver and physical objects and the demand made by his account of physical objects that these relations not exist. In the one case the assertion of conflicting principles is said to be due to Berkeley's desire to reconcile his idealism with common sense realism, and in the other the conflict is due to Berkeley's desire to reconcile his idealism with the common sense view that the perceiver is situated within the physical world within a human body. The moral of the story is that Berkeley's difficulties with common sense which result from his collapse of the subjective and the objective are not limited to the objective side of the collapsed distinction, but are also to be found on the subjective side.

NOTES

1. There is an additional argument, not used until after the discussions of the specific sensible qualities are finished, which has been labelled Berkeley's "Master Argument" (Andre Gallois, "Berkeley's Master Argument," *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974), 55-69). Berkeley claims the Master Argument is itself sufficient to establish the inconceivability of mind-independent sensible qualities. However, as both Hylas and Philonous reach the conclusion that all sensible qualities are mind-dependent before the Master Argument is introduced, Berkeley clearly intends the arguments found in the discussions of the specific sensible qualities to be sufficient to establish the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception. The Master Argument will be discussed in greater detail in the fifth section.

2. Berkeley applies IA and CTA to the secondary qualities alone, ignoring them in his treatment of the primary qualities. However, as Berkeley has an argument which he uses to establish the mind-dependence of the primary qualities on the basis of the mind-dependence of the secondary qualities, whatever use to which he puts IA and CTA in establishing the mind-dependence of the secondary qualities will ultimately be transferred via this argument to the primary qualities. The argument in question runs as follows:

> PHILONOUS. And can you think it possible, that should really exist in Nature, which implies a

> repugnancy in its conception?
> HYLAS. By no means.
> PHILONOUS. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist, the other necessarily exist likewise?
> HYLAS. It should seem so.
> PHILONOUS. Consequently the very same arguments which you admitted, as conclusive against the secondary qualities, are without any farther application of force against the primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them, appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities? (DHP 194)

A version of this argument appears at PHK 10. As noted in the last section, the argument appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Locke's argument for the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

3. CTA is almost universally ignored. An exception is Pitcher, (*Berkeley*, 106-9), who gives a brief account of the argument. Discussions of the First Dialogue often make mention of the presence of the causal theory of perception, but the authors of these accounts do not often view the causal theory of perception as playing a role in a substantial argument for the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception.

4. This lack of clarity is due in part to the fact that Berkeley gives Hylas the lead in contexts in which CTA is discussed. The fact that Hylas is made responsible for expounding this argument may also go a long way to explaining

why commentators have, for the most part, paid scant attention to CTA.

5. The claim that theories of perception along the lines of the one just sketched were more or less standard during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has not gone unchallenged. In particular, Yolton has argued that taking this form of representationalism to be standard is a misinterpretation. See John W. Yolton, *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid* (Minneapolis, 1982). However this may be, it is fairly clear (as will become apparent) that Berkeley interpreted his contemporaries and recent predecessors along the lines just sketched. See also Tipton's discussion of Yolton's interpretation of Berkeley's view of ideas in "'Ideas' in Berkeley and Arnauld", *History of European Ideas*, 7:6 (1986), 575-84, which includes a short response to Tipton by Yolton.

6. While Malebranche does not take the physical objects described in CTP to be causally efficacious, I shall nonetheless retain the label "causal theory of perception" for his account of the relation between physical objects and the perceiver's sensations, since on a descriptive level it is very similar to Locke's.

7. Locke writes at *Essay* IV.III.13 that

> We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of those invisible parts produce a yellow Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we

> can by no means conceive how any *size, figure, or motion* of any Particles, can possibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour, Taste,* or *Sound* whatsoever; there is no conceivable *connexion* betwixt the one and the other.

8. This argument is also to be found at DHP 221.

9. Berkeley does not think that any of the "principles and theorems of the sciences" will have any difficulty in being reconciled with immaterialism, as is clear from the following passage:

> HYLAS. ...I said indeed, that a *sceptic* was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.
> PHILONOUS. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of the sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter; the denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them. (DHP 173)

10. A similar argument occurs at DHP 217.

11. Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Manifest Qualities Thesis," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28:3 (July 1990), 385-401.

12. It has been argued that Berkeley can endorse a version of the distinction which hinges on the explanatory usefulness of the two types of quality: primary qualities are those mentioned in the most basic--that is, the most general--laws of nature. The argument continues that for Berkeley this version of the distinction is at least compatible with the view that both primary and secondary qualities are qualities

of physical objects, and so equally real. See Winkler, *Berkeley*, 274, Garber, "Locke, Berkeley, and Corpuscular Scepticism," 193-4, Tipton, "The 'Philosopher by Fire' in Berkeley's *Alciphron*," 173.

13. It isn't clear what inconsistency Hylas sees between the First Dialogue arguments and CTP; perhaps at this stage of the argument Hylas assumes that the physical causes of ideas must be "outward." At any rate, Berkeley's reasons for introducing and criticizing this version of CTP at this point is clear. He is preparing the ground for his impending introduction of God as the cause of our ideas of perception.

14. Berkeley's use of "occasion" in addition to "cause" at DHP 208-10 might be thought to indicate that Berkeley is not only rejecting causal relations between physical objects and ideas, but also non-causal occasional relations of the type that Malebranche endorses. However, Berkeley is not using "occasion" to mean anything other than "cause" at DHP 208-10. This is clear from the way in which Berkeley alternates between "cause" and "occasion" in the last-quoted passage: he says that if Hylas is claiming that ideas are *occasioned* by impressions, then Hylas is saying that these impressions *cause* ideas. Moreover, Berkeley elsewhere argues that one sense of "occasion" is "cause."

> Again, let us imagine what is meant by *occasion*: so far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies, either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that

> is observed to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. (PHK 69)

15. It is to be noted that Berkeley's argument at DHP 208-10 that physical objects cannot be causes of our ideas does not hinge on the claim that ideas are inactive and as such cannot be causes, as does the argument at PHK 25-6. In fact, his argument at DHP 208-10 more closely resembles the argument Berkeley uses at PHK 18-19 to show that material objects are not the causes of our sensations. Both turn on the unintelligibility of the theory that physical objects cause ideas. PHK 19 turns on the problems associated with making the relationship between two distinct substances, mind and matter, intelligible, while the argument at DHP 208-10 turns on the problem of making causal relations between primary and secondary qualities intelligible (as well as on the problems related to the production of ideas by physical objects which are themselves composed of ideas).

16. Berkeley is here following precedent. At 1.5 of *The Search after Truth* Malebranche writes:

> For the union of soul and body, which consists primarily of a mutual relation between sensations and motion in the organs, would seem to be more arbitrary than natural had Adam been able to sense nothing when the main part of his body received some impression from the bodies surrounding him.

And Locke at *Essay* II.XXVII.17 writes:

> *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain,

> capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as much a part of it *self*, as what is most so.

While Locke does not explicitly refer to CTP, it is evident from the discussion of II.VIII in the last section that conscious comprehension of the pleasure and pain of little fingers is due, as a matter of fact, to those motions of the sensory system comprehended under CTP. So for Locke as well, the embodiment of a consciousness is to be accounted for in terms of CTP.

17. This example seems to come from Elucidation 16 of Malebranche's *The Search after Truth*, which was included as "F. Malebranche's Treatise Concerning Light and Colours. Being an Illustration of the Fourth Chapter of his Sixth Book" in the 1700 edition of Taylor's translation of the *Search*. (This is the translation which Berkeley is thought to have had, according to McCracken, *Malebranche and British Philosophy*, page 215, note 35.) Malebranche writes that "Sound is rendred Sensible only by the Vibrations of the Air, which shake the Ear; for upon the Air's being drawn out of the Air-Pump, sound is no longer heard."

18. This is the evidence, promised at the end of the preceding chapter, that Berkeley should not be viewed as taking Locke to be one of the Baylean materialists (i.e. one of the "modern philosophers" of PHK 14). Both Wilson, "Did Berkeley

completely Misunderstand the Basis of the Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke" and Stroud, "Berkeley *v.* Locke on Primary Qualities" (which were discussed in the preceding chapter) overlook this conclusive evidence that Berkeley did not misunderstand Locke.

19. At DHP 181 Berkeley grants "that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air." And Philonous's descriptions of various instances of FPR in the First Dialogue clearly reveal that he takes variations in perception to be lawfully correlated to changes in the sense organs.

20. Given Berkeley's description of the activities of the natural philosopher in PHK 62, it is difficult to see how else he could have Philonous arrive at CTP.

21. Tipton, *Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism* makes substantially the same point at 18-26 and 210-26. On pages 23-4 he writes:

> The way out of the difficulty is not to deny the propriety of scientific accounts of perception in terms of processes but rather to resist the temptation to reify sensations or to treat sensations as if they were themselves perceptual objects....Indeed, if we go along with the scientific account of the perception of a table, and if we believe that the scientist succeeds in answering the question he is set, then we must hold that the end result of the causal process is, not a perceptual object of a worrying sort, but rather the sensing of the table.

22. In fact, Hylas's argument follows fairly closely the argument found in Locke's *Essay*, II.VIII.12.

23. Hedonic sensations (pleasure and pain) are the model for the type of entity of which the sufficient condition of the mind's awareness of them is that they are produced in the mind. See Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Ideas of Sense," *Nous* 9:1 (1975), 55-72, for a convincing case that Berkeleian immediate objects of awareness are construed on the model of hedonic sensations. Cummins also links the historical antecedents of this construal of the immediate objects of perception to CTP.

> [O]ne can discover historical antecedents for this doctrine of sensations without much difficulty. The 'new philosophers' generally construed colours, sounds, odours, tastes and various tactile qualities as responses in consciousness to physical-physiological transactions....Such diverse thinkers as Descartes, Rohault, Malebranche, Boyle, and Locke used 'sensation' for immediately experienced objects, sounds, colours and the like, which were denied extra-mental existence. (67)

24. Hylas is here responding to Philonous's invitation to "recover any slips" he might have made, or offer whatever he has omitted, in the progress of their inquiry. The question of the distinction between act ("sensation") and object is raised in such a way to make it clear that in the preceding discussion, which includes the use of CTA, it had been assumed that there was no distinction: and on this assumption Berkeley can use CTA to prove that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent. Nonetheless, Hylas is obviously justified in demanding that this assumption be provided with some grounding.

25. This is not the universally accepted account of Berkeley's argument. For a different account, in which Berkeley is taken to be using the argument in an *ad hominem* fashion, see Winkler, *Berkeley*, 7-10. Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 198-203 points out the shortcomings of Winkler's interpretation.

26. The only possible source for Berkeley's conflation of mental act and mental action that I have come across is Locke's *An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all Things in God* (*The Philosophical Works of John Locke*, vol. II, ed. J.A. St. John (London, 1899) 413-58). It is almost certain that Berkeley was acquainted with this work, as is pointed out by McCracken, *Malebranche and British Philosophy*, 215 (note 35). Indeed, R.I. Aaron argues in "Locke and Berkeley's *Commonplace Book*," *Mind* 40 (1931), 445-53 that this work was the key "agency which stirred Berkeley's mind in those eventful years 1706-7." This assessment is endorsed by David Raynor on page 615 of "Berkeley's Ontology," *Dialogue* XXVI (1987), 611-20. In section 38 of *An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion*, Locke makes some remarks that might have suggested to Berkeley that the distinction between sensation and object is equivalent to the distinction between a mental action or operation and the immediate object of perception. Locke writes:

> The distinction he makes a little lower between *sentiment* and *idea*, does not at all clear to me, but cloud his doctrine....If by *sentiment*, which is the word he uses in French, he means the act of sensation, or the operation of the soul in

> perceiving; and by *pure idea*, the immediate object of that perception, which is the definition of ideas he gives us here in the first chapter, there is some foundation for it, taking ideas for real beings or substances.

Locke's equation of the "act of sensation" with the "operation of the soul in perceiving" may well have suggested to Berkeley that the act of sensation was some activity of the mind. This suggestion would have been reinforced by Locke's comment later in the same section regarding the "action of one of our senses." (The fact that Berkeley uses flowers as his examples in his argument may be taken as further evidence that section 38 of *An Examination* influenced Berkeley's argument, as the examples used by Locke also involve flowers.)

27. While Berkeley takes spirits to be agents as well as perceivers (PHK 27), I shall consider only his account of the place in the physical world of finite minds insofar as they are perceivers. By "perceiver," then, I mean finite minds insofar as they are perceivers.

28. This can also be seen from Berkeley's Third Dialogue description of a cherry:

> Since it is not a being distinct from sensations; a *cherry*, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind; because they are observed to accompany each other. (DHP 249)

29. E.g. PHK 30.

30. For example, at PHK 150 Berkeley makes the following comment:

> But you will say, hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they all be ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by *Nature* is meant only the visible *series* of effects, or sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain fixed and general laws; then it is plain, that Nature taken in this sense cannot produce anything at all. But if by *Nature* is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound, without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature in this acceptation is a vain *chimera* introduced by those heathens, who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God.

31. See for example PHK 88:

> I can as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense: it being a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in Nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*.

32. On Locke's account, by contrast, those ideas of which the perceiver is immediately aware are not objective constituents of the physical world, but rather are subjective existents produced by objective constituents of the physical world in the perceiving subject in accord with laws of nature. Thus, for Locke, natural relations between ideas and the physical world are natural relations between perceivers and the physical world.

33. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," gives an account of Berkeley's keen interest in refuting scepticism.

34. Berkeley gives a clear account at PHK 87 of the sceptical problems he takes to arise if natural relations between physical objects and the perceiver are countenanced.

> Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered only as so many *sensations* in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to *things* or *archetypes* existing without the mind, then we are involved all in *scepticism*. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of any thing really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or the relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things, existing in *rerum natura*.

35. Pitcher, *Berkeley*, 136-7 notes that causal relations between perceptions and perceived objects cause problems for Berkeley. Pitcher focusses on the problems which CTP causes for Berkeley's conception of physical objects. He writes that Berkeley avoids these problems by rejecting "the principle that there is a real causal link between what we perceive and our perceiving of it" (137). However, the same problems arise whether this link is taken to be causal or, as Berkeley takes it to be, nomological.

36. Making physical objects nomologically dependent on the conditions of perception has some plausibility when these conditions are external to the perceiver's body, as is the case in the passage (DHP 238) in which Philonous deals with Hylas's queries concerning perceptual error. However, it is considerably less plausible when the conditions of perception internal to the perceiver's body are taken into account. In effect, this version of the theory is an account according to which all the physical objects of which a perceiver is aware are embodied, since it is they which are nomologically dependent on changes in the sensory system. Cf. Winkler, *Berkeley*, 174-5.

37. Those commentators who argue that Berkeley accepts the possibility of an idealistic interpretation of corpuscular mechanics tend to assert or assume that the causal theory of perception poses no special problem for Berkeley. Examples of this tendency are to be found in Margaret Atherton, "Corpuscles, Mechanism, and Essentialism in Locke and Berkeley," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 29:1 (January 1991) 47-67; Daniel Garber, "Locke, Berkeley, and Corpuscularian Scepticism," in Colin M. Turbayne, ed. *Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays* (Minneapolis, 1982), pp. 174-94, especially footnote 17; and Winkler, *Berkeley*, chapter 8.

38. It is not open to Berkeley to account for embodiment by holding that the perceiver is metaphysically annexed to (and therefore aware of) only one physical object (the human body). The perceiver would have to "perceive" other physical objects by perceiving the effects they make on the human body. The advantage to limiting the perceiver's awareness to one object in this way is that it provides a way of reconciling the perceiver's embodiment and its dependence on the order of nature for its perceptions of all physical objects other than the human body with the fact that the perceiver is not itself a physical object. However, this version of the causal theory of perception obviously involves natural relations between the perceiver and perceived physical objects and so opens the distinction between the way objects appear and their real nature.

39. This does not imply that there is a distinction between the idea and the awareness of the idea. It is merely to say that the order between ideas is one thing, and the perception of ideas is another. The ideas perceived are ordered, but this order does not ground the explanation of the awareness of these ideas. Thus there can be natural explanations of neither the production of ideas in the perceiver's mind nor of the perceiver's situation with respect to the world.

40. Apart, of course, from allowing for the account of embodiment suggested here.

41. *Malebranche and British Philosophy*, 236-9. McCracken himself relates this to the tension in Berkeley's philosophy between idealism and realism.

42. S.A. Grave, "The Mind and Its Ideas: Some Problems in the Interpretat on of Berkeley," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (1964), 199-210. On page 200, Grave writes: "Nothing could be more valuable in Berkeleian commentary than a reconciliation of what I am calling the "distinction" and "identity" principles, an interpretation of Berkeley's words about the entire distinction of minds and ideas, which would show that he had a meaning for them consistent with what he says about the identity of an idea and its perception." See also George Pitcher, "Minds and Ideas in Berkeley," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 6:3 (July 1969), 198-207 and *Berkeley*, chapter XI, and Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Unstable Ontology," *The Modern Schoolman*, LXVII (November 1989), 15-32. Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, chapters VII and VIII, discusses the tension betwee- idealism and realism in Berkeley's system and offers suggestions as to how it may be resolved.

4. The Identity Argument

The third and final argument that Berkeley includes in the First Dialogue discussion of the sensible qualities is the Identity Argument (IA). This argument is used in he discussions of those secondary qualities (heat and cold, tastes, and odours) to which CTA is not applied. In fact, the argument is fully developed only in the discussion of heat and cold; in the discussions of tastes and odours, Philonous quickly draws the desired concessions from Hylas on the basis of an abbreviated version of the argument he had developed in the discussion of heat. Unlike APR and CTA, it is immediately clear that Berkeley intends IA to support his idealism.[1] In other words, Berkeley employs IA not only to undermine Hylas's materialism by using it to show that the immediate objects of perception are not qualities of material objects, but to support his idealism by using it to show that the immediate objects of perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them.[2] Nonetheless there are a number of intriguing interpretive and critical questions regarding IA. After giving a brief account of Berkeley's application of IA to heat and indicating some possible sources for Berkeley's argument, I shall address these questions.

IA starts from the premise, which Hylas accepts without question, that hedonic sensations (i.e. pains and pleasures) cannot exist in an unperceiving thing (by which it is implied that they can only exist in perceiving things). Hylas admits

to Philonous that external things, by which he means material substances with sensible qualities inhering in them, are "senseless" beings, and as such cannot be the subject of hedonic sensations. But since Philonous has already received the admission from Hylas that "the most vehement and intense degree of heat [is] a very great pain" (DHP 176), the conclusion that is drawn is that "the greatest heat perceived by sense" (DHP 176) cannot exist in a material substance. Philonous explicitly draws only an immaterialistic conclusion from IA: very great heat cannot exist in a material substance. However, this conclusion is drawn on the basis of the agreed premise that only perceiving things are capable of pain or pleasure.[3] Thus IA is used undermine materialism, but this use is premised on the idealistic claim that pain and pleasure can only exist in minds. So IA not only supports the conclusion that great heat, because it is a pain, cannot exist in material substance, but also the (prior) conclusion that great heat, because it is a pain, cannot exist without the mind perceiving it.[4]

While Hylas does not balk at the premise that hedonic sensations cannot exist in unperceiving things, he does resist accepting the premise that a very great heat is a pain once he becomes aware that the consequence of doing so is that great heat cannot exist in an unperceiving thing.

> Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem, rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it. (DHP 176)

In order to convince Hylas that he was not out after all, Philonous brings two arguments to bear in support of this premise. The first is that there is no separation in perception between a great heat and a pain. After extracting the admissions from Hylas that when he puts his hand near the fire he perceives but one uniform sensation, and that when he does this he immediately perceives both heat and pain, Philonous proceeds to draw the conclusion that heat is nothing distinct from pain.

> Seeing therefore that they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and that fire affects you with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived, is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain. (DHP 176)

Since both are immediately perceived at the same time, and only one sensation is perceived, heat and pain as perceived are not distinct. Since there is no distinction in perception between immediately perceived heat and immediately perceived pain, the conclusion is drawn that there is no distinction between the two. Philonous adds a second argument designed to show that not only is there no distinction *perceived* between great heat and pain, no such distinction can be *conceived*.

> PHILONOUS. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain, or pleasure.
> HYLAS. I cannot.
> PHILONOUS. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? *&c.*
> HYLAS.I do not find that I can.

> PHILONOUS. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree? (DHP 176-7)

Since we cannot conceive them in separation from one another, Philonous concludes that they cannot exist apart from one another. Hylas, of course, accepts these arguments, and as a result finds that he must accept the conclusion of this reached through the application of IA to heat, that great heat cannot exist without the mind.

Even though Hylas has been convinced that great heat, since it cannot be distinguished from a great pain, must be existentially dependent on the mind perceiving it, he resists drawing the conclusion on the basis of IA that all immediately perceived degrees of heat are not qualities of material objects. Hylas's reason for resisting this conclusion is that even though he has admitted that intense heat is not distinct from pain, lesser degrees of heat are not pains. Philonous attempts to get around this objection by arguing that while lesser degrees of heat (i.e. warmth) are not indistinguishable from pains, they are indistinguishable from pleasures. Since pleasure, like pain, can only exist in a perceiving substance, warmth, like heat, can only exist in a perceiving substance. While Hylas goes along with Philonous's line of reasoning for a time, once he realizes that the consequence of doing so is to be stuck with the conclusion that all degrees of heat are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them he raises an objection to the premise that warmth is indistinguishable

from pleasure.

> HYLAS. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure, as that a great degree of heat is a pain.
> PHILONOUS. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.
> HYLAS. I could rather call it an *indolence*. It seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny. (DHP 178)

After admitting that if Hylas thinks warmth to be an indolence rather than a pleasure he has no argument to convince him otherwise, Philonous abandons IA in favour of APR in order to elicit the admission from Hylas that neither heat nor cold can exist without the mind. Philonous returns to IA in the discussions of tastes and odours, but adds nothing to the argument that is not to be found in the discussion of heat. Hylas docilely allows Philonous to draw the conclusion on the basis of IA that all determinates of these determinables are indistinguishable from pains or pleasures, and as such, mind-dependent.

Before commenting on IA, I shall briefly consider Berkeley's probable sources for this argument. The most extensive account of the relation of secondary qualities to hedonic sensations is to be found in Malebranche's *The Search after Truth*. As mentioned in section 2, Malebranche argues that sensations, which correspond to what I have, following Locke, called ideas of secondary qualities, are modifications of the soul. His argument centres on the claim that material

substance is extension and its modes. Since sensations are neither extension nor its modes, they cannot be modes of material substance, and so must be modes of mental substance (see *The Search after Truth*, 1.10). Given this argument, Malebranche is left with the task of explaining why we mistakenly judge that sensations are modifications of material physical objects. Malebranche's explanation of this error rests on his argument that "In almost all sensations there are four different things that we confuse because they all occur instantaneously and together" (1.10). Malebranche describes these four different but confused things as follows:

> The first is the *action* of the object, i.e., in heat, for example, the motion and *impact* of the particles of wood against the fibers of the hand. The second is the *passion* of the sense organ, i.e., the agitation of the fibers of the hand caused by the agitation of the tiny particles of fire, which agitation is communicated to the brain, because otherwise the soul would sense nothing. The third is the *passion*, sensation, or perception of the soul, i.e. what each of us feels when near fire. The fourth is the *judgment* the soul makes that what it perceives is in the hand and in the fire. Now this natural judgment is only a sensation, but the sensation or natural judgment is almost always followed by another, free judgment that the soul makes so habitually that it is almost unable to avoid it. (1.10)

Malebranche's explanation centres on why on some occasions we take the sensation to be one or the other of the first two things listed. The portion of this explanation which is relevant to the relation of secondary qualities to hedonic sensations concerns the confusion of the passion of the sense organ with the sensation. In the chapter concerning this

confusion (1.12), Malebranche argues that "three sorts of sensations must be distinguished in the soul: the strong and lively, the weak and languid, and those in between."

> Strong and lively sensations are those that startle and forcefully rouse the mind because they are either quite pleasant or else very unpleasant; such are pain, tickling sensations, [and] extremes of heat and cold.... Weak and languid sensations are those having little affect on the soul and that are neither pleasant nor unpleasant, such as moderate light, all the colours, rather weak, ordinary sounds, and so on. Finally I term intermediate between the strong and weak those sensations that moderately affect the soul, such as a strong light, or a great noise, and such. Now it should be noted that a weak and languid sensation can become intermediate, and finally strong and lively. (1.12)

Malebranche then argues that we take the strong and lively sensations which have a great effect on the soul due to their pleasantness or unpleasantness both to be modifications of our soul and to be in physical objects,[5] while those which are weak and languid and consequently neither pleasant nor unpleasant we take to be modifications of physical objects.

> Now the reason why all men do not immediately see that colors, odors, tastes, and all other sensations are modifications of their soul is that we have no clear idea of our soul....Therefore, given that we do not know our soul through an idea, as I shall explain elsewhere, but only by the inner sensation we have of it, we do not know through simple perception but only through reasoning whether brightness, light, colour, and the other weak and languid sensations are modifications of our soul. But for lively sensations such as pleasure and pain, we easily judge that they are in us because we perceive that they affect us, and we need not know them through their ideas in order to know that they belong to us. (1.12)

Intermediate sensations are sometimes taken to be both in the body and the object, sometimes in the object only, and

sometimes we are at a loss as to where to place these sensations.

The important points here are that we judge lively and strong sensations to be in our soul because they strongly affect us either pleasantly or unpleasantly, and that not all sensations are known to be in our soul in this way, since some intermediate sensations and all weak and languid sensations are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. So Malebranche uses the hedonic aspect of some sensations to explain why we take them to be in the soul, but also claims that not all sensations have this hedonic aspect as part of the reason that they are not taken to be in the soul. Berkeley's reading of *The Search after Truth* may well have suggested both IA and the possibility that IA's application is limited to a certain range of sensible qualities. Also of note is that fact that Malebranche singles out heat and cold as paradigm instances of strong and lively sensations, while moderate light, all the colours, and ordinary sounds are the paradigms of weak, languid sensations. This is of note since Berkeley himself takes heat and cold to be paradigm instances of vehement sensations, while he does not apply IA to colour and sound.

Malebranche was not the only author to have discussed the relation between sensible qualities and hedonic sensations. Hobbes writes that "the *heat* we feel from the fire is manifestly in *us*, and is quite *different* from the heat which is in the *fire*: for *our* heat is *pleasure* or *pain*, according as

it is *great* or *moderate*; but in the *coal* there is no such thing."[6] Hobbes's reasoning is much like Malebranche's, although he does not explicitly restrict the range of sensible qualities to which this sort of reasoning is applicable. In *Essay* II.VII.1-6, Locke argues that pleasure or pain is annexed to nearly all our ideas, so that we will have incentive to perform the appropriate actions for the preservation of our bodies.[7] Locke, however, does not use the annexation of pain and pleasure to our ideas as an argument that they are in the mind. Moreover, he says that hedonic sensations are annexed to the majority of our ideas of sensation. So if Berkeley's reading of *The Search* suggested IA to him, this suggestion would have been reinforced by his reading of the *Essay* and this passage (if he was aware of it) from Hobbes.

While Locke and Hobbes place no limitations on either the range of qualities or the degree of any quality which is pleasant or painful, such limitations are to be found in *The Search after Truth*. This discrepancy raises the question as to the range of sensible qualities to which Berkeley himself would have been willing to apply IA. Malebranche's restriction of the range of sensations which are pleasant or unpleasant may be the reason that Berkeley does not have Philonous argue against Hylas's objection to IA that lesser degrees of heat and cold are indolences rather than pleasures. Even if Berkeley believed that pleasure or pain is identical

to or inseparable from all sensible qualities, the fact that this is denied by so influential a philosopher as Malebranche would give Berkeley strong reason to either show that Malebranche is mistaken here or use an argument other than IA in the discussions of those sensible qualities which Malebranche terms "weak and languid." But since Philonous does not know how to convince Hylas that a moderate heat is a pleasure rather than an indolence, it would seem that Berkeley would see the need to supply Philonous with some argument other than IA to convince Hylas and Malebranche's readers that weak and indifferent sensations are mind-dependent. That Berkeley was in fact influenced in this way by Malebranche's discussion in book 1, chapter 12 of the *Search* is indicated by the fact that those qualities which Malebranche especially mentions as being weak and languid, colours and sounds, are those qualities to which Berkeley applies CTA rather than IA.[8] And at DHP 191-2, Berkeley has Philonous admit the existence of "indifferent sensations", i.e. those that are neither pleasant nor painful, which implies that he did not, in fact, believe that IA could be applied to all qualities.

The claim that Berkeley did recognize limitations on the range of applicability of IA is not accepted by all commentators. Some commentators believe that Berkeley would have been willing to extend IA at least to cover all the secondary qualities.[9] Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, claims that Berkeley recognized no limitations whatsoever on the

applicability of IA:

> Berkeley in fact holds IA in the highest of esteem and, moreover, would be willing to apply it to all sensed qualities....While Berkeley observes that IA does not so readily apply to sounds, colours, and the primary qualities, he could have applied IA, with equal plausibility, to *all* of the sensible qualities; if one hears an intensely loud sound, one feels a great pain; and if one stares at a brilliant light (e.g., the sun), one feels a great irritation; moreover, if one intensely touches (say, by falling off one's horse) the solidity of the ground, one feels, perhaps, a whole barrage of very great pains. (137-8)

Muehlmann derives support for interpreting Berkeley as recognizing no restrictions on the applicability of IA from his reading of the following passage:

> HYLAS. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the secondary qualities any real existence, should yet attribute it to the primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?
> PHILONOUS. It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable, that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter, may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion, affect us with. And it being too visibly absurd to hold, that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the secondary, than the primary qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat, allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a *sensation*, as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject. (DHP 191-2)

Muehlmann reads the last sentence of the above passage as

Berkeley's extension of IA to all qualities, even those that are moderate. However, the more plausible reading of this sentence is that Berkeley is saying that sensations which are neither painful nor pleasant ("indifferent" sensations), and so which are not subject to IA, are nonetheless sensations, and as sensations, cannot exist in an unthinking subject. (Philonous gets Hylas to admit, at DHP 181 and again at DHP 187, that no sensation can exist without the mind, and Hylas's admission does not depend on the premise that all sensations are identical to or inseparable from hedonic sensations.) On this reading, Berkeley does in fact recognize some limitations on IA: there are indifferent sensations, and IA is of no use in showing that they are mind-dependent.

Indeed, Muehlmann eventually argues that what is fundamentally wrong with Berkeley's use of IA is that IA is in fact restricted in the way in which he claims that Berkeley denies that it is restricted.

> IA will demonstrate the mind dependence of a quality only if...it can either link that quality inseparably to an hedonic sensation or identify the former with the latter. But within some thermal experiences there are, phenomenologically, no hedonic sensations to be found and therefore nothing mental to which they can be inseparably tied. IA requires that hedonic sensations be mental and this means that they must be both transparent and given to the perceiver with the experience of the sensible quality perceived. (145)

Muehlmann's procedure is to interpret Berkeley as holding that IA can be applied to all sensible qualities, and then to criticise Berkeley on the grounds that there are significant

limits on the range of qualities to which IA can in fact be applied. If it is the case that IA is limited in this way, charity of interpretation favours the interpretation that Berkeley holds that there are limits on the applicability of IA over the interpretation that Berkeley denies that such limits exist. The same interpretation is to be preferred both on grounds of charity of interpretation and on the basis of the passage at DHP 191-2: Berkeley holds that IA is of limited applicability since there are indifferent sensations.[10]

While interpreting Berkeley as admitting limits to the applicability of IA shields him from Muehlmann's objection, there remain a pair of objections in the literature to be considered. The first of these objections is that even Berkeley's claim that *intense* heat is identical to or inseparable from pain fails on phenomenological grounds. Pitcher raises this objection with reference to the case of putting one's hand near a blazing fire.

> There are two objects whose heat I feel: the heat of the fire and the heat of that part of my hand that is nearest the fire. The former heat causes the latter, but there is no credibility at all in the idea that the former--the heat of the fire--might actually *be* a pain; because, for one thing, I feel the heat of the fire for some time before I begin to feel the pain--and since the heat of the fire, which is presumably unchanging, cannot be the pain *before* the pain begins, it is wildly implausible to suggest that it might be the pain *after* the pain begins. (*Berkeley*, 101)[11]

This sort of objection, if it is successful, undermines Berkeley's argument that intense heat cannot be perceived apart from pain. Since whatever can be perceived apart can be

conceived apart--see PHK 5--his argument that such a separation is inconceivable is also undermined.

The second objection centres on Berkeley's apparent claim that intense heat is *identical to* pain. As a number of commentators have pointed out,[12] this would mean that if Berkeley insists that heat is in fire, then pain, being identical to heat, is in the fire as well. Since Berkeley, as he indicates at Notebooks entry 444, holds that his idealism is consistent with the common sense belief that hedonic sensations are located in one's body, this result is unacceptable to him. Muehlmann offers a solution to this apparent problem (*Berkeley's Ontology*, 139-144) by drawing our attention to the fact that Berkeley wavers between the claim that great heat is identical to pain and the claim that great heat and pain are indistinguishable.

> Berkeley seems to vacillate between two possible conclusions: the argument is supposed to prove either that (c1) any determinate thermal quality is *identical with* a sensation or that (c2) any determinate thermal quality is *inseparable from* a sensation. (139)

After noting that either (c1) or (c2) will perform the task that Berkeley is focussing on in the context, the undermining of materialism, Muehlmann points out, as do the commentators noted above, that the consequence of (c1) is that "the plain man's view--that the heat is in the fire and the pain is in that part of one's body which comes into contact with the fire--cannot be sustained." (139) Muehlmann suggests that in order to avoid this consequence while still being able to use

IA to establish the mind-dependence of e.g. intense heat, Berkeley must instead claim only that great heat and pain are inseparable. If intense heat and pain are inseparable rather than identical, then Berkeley can place heat in fires and pain in human bodies.

Muehlmann explicates the difference between identity and inseparability in terms of real and apparent distinctions. Real distinctions hold between items that can really exist apart; really distinct items are neither identical nor inseparable. Beside real distinctions, there are apparent distinctions. Things which are only apparently distinct cannot exist apart from each other. But within the category of the apparently distinct, there are both virtual distinctions and illusory distinctions. Illusory distinctions "obtain" between items that are in fact identical: for example, the distinction between the evening star and the morning star is illusory. Virtual distinctions, on the other hand, hold between items which are not identical, but which cannot exist apart because they are inseparable. An example of a virtual distinction from a Berkeleian context is the distinction between colour and visual extension. While colour and visual extension cannot exist apart from one another, they are not identical, and so they are virtually distinct.

Muehlmann makes a convincing case that Berkeley, although he does not explicitly accept virtual distinctions, is committed to them in virtue of the fact

> that Berkeley *needs* to concede (and that he in fact does so by 1734) that, in some cases where the distinctions are apparent, selective attention is possible. It follows that at least some apparent distinctions cannot be illegitimate [i.e. illusory], for if there were no distinction at all there would be no difference on which selective attention could focus. (142-3)

In fact, as Muehlmann points out, Berkeley presupposes the possibility of selective attention in IA itself.

> The way Berkeley has Philonous express IA in this passage presupposes that we *can*, at least in less extreme cases, selectively attend to either the heat or the pain: while Philonous urges that we "perceive one simple uniform sensation," he also says (my italics) "they are *both* immediately perceived at the same time." He could not say the latter if, in every thermal perception, 'heat' and 'pain' referred to one and the same *utterly simple* sensation. (140)

Since Berkeley supposes that it is possible to selectively attend to heat and pain, then they must be at least virtually distinct; IA should, then, be interpreted as establishing that great heat and pain are inseparable rather than identical.

Even given that this is the correct interpretation of IA, it is not clear that taking heat and pain to be merely inseparable rather than identical will in fact square Berkeley with the plain person's view. Construing the relation between great heat and pain as one of inseparability rather than identity does allow Berkeley to place heat in fires and pain in human bodies, but it does so at the expense of making fires and human bodies inseparable. As pain is a constituent of the human body, and heat is a constituent of the fire, if heat and pain are inseparable then the fire and the human body are

inseparable. Moreover, if heat and pain are inseparable, then Berkeley has no reason to treat one of them as belonging to one physical object and the other belonging to another physical object. To do so would be the same as treating the visible shape of a cherry as belonging to one physical object and the colour of a cherry as belonging to another physical object, since visible shape and colour are inseparable in the same sense as great heat and pain are inseparable. So taking great heat and pain to be inseparable rather than identical does not set Berkeley square with the plain person, for taking great heat and pain to be inseparable is to hold that fire is inseparable from the human body, and to remove any reason for taking fire and the human body to be distinct physical objects.

One final point remains to be made concerning IA. This is that in the two arguments which Berkeley offers to establish the inseparability of heat and pain (the argument that they cannot be perceived apart and the argument that they cannot be conceived apart), it is *presupposed* that heat is a sensation or idea. Berkeley's first argument--that great heat and pain cannot be perceived apart--turns on the premise that "one simple uniform *sensation*" (my italics) is perceived upon putting one's hand near the fire. The conclusion drawn is that since "the fire affects you only with one simple, or uncompounded *idea*, it follows that this same simple *idea* is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain" (my

italics). Unless heat is presupposed to be an idea or sensation, the conclusion does not follow, for from the fact that we are affected with only one simple sensation when we put our hand near the fire, it does not follow that nothing else besides the sensation or idea is perceived. In other words, Berkeley's argument does not eliminate the possibility that besides the one simple uniform sensation with which we are affected, we could also be affected with the perception of heat which is not perception of a sensation.[13] So unless heat is assumed to be a sensation, Berkeley's argument does not go through. The same assumption is at work in Berkeley's second argument, the argument that heat and pain cannot be conceived apart. Philonous asks Hylas "if he can conceive a vehement *sensation* to be without pain, or pleasure" (my italics), or whether he can frame to himself "an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular *idea* of heat, cold, tastes, smells? *&c.*" (my italics). The conclusion that Philonous draws is "that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those *sensations or ideas*, in an intense degree" (my italics). But from the fact that a *vehement sensation* cannot be conceived apart from a great pain, it does not follow that a great heat cannot be conceived apart from a great pain unless the great heat is taken to be a vehement sensacion. It is clear that the same assumption is at work in IA that was at work in CTA: that the object of immediate perception is a sensation. As in CTA,

this assumption is apparently based on the claim that there is no distinction in perception between sensation (act) and object of perception, so that there is no "difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation" (DHP 195).

Since heat is assumed at the outset of these two arguments to be a sensation, the question of why this assumption is made presents itself. Why didn't Berkeley characterize heat more generically in these arguments as an object of immediate perception rather than specifying that heat is a particular sort of object of perception (a sensation)? Indeed, the sort of object of perception that Berkeley specifies heat to be is just what IA is supposed to show heat to be. Unless he needs to assume that heat is a sensation in order for the argument to be effective, it would appear that Berkeley has made IA into an obviously circular argument when this circularity was avoidable.

I think that Berkeley needs to assume that the immediate object of perception is a sensation for much the same reason in both the argument that great heat and pain cannot be perceived apart and the argument that they cannot be conceived apart. I shall start by explaining why Berkeley assumes that the immediate object of perception is a sensation in the argument that they cannot be perceived apart. Berkeley's argument is that since both great heat and pain are immediately perceived at the same time, and since fire affects us with only one idea, great heat and pain are inseparable in

perception. Since, in perception, great heat and pain are inseparable, the great heat and the pain perceived are inseparable. But from the fact that *in perception* great heat is inseparable from pain, it does not follow that great heat is inseparable from pain. If great heat and pain are inseparable in perception, this may mean either that (1) the objects perceived, heat and pain, cannot be separated, or that (2) perception of heat and perception of pain cannot be separated.[14] Since either (1) or (2) follows from Berkeley's argument, Berkeley cannot immediately conclude on the basis of his argument that (1) is the case. If Berkeley does want to take (1) as the conclusion of his argument, he has to reject the distinction between (1) and (2). This he achieves by assuming that the immediate object of perception is a sensation: since there is no distinction between a sensation and the perception of it, the distinction between (1) and (2) collapses and Berkeley is free to draw the desired conclusion, that great heat is inseparable from pain. So, in order to draw the desired conclusion, Berkeley has to reject the distinction between (1) and (2), which is to reject the distinction between perception and the object perceived, and this he does by assuming that the object of perception (intense heat) is a sensation.

I think that there is a similar reason behind Berkeley's use of the assumption that heat is a sensation in the second argument, that great heat and pain cannot be conceived apart.

Consider the following premise of this argument:

> Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain, or pleasure.

I suggest Berkeley uses "vehement sensation" here rather than "intense heat" (for example), since one who believes, as Hylas does at this point, that intense heat can "exist without the mind" (DHP 175) will also believe that an intense heat can be conceived to be without pain. In other words, someone who believes that heat can exist apart from being perceived will not take it that (1) they cannot conceive an intense heat to be without pain. However, such a person may well be willing to admit that (2) they cannot conceive of *perceiving* intense heat to be without perceiving pain. But since they take intense heat to exist apart from being perceived they will not take this admission to imply (1). Clearly, though, Hylas's admission of (2) is not sufficient for Philonous's purposes; what Philonous needs is Hylas's admission of (1) if his argument is to succeed. Philonous either has to provide some reason for Hylas to admit to (1) rather than (2), or he has to find some way of bridging the gap between (1) and (2). A quick and easy way to bridge the gap is to replace "intense heat" with "vehement sensation" This is so because the distinction between (1) and (2) collapses when "intense heat" is replaced by "vehement sensation." Since there is no distinction between a sensation and the perception of it, if

what is perceived is a sensation then the distinction between (1) and (2) disappears. So by replacing "intense heat" with "vehement sensation," Berkeley makes the distinction between (1) and (2) disappear. My suggestion is, then, that Philonous uses "vehement sensation" as a convenient way of bridging the gap between (1) and (2); a convenient way, that is, of getting someone who would only assent to (2) if Philonous had used "intense heat" to also accept (1).[15]

While collapsing the distinction between (1) and (2) in this way in the two arguments is in the context of IA viciously circular, Berkeley does eventually provide an independent argument to justify his view that intense heat is a vehement sensation. This, of course, is the Flower Argument at DHP 194-7 that there is no distinction in perception between act (sensation) and object. This is the same argument that Berkeley was seen, in the last section, to rely on to deal with a similar difficulty with CTA: in the context of CTA, it is assumed that what is produced in the mind when perception occurs is a sensation, just as it is assumed in the context of IA that the immediate object of perception is a sensation or idea. So both CTA and IA rely on the assumption that the immediate object of perception is a sensation, and so rely on the Flower Argument found at DHP 194-7 which is designed to justify this assumption.

NOTES

1. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, however, deny that Berkeley used IA for any other purpose than an *ad hominem* attack on materialists. They believe, in other words, that Berkeley uses IA in the same way that I have argued (and that Luce and Jessop also believe) that he uses APR. See Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 165-7.

2. It is to be noted that neither IA nor CTA can be used to reject all forms of materialism even though they are used by Berkeley to establish the mind-dependence of the immediate objects of perception. This is the case because those materialists who are representative realists rather than naive realists hold that while the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, there are resembling mind-independent qualities inhering in material objects which these immediate objects of perception serve to represent, in virtue of this resemblance, to the perceiver. Berkeley, near the end of the First Dialogue, will muster what has been called the "Likeness Principle" to counter representative realism. (This principle is discussed by Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Likeness Principle," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 4 (1966), 67-9. Winkler, *Berkeley* 140-8, provides a critique of and alternative to Cummins' interpretation.) According to this principle, only an idea can be like an idea, and as ideas cannot exist in unthinking things, no object of immediate

perception can represent by resembling a quality of a material object. Even after being led to abandon representative realism by the Likeness Principle, Hylas tries to make sense of mind-independent material objects by construing them as being involved in different ways in the production of ideas. The Second Dialogue is devoted to a discussion of the production of ideas, in which Philonous considers and rejects Hylas's several attempts to involve material objects in the production of ideas.

3. At DHP 176 Berkeley writes:

> PHILONOUS. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?
> HYLAS. No certainly.

4. Thus Berkeley is not left with the conclusion that while hedonic sensations cannot exist in unperceiving things, they can exist apart from both perceiving and unperceiving things.

5. Malebranche argues that since we do not sufficiently distinguish the soul from the body, we not only believe that lively sensations are in the soul, but are also in the part of body which is affected by the physical object which causes the sensation. For example, heat is taken to be in the soul since it strongly affects the soul, but since the soul is not sufficiently distinguished from the body, heat is also taken to be in the hand held near the fire.

6. *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, 4 vols., William Molesworth, ed. (London, 1966), vol.4 page 8.

7. Another reason is given at II.VII.5:

> Beyond all this, we may find another reason *why* God hath scattered up and down *several degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the things that environ and affect us*; and blended them together, in almost all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.*

8. The influence of Malebranche on IA is noted by McCracken, *Malebranche and British Philosophy*, 222-3. Genevieve Brykman, "Pleasure and Pain versus Ideas in Berkeley," *Hermathena* 139 (Winter 1985), 127-37, also notes Berkeley's indebtedness to Malebranche's distinction between these three types of sensations (132).

9. Donald F. Henze, "Berkeley on Sensations and Qualities," *Theoria* 31 (1965), 174-80 suggests (175) that Berkeley might have been willing to apply IA to all secondary qualities. Steven Nadler, "Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction" *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20:1 (March 1990), 47-62, likewise believes (51-2) that Berkeley would sanction the application of IA to all secondary qualities.

10. Muehlmann is constrained to interpret Berkeley as holding that there are no limits on the applicability of IA, since

Muehlmann believes that it is the only argument by which Berkeley, in the discussion of the sensible qualities, secures the mind-dependence of these qualities. However, if it is admitted that CTA is used by Berkeley for the same end as IA, this constraint disappears. That Berkeley does limit the applicability of IA is evidence that he intends CTA to be part of his case that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent.

11. Tipton, *Berkeley*, 229-33, discusses the sort of objection that Pitcher raises. And Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 144, also argues that Berkeley's appeal to phenomenology in the case of feeling great heat fails to establish the conclusion that great heat and pain are identical or inseparable since we are aware of pain alone. Tipton in the passage cited above discusses the point that Muehlmann raises. See also Brykman, "Pleasure and Pain versus Ideas in Berkeley," 129-30.

12. Commentators who point this out include Henze, "Berkeley on Sensations and Qualities," Pitcher, *Berkeley*, 101, and Thomas M. Lennon on page 235 of "Berkeley and the Ineffable," *Synthese* 75 (1988), 231-50. Tipton makes the related point that "the trouble with [IA] is that if it succeeds then heat of any intensity *ceases to be a quality of objects.*" (*Berkeley*, 233)

13. Thomas Reid developed a theory of perception in which it is in fact the case that we are affected with both a sensation

and a perception of a mind-independent object when we put our hand near the fire. See for example Chapter V, section I of Reid's *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* (1764).

14. (2) is not an acceptable conclusion for Berkeley's argument, since from the fact that two perceptions are inseparable it does not immediately follow that the two objects perceived are themselves inseparable.

15. Berkeley also tries to bridge the gap between (1) and (2) in PHK 5.

> [C]an there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived?...[M]y conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.

Berkeley's argument is that since it is impossible to sense or perceive a sensible object without sensation or perception of it, there is no distinction between the sensation or perception of the object and the object sensed or perceived. Via his anti-abstractionism, Berkeley extends this conclusion to the conclusion that no distinction between a sensible object and the perception or sensation of it can possibly be conceived. Thus Berkeley attempts to bridge the gap between (1) and (2) in PHK 5 on the questionable grounds that since we cannot perceive something without perceiving it, the object

perceived is not distinct from the perception of the object.

Indeed, both Muehlmann, *Berkeley's Ontology*, 136-49 and Margaret Atherton, "Berkeley's Anti-abstractionism," *Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley*, E. Sosa (ed.), Boston, 1987, 45-60, argue that IA is Berkeley's development in DHP of the argument of PHK 5.

5. The Master Argument

After having brought Hylas by means of APR, CTA, and IA, to the conclusion that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, Philonous pauses to allow Hylas to reconsider these arguments. In consideration of Hylas's worry that he may have been stampeded into granting ill-grounded conclusions, Philonous generously allows Hylas the "liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted, which makes for your first opinion" (DHP 194). Hylas takes advantage of this generosity by putting forward a number of ways in which he believes that his admission, that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, can be taken back. He begins by suggesting that his concessions were based on the assumption that there is no distinction between the sensation (act of awareness) and the object of immediate perception. As we have seen, Philonous does not deny that this assumption has been at work in the previous discussion, but rather argues that the assumption is fully justified since there is in fact no distinction to be drawn between sensation (act) and object. Hylas accepts Philonous's argument, but immediately moves on to express another reservation concerning the mind-dependence of sensible things.

> I acknowledge, Philonous, that upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else, but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then on the other hand, when I look upon sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes

> and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material *substratum*, without which they cannot be conceived to exist. (DHP 197)

Hylas has agreed that sensible things are only those things which can be immediately perceived by sense, and he has also conceded that nothing is immediately perceived by sense but sensible qualities. Although Hylas has been led by the foregoing arguments to admit that sensible qualities are sensations (and as such both mind-dependent and incapable of existing in a material substance), he is not yet willing to abandon the materialist view that sensible qualities are modes of material substance. Hylas's point seems to be that while Philonous has presented him with some arguments that (so far as he can tell, show that) sensible qualities are sensations, there is an incompatible but more intelligible account of the ontology of sensible qualities according to which they are modes of material substance. Hylas seems to be saying that so long as the view that sensible qualities are more intelligibly viewed as modes of material substance, the conclusion that sensible qualities are sensations should be resisted even when supported by the battery of arguments which Philonous has presented. Philonous's response is that the supposed intelligibility of the view that sensible qualities are modes supported by material substance is no obstacle to accepting that sensible qualities are sensations, since the former view is in fact unintelligible. Prompted by Philonous, Hylas finds that he has no positive conception of what is variously termed

material substance, substratum, or support. Asked to supply a "relative notion" of substratum, Hylas accepts Philonous's suggestion that substratum supports sensible qualities by being *spread under* them. Philonous points out that this literal definition will not do, since in order to be spread out, material substance must be extended. But as material substance is supposed to be the support of extension (along with all other sensible qualities), it cannot itself be extended. The literal sense of substratum (spread out under), since it requires that substratum be extended, leads either to circularity or infinite regress when applied to the material substance which Hylas claims is the substratum of sensible qualities. As Hylas can come up with no other sense for substratum, Philonous points out that Hylas has neither a positive nor a relative notion of material substance, and so cannot claim the intelligibility of material substance/ sensible quality ontology as a reason to resist the conclusion that sensible qualities are sensations.

Having slipped from this foothold, Hylas then clutches at the following reason for thinking that sensible qualities are not mind-dependent:

> It is just come into my head, that the ground of all our mistakes lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind....But as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind. (DHP 199)

Philonous quickly rejects this suggestion by pointing out that

"my arguments, or rather your concessions" were not that sensible qualities cannot exist "each alone by itself" independently of the mind perceiving them, "but that they were not *at all* without the mind." Philonous illustrates his point by referring to his argument that since primary qualities cannot be abstracted from secondary qualities, primary qualities, like secondary qualities must be taken to be mind-dependent. So far from showing only that sensible qualities cannot exist singly without the mind, this argument actually shows that it is *because* primary qualities cannot exist "singly" but must be blended or united with other qualities that they are not mind-independent.

Perhaps regretting his generous offer that Hylas be allowed to bring forth whatever ill-considered and tedious objections he can dream up, Philonous next tries to forestall these objections by arguing that it is impossible to conceive of mind-independent sensible objects. This argument has been labelled Berkeley's "Master Argument," and it has received much attention in the literature. While attempts have been made to show that some or all of this argument is satisfactory, in general the reaction to this argument has been strongly negative. I believe that the "standard interpretation" of the Master Argument which underlies this negative reaction is correct. However, this interpretation, although it has been the basis of much negative criticism, has the strength of showing the Master Argument to be of a piece

with the other First Dialogue arguments which Berkeley provides in support of the contention that the objects of immediate perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them. As both CTA and IA have been seen to rest on the premise, defended in the Flower Argument, that there is no distinction in perception between the act of awareness and the object of awareness, so the standard interpretation shows that the Master Argument rests on the premise that in conception, there is no distinction to be drawn between an idea and what an idea is of. But before I address the standard interpretation, I shall (a) describe the Master Argument and (b) consider and reject three "non-standard" interpretations which are designed to avoid the negative criticism which is based on the standard interpretation.

While the Master Argument occurs both in PHK (22-3) and DHP 200-1), I shall focus on the *Dialogues* version. (Significant differences between the two versions will be noted below.) The argument is as follows:

> PHILONOUS. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.
> HYLAS. If it comes to that, the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.
> PHILONOUS. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?
> HYLAS. No, that were a contradiction.

> PHILONOUS. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of *conceiving* a thing which is *unconceived*?
> HYLAS. It is.
> PHILONOUS. The tree or house therefore which you think of, is conceived by you.
> HYLAS. How should it be otherwise?
> PHILONOUS. And what is conceived, is surely in the mind.
> HYLAS. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
> PHILONOUS. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds, whatsoever?
> HYLAS. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.--It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of, not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see, that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or house, or a mountain, but this is all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them *existing out of the minds of all spirits*.

The argument begins with Philonous's challenge to conceive of a sensible object which exists "without the mind." Note that Philonous's challenge is not to conceive of a sensible object that is unperceived, but to conceive of a sensible object that is without the mind. Nonetheless, in response to Philonous's challenge, Hylas replies that he can easily conceive of sensible objects (a tree, for instance) "existing by itself, independent of, and *unperceived by* any mind whatsoever" (my emphasis). Philonous then counters Hylas's response with the following argument. First, he points out that, just as Hylas cannot see a thing which is at the same time unseen by him, he cannot conceive of something which is at the same time unconceived. The second premise of Philonous's argument is

that whatever is conceived is in the mind. It follows from these premises that it is impossible to conceive something which is not in the mind. Philonous does *not* argue that Hylas cannot conceive of something unperceived, but rather argues that whatever is conceived is within the mind.[1] Then follows Hylas's diagnosis of the mistake which led him to believe that he could conceive of something without the mind. It turns out that the mistake, according to Hylas, is that he thought that in conceiving something that is *unperceived* ("thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it"), he was conceiving something that was without the mind. In other words, Hylas thought that conceiving something which is unperceived counts as conceiving something which is without the mind. But Philonous's argument has shown Hylas that conceiving something that is unperceived is not sufficient to conceive of something without the mind, because in conceiving that which is unperceived, Hylas is conceiving something which is mind-dependent, since all that is conceived is in the mind.[2] Before offering critical comments on the Master Argument, I shall consider and reject three lines of interpretation of the Argument that are to be found in the literature.

Given Philonous's admission that what is unperceived can be conceived, and Hylas's diagnosis of his mistake as being the belief that in imagining something unperceived, he is conceiving something without the mind, the interpretation

according to which the key claim of the Master Argument is that to imagine something is to imagine oneself having the perception of that thing must be rejected. If this interpretation is to be allowed, Berkeley's challenge must be read as the challenge to conceive something unperceived, but it has just been shown that Berkeley's challenge is to be read as the challenge to conceive of something existing without the mind. An interpretation according to which this the key claim of the Master Argument is given by Andre Gallois,[3] and is repeated in part by Christopher Peacocke[4]. Gallois argues that to conceive of something perceivable involves imaging that which is conceived. Secondly, imaging something is to image oneself perceiving that thing. (For Gallois, this amounts to the claim that it is impossible to image a thing without imaging the perception of that thing.[5]) Consequently, to conceive something involves having an image of something perceived. Therefore something unperceived is inconceivable. Gallois adds to this conclusion the premise that whatever is inconceivable is impossible, thus deriving the conclusion that something unperceived is impossible. This, then, is Gallois's interpretation of Berkeley's Master Argument. Like Gallois, Peacocke argues that imagining a tree (for example) is closely connected to imagining a perceived tree.

> In being asked to imagine an unperceived tree, we are asked not just to imagine the sort of experience one has when one sees a tree, but to imagine a *tree*, really there in front of us. What this last involves, I have argued, is that the imaginer not merely imagine from the inside an

> experience as of a tree, but also that he S-imagine[6] as a condition on that same imagined world that the experience is a perception of a tree. So when he imagines a tree, the S-imagined conditions entail that, in the imagined world, some tree is perceived. To combine this with the supposition that in that imagined world no tree is perceived is to place inconsistent conditions on the imagined world: and that was precisely Berkeley's conclusion. (28)

Where Peacocke parts company with Gallois is in his denial that conceiving something necessarily involves imaging that thing. So while Peacocke defends the conclusion that it is impossible to imagine something which is imagined to be unperceived, he does not think that the conclusion that it is impossible to conceive something which is conceived to be unperceived is defensible. Given this, Peacocke does not, of course, follow Gallois in supplying the additional premise that whatever is inconceivable is impossible, and so does not move from the conclusion that it is impossible to conceive an unperceived thing to the conclusion that an unperceived thing is impossible.

As has already been indicated, both Gallois and Peacocke mistake the conclusion that Berkeley wants to establish with the Master Argument. They both take Berkeley to be interested in showing that it is impossible to conceive of something which is unperceived, while Berkeley is actually intent on drawing the conclusion that it is impossible to conceive of something existing without the mind. Peacocke and Gallois do not capture Berkeley's argument, since Berkeley admits in PHK and allows Hylas to claim in DHP that it is possible to

conceive of something unperceived. So, whatever the philosophical interest of Peacocke's and Gallois's papers, they fail as interpretations of Berkeley's argument.

There is another approach to the Master Argument which has the laudable goal of making it out to be less of a dud than it is sometimes taken to be. On this approach, the attempt is made to show that the Master Argument is successful by arguing that Berkeley tacitly rests the Master Argument on a premise that many readers assume that he is forgoing in the context of the Master Argument. The premise that these commentators believe should be supplied is that whatever is perceived is mind-dependent. Desiree Park,[7] Martha Brandt Bolton,[8] and Eric Saidel[9] all believe that this premise is assumed by Berkeley in the Master Argument.[10] They then go on to argue that once this premise is granted, the Master Argument is much more convincing than it is generally taken to be. Since all three commentators rest their case on the claim that Berkeley assumes that whatever is perceived is mind-dependent, if it can be shown that it is unlikely that Berkeley did in fact make this assumption, then all three accounts can be rejected on this basis. Tipton (in "Berkeley's Imagination") in the course of addressing Park's account of the Master Argument, provides a strong case that Berkeley is not resting the Master Argument on this assumption. Tipton's first point of objection to Park's account is that by resting the Master Argument on this assumption, she makes the Master

Argument out to be far less interesting than it is usually taken to be. For "most scholars...have taken it that Berkeley believes himself to be justifying, not presupposing, the *esse/percipi* thesis" (89). Of course, it is possible that most scholars are wrong, but Tipton points out that Berkeley himself, in allowing Hylas to "pass by all that hath been hitherto said" and in being "content to put the whole upon" it leads the reader to expect that the Master Argument is of special significance. Secondly, as Tipton points out, the context in which the Master Argument occurs in DHP provides near-conclusive evidence that Berkeley was not presupposing the truth of the *esse/percipi* thesis in the Master Argument. As has been described above, the Master Argument occurs in the context of Philonous's generous offer (at DHP 194) that Hylas be allowed to reconsider his concession that immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent to make sure that he had not been "too liberal," or "overlooked some fallacy or other." Hylas uses this offer to try to forge an objection to the *esse/percipi* thesis based on sensible mode/material substance ontology, and when that fails, to try to reject the thesis on the grounds of a distinction between sensation and object. When that too fails, Hylas attempts to fly the claim that although sensible qualities cannot "singly" exist apart from the mind, they may do so when they form the appropriate sorts of clumps. Immediately after showing that this claim is false, Philonous makes his second generous offer, that he will

"pass by all that hath been hitherto said" and will rest the issue entirely on the following Master Argument. As the Master Argument occurs in the context of Philonous's offer to allow Hylas to reconsider his concession that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent, it is difficult to believe that Philonous's offer to pass by all that hath hitherto been said does not include this concession. There is, then, strong evidence that the *esse/percipi* thesis is not a presupposition of the Master Argument.

A third interpretation of the Master Argument, which, like the two just considered, is an attempt to construe the Master Argument as being of greater strength than it is generally taken to be, has been developed by Peter S. Wenz.[11] While Bolton, Park, and Saidel try to shore up the Master Argument by supplying Berkeley with strong premises, Wenz's approach to the Master Argument is to argue that it has a weaker conclusion than it is usually taken to have. Wenz believes that Berkeley uses the Master Argument to answer an objection to his idealism, rather than using it as an independent argument for idealism. According to Wenz, this objection is:

> If the non-existence of unperceived things had really been already proved *a priori* (as Berkeley claims at this point), then such unperceived things as books existing unperceived in a closet would be logically impossible and, therefore, inconceivable. But such things can be conceived. So they must not be logically impossible. There must, then, be some flaw in the *a priori* demonstrations of their impossibility which Berkeley has offered up to this point." (35)

While there is an element of truth to Wenz's claim as far as the *Dialogues* version of the Master Argument goes (as will be seen), the *Principles* version is, contrary to Wenz's claim, offered as a proof of the mind-dependence of sensible objects.

Wenz supports his contention with six reasons, five of them textual. First, Wenz argues that Berkeley's use of dialogue in PHK 22-3 is an indication that what Berkeley is doing is replying to an objection rather than providing an argument for idealism, since in PHK Berkeley generally uses the dialogue form when he is entertaining supposed objections to his account. Secondly, Wenz points out that what Berkeley's use of the dialogue indicates in fact occurs, since it is obvious that

> the content [of PHK 22-3] clearly is an objection and a reply. After attributing to the reader the view, contradictory to his own, that books can be imagined to exist unperceived in a closet, Berkeley begins, 'I answer...' He proceeds to argue that the books in question exist in the mind of and are being perceived by whoever imagines them existing in the closet. (34)

However, Wenz's first two points can be granted without thereby granting that there is any reason not to interpret the Master Argument as being an attempt to support idealism. The bare fact that PHK 22-3 contain an objection and reply is of itself no evidence that the Master Argument is a counter to an objection to idealism rather than an argument for idealism. While sections 22 and 23 do contain an objection and a reply, the objection is not to Berkeley's idealism, but to Berkeley's claim that it is impossible to conceive sensible objects

existing without the mind. Likewise, the reply is not to an objection to Berkeley's idealism, but to the imagined interlocutor's claim that sensible things can be conceived to exist unperceived. Thus, the objection and reply which are actually to be found in PHK 22-3 are in themselves quite different from the objection to Berkeley's idealism which Wenz envisions to be the subject of PHK 22-3. Thus the presence in PHK 23 of an objection and reply, and of the associated dialogue form, is no indication whatsoever that Berkeley is providing a reply to an objection entirely different from the one actually raised by the imagined interlocutor in PHK 23. What is at question is whether Berkeley's claim that it is impossible to conceive of sensible objects existing without the mind is meant as a reply to an implied objection of the sort which Wenz supplies. That Berkeley's claim is itself the subject of an objection and reply is irrelevant to deciding this question.

Wenz's third point concerns the context in which the *Principles* version of the Master Argument occurs.

> Furthermore, in section 21, Berkeley explicitly rejects the need to offer additional proofs of his immaterialism. He considers them to be 'unnecessary for confirming what has been...sufficiently demonstrated *a priori*.' He even goes so far as to apologize at the beginning of section 22 for being 'needlessly prolix in handling this subject.' These statements would be out of place if Berkeley were about to begin yet another refutation of materialism later in section 22. They would be in place if Berkeley were about to entertain and then reply to an objection. (34)

In PHK 21, Berkeley is deferring consideration of "those

errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from" the belief that matter exists. He excuses himself from doing so at this point on the grounds that offering "arguments *a posteriori* are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated *a priori*." While Berkeley does indicate that it is not "necessary to add any farther proof" of immaterialism, since the foregoing proofs are themselves sufficient, that such proofs are not *necessary* is no indication that none will be forthcoming. Berkeley certainly wants to marshall whatever proofs he can in support of his idealism, even if one proof was to be sufficient to make his case. Secondly, the apology for prolixity at the beginning of PHK 22, far from indicating that he will not be giving farther proof of idealism, is in fact Berkeley's way of introducing just such a farther proof. This can be readily seen from the fact that after issuing the apology, Berkeley continues with:

> For to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to anyone that is capable of the least reflection? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to exist without your mind, or unperceived. This easy trial may make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright contradiction. (PHK 22)

Immediately following is the Master Argument, by which Berkeley demonstrates that "what you contend for" is in fact a "downright contradiction." It is patent that the demonstration "in a line or two" is the Master Argument

itself, which accordingly must be taken as an proof of idealism.

Wenz's fourth point concerns Notebooks entry 472. There Berkeley makes the point that "[t]he existence of our ideas consists in being perceived, imagined, thought on; whenever they are imagined or thought on they do exist." As Wenz points out, Berkeley is here addressing the objection based on the possibility of sensible objects continuing to exist when unperceived by me: at this point, Berkeley's reply is that since whatever is imagined or thought on exists, the very framing of the question of whether what I am not now perceiving exists necessitates their existence. Wenz claims that the fact that an argument which is similar to the Master Argument is used as a reply to an objection in the Notebooks "lends weight to the contention made here that Berkeley's use of the same point in *Principles* 23 was similarly designed not to establish the idealist philosophy, but only to defend it against an objection" (36). If Berkeley had used this point to defend himself against the *same* objections in both Notebooks 472 and PHK 23, Wenz's claim that the parallel between the two passages supports his case would be substantial. However, as the objection addressed at Notebooks 472 and the objection Wenz takes Berkeley to be addressing at PHK 22-3 bear no resemblance, very little support (if any) is supplied to Wenz's case by this parallel.

Wenz's fifth and final textual point is that Berkeley's

willingness to "put the whole upon" the question of whether it is possible to conceive of sensible objects existing without the mind should not be interpreted as indicating that Berkeley thought that a negative answer to this question would secure his idealism, but "as heightening the challenge which follows it" (36). Wenz believes that Berkeley's staking his entire case on this challenge is an instance of "Berkeley's tendency towards bravado," which is also exhibited at Notebooks 349 and PHK 45. While Berkeley's way of introducing the Master Argument does undeniably contain a strong element of bravado, the presence of bravado is by itself nc indication that Berkeley meant the Master Argument as merely a reply to an objection to idealism. The presence of bravado only shows that Berkeley had great confidence in the Master Argument; the presence of bravado does not determine whether this was confidence that the Master Argument could answer Wenz's objection or confidence that the Master Argument could establish idealism.

Wenz's final point is the claim that the conclusion of the Master Argument in PHK 23 is "simply that it is not possible for any individual to conceive of anything existing outside of his own mind (i.e., unthought of by himself)" (37). As Wenz indicates, this is distinct from the claim that it is impossible for anything sensible to exist without the mind, which is the conclusion required if the Master Argument is to establish idealism. Wenz points out that an additional

premise, "that whatever cannot possibly be conceived of cannot possibly exist" (38), must be supplied if Berkeley's idealism is to follow. But, says Wenz, adding this premise makes the argument too strong, for it then not only shows that nothing sensible exists without the perceiver's own mind, but also that no other minds exist. In other words, the addition of this premise leads to solipsism, something which Berkeley would certainly want to avoid. So, claims Wenz, there is good reason, in addition to the supposed fact that Berkeley does not himself explicitly draw it, not to believe that the conclusion of the Master Argument is that nothing can exist without the perceiver's mind. In answer to the first part of Wenz's point, that Berkeley's conclusion is "simply that it is not possible for any individual to conceive of anything existing outside of his own mind," the final three sentences of PHK 23 may be quoted.

> When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

Berkeley quite clearly believes that the Master Argument is a proof against the existence of material substance. And since the only plausible route to the rejection of material substance by way of the Master Argument is through the denial

that sensible objects exist without the mind perceiving them, it is clear that Berkeley takes the Master Argument to establish that this is the case. And in DHP, Berkeley also uses the Master Argument to support idealism, albeit in a significantly different fashion than in the *Principles* version. Here is the final exchange between Hylas and Philonous:

> PHILONOUS. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive, how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind.
> HYLAS. I do.
> PHILONOUS. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive.

Here Berkeley uses the Master Argument in support of idealism by using it to show that there are no conceivable alternatives to idealism. This, of course, is significantly different than the PHK version of the Master Argument, in which it is argued that alternatives to idealism are false rather than inconceivable. In the DHP version of the Master Argument, Berkeley clearly does not employ, nor does his conclusion require the employment of, the premise connecting inconceivability and impossibility that Wenz thinks that Berkeley must use if the Master Argument is to provide positive support (in the form of a proof) for idealism, but nonetheless Berkeley uses the argument to support idealism (but this support is not in the form of a proof). Although Berkeley tones down the conclusion of the Master Argument between 1710 and 1713, in neither work is Berkeley merely

answering an objection to idealism with the Master Argument, but is using this argument to provide positive support for idealism.[12] So: the element of truth in Wenz's contention is that the *Dialogues* version of the Master Argument is not intended to be a proof of idealism (although it is meant to supply support for idealism); however, the *Principles* version of the Master Argument *is* meant to be a proof of idealism.

As for Wenz's charge that adding the premise connecting conceivability with possibility lands Berkeley in solipsism, Berkeley is not that much better off in this regard even when this premise is withheld. For without the premise, Berkeley still seems to be committed to the conclusion that he cannot conceive of anything without his mind. Berkeley must still maintain that other minds as well as sensible objects cannot be conceived to exist without his mind. Surely this result is nearly as unpalatable to Berkeley as solipsism. A better way to interpret the Master Argument so that Berkeley is not seen to be arguing either that nothing outside of the perceiver's mind exists or that the perceiver can conceive of nothing which exists outside of her own mind is to interpret Berkeley's claims that "what is conceived, is surely in the mind" (DHP 200) and that you cannot "conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind" (PHK 23) as being restricted to the conception of sensible objects--that is, restricted to cases wherein conception involves ideas. In this way, Berkeley could allow that other minds can

be conceived, since minds are not sensible objects.[13]

While the three lines of interpretation just canvassed provide alternatives to the standard line of critical interpretation of the Master Argument, their failure is some indication that this standard line is in fact correct.[14] On the standard line of interpretation, the problems with the argument are to be found in the premise that whatever is conceived is in the mind.[15] Berkeley does not provide any grounding for this premise: he merely has Philonous assert the premise and Hylas assent to it.[16] In other words, it is presented as not only a shared assumption, but a shared assumption that is taken to be patently obvious.[17] However, according to the detractors of the Master Argument, it is far from clear that this premise should be accepted. What Berkeley seems to be doing is assuming that when something is conceived, an image is called up in the conceiver's mind. Berkeley then proceeds to identify this image with the object conceived, so that it follows that whatever is conceived is in the mind.[18] But, say the detractors, even if it is conceded that whenever we conceive, we call up some mind-dependent image, it does not follow that whatever is conceived is mind-dependent, for the object which we conceive is not the mind-dependent idea. To take the example used by Berkeley at PHK 36, the sun "which I imagine at night" is not the *idea of* the real sun that I see by day, but is the very sun that I see by day: the idea called up in my night-time imaginings (if my

night-time imaginings actually do require such an idea) copies and represents the real sun, which is the conceived object. The called up idea is not itself what is imagined when I imagine the sun.[19] In short, the detractors accuse Berkeley of confusing an idea with what an idea is of.[20] So although the first premise of the Master Argument seems trivially true, Master Argument detractors take the argument the second premise of the argument, that whatever is conceived is mind-dependent, to be trivially false.

While I believe that Master Argument detractors are correct in maintaining that the assumption that there is no distinction in conception between an idea and what an idea is of is central to the Master Argument, it is to be emphasized that this assumption on which the Master Argument rests is similar to the assumption concerning perception which Berkeley defends at DHP 194-7. In the argument at DHP 194-7 (the Flower Argument, discussed in section 3), Berkeley attempts to establish that there is no distinction in perception between a sensation or idea and what the sensation or idea is of. Similarly, the key assumption of the Master Argument is that there is no distinction in conception between an idea and what an idea is of. Since both CTA and IA rest on the assumption defended in the Flower Argument, and the Master Argument is the only other argument in the First Dialogue that can plausibly be construed as an argument supporting the mind-dependence of the objects of immediate perception, Berkeley's

entire case for this conclusion, at least as he presents it in DHP, rests on the assumption that ideas cannot be distinguished from what ideas are of.

This, then, is the main conclusion I wish to draw concerning Berkeley's case for the mind-dependence of the objects of immediate perception. In the First Dialogue, the key argument is the Flower Argument, since it is used to establish that there is no distinction in immediate perception between the object of awareness and awareness of the object. Thus, for Berkeley, perception is a matter of the production in a passive mind of objects of perception, which objects Berkeley takes to be sensible qualities such as colours and sounds. The conclusion which Berkeley uses the Flower Argument to establish is, as has been shown, an assumption on which a pair of arguments that occur earlier in the First Dialogue, CTA and IA, depend. It is on these two arguments that Berkeley directly rests his case for the claim that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent. A third argument that occurs alongside CTA and IA, APR, has been shown to play no positive role in Berkeley's attempt to establish this claim, although *Hylas* is mistakenly convinced by this argument that the objects of immediate perception are mind-dependent.

The conclusion which Berkeley rests on CTA and IA, that the objects of immediate perception are existentially dependent on the mind perceiving them is, in turn, central to

Berkeley's full-blown idealism, which is the thesis that only minds (both finite and infinite) and objects of immediate perception exist. This centrality is due to the fact that Berkeley takes this conclusion as the basis for arguments, which are to be found at the end of the First Dialogue and in the Second Dialogue, that there are no unperceived and unperceiving objects which either (a) resemble or (b) are causes or occasions of the objects of immediate perception.[21]

NOTES

1. Tipton, *Berkeley* (page 368, footnote 8), discusses the conflict between Berkeley's claim at PHK 5-6 that it is impossible to conceive an unperceived sensible thing and his allowance at PHK 23 that "there is no difficulty" in conceiving books and trees unperceived. Berkeley writes:

> [M]y conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. (PHK 5)

This is in clear conflict with Berkeley's claims at PHK 23 and similar claims (voiced by Hylas) at DHP 200. Tipton argues that this conflict is merely apparent on the basis of his belief that Berkeley is not really allowing in PHK 23 that it is possible to conceive an unperceived sensible thing, but only that it is possible to suppose that one can conceive some unperceived sensible thing. While Tipton's interpretation of PHK 23 would remove the conflict, it cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Berkeley actually says that there is no difficulty in conceiving some unperceived sensible thing. Moreover, as has just been seen, Berkeley allows Hylas to go unchallenged when he claims, at DHP 200, that he can conceive a tree "where no one was present to see it."

2. One difference between the DHP and PHK versions of the Master Argument is that in PHK it is not immediately clear

whether the challenge is to conceive of something unperceived or to conceive of something that is without the mind. In PHK, Berkeley's challenge is: "I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause" (PHK 22). Taken literally, Berkeley seems to be challenging the reader to conceive of something unperceived. But Berkeley then argues that while trees in a park or books in a closet may be imagined with "no body by to perceive them," they are nonetheless mind-dependent since "When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while contemplating our own ideas" (PHK 23). So Berkeley (as in DHP) admits that books and trees can be conceived to exist unperceived, but denies that this implies that they can exist without the mind. If the PHK version of Berkeley's challenge is taken literally, he will in fact have to "give up the cause," since the challenge is to conceive of an idea or any thing like an idea existing otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, a challenge which Berkeley admits in the subsequent section is easily met. Given that the Master Argument in PHK (if successful) proves only that it is impossible to conceive of something without the mind, and given that Berkeley's more carefully phrased statement of the challenge in DHP is to conceive of something without the mind

rather than something unperceived, the statement of the challenge in PHK should not be read literally, but should be taken to mean what Berkeley actually manages to say in the DHP version of the challenge.

3. "Berkeley's Master Argument," *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974), 55-69.

4. Christopher Peacocke, "Imagination, Experience, and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended," in John Foster and Howard Robinson (eds.), *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration*, Oxford, 1985, 19-35. On page 28, footnote 14, Peacocke clarifies his intention that his paper be taken as a partial defense of a Berkeleian argument, not as a well-founded interpretation of the Master Argument.

5. Gallois ultimately argues that this premise is indefensible, and so Berkeley's Master Argument fails.

6. To "S-imagine" something is to imagine specific conditions which the imagined image fulfills. The same image can fulfill a number of different conditions: for example, the image of steering a yacht can be S-imagined to be the experience of being at the helm of a yacht, or it can be S-imagined to be the result of a brain surgeon causing one to have the experience as of being at the helm of a yacht. Peacocke's discussion of S-imagining is found on pages 24-6.

7. "Prior and Williams on Berkeley," *Philosophy* 56 (1981), 231-41.

8. "Berkeley's Objection to Abstract Ideas and Unconceived Objects," in E. Sosa (ed.), *Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley*, Dordrecht, 1987, 61-80.

9. "Making Sense of Berkeley's Challenge," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 10:4 (October 1993), 325-39.

10. Tipton ("Berkeley's Imagination" in *Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley*, E. Sosa (ed.), Dordrecht, 1987, 85-102) argues that M.R. Ayers, in his introduction to the Everyman edition of Berkeley's *Philosophical Works*, must also be read as claiming that Berkeley rests the Master Argument on the assumption that "nothing is perceivable but a mind-dependent idea" (92).

11. Peter S. Wenz, "The Books in Berkeley's Closet" *Hermathena* 128 (1980), 33-40.

12. Indeed, in admitting that Berkeley draws the conclusion "that it is not possible for any individual to conceive of anything existing outside of his own mind," Wenz admits (apparently unwittingly) that Berkeley does use the Master Argument to support his idealism--although Wenz is correct insofar as he claims that this use is not as a proof of idealism. Wenz seems to work on the premise that whatever is not a proof of idealism provides no direct support for

idealism.

13. Pursuing this suggestion farther would, of course, require discussion of Berkeleian notions, since Berkeley argues that to conceive a mind is to have the appropriate notion.

14. It is to be pointed out that Wenz's only objection to the standard analysis of the Master Argument concerns the conclusion which it is generally taken to support.

15. On the standard line of interpretation, the first premise, that it is impossible to conceive a thing which is unconceived, is trivially true.

16. In PHK 23, the premise appears in the following guise: "When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while contemplating our own ideas."

17. A proposition quite similar to this premise is taken to be an uncontroversial assumption in PHK 3: "That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow."

18. That Berkeley, at least at times, took the image called up when something is conceived to be the object conceived, is clear from PHK 36:

> There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure: but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of Nature, speak themselves the

> effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more *reality* in them than the former: by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense, the sun I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former.

At other times Berkeley seems to distinguish between the called up image and the conceived object. For example, at PHK 33, Berkeley writes that "The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent." Also, in Notebooks entry 657a, Berkeley writes that "properly speaking Idea is the picture of the Imagination's making this is ye likeness of & refer'd to the real Idea or (if you will) thing."

19. Of course, if such representative ideas (i.e. images) are used to conceive of things, they themselves could become objects of conception, but conceiving of these images is obviously not conceiving of the objects they represent.

20. Pitcher, *Berkeley*, 113-4, makes this point vividly by comparing the Master Argument to the argument that it is impossible to put on a public performance about Robinson Crusoe since the actor portraying Crusoe is *ex hypothesi* surrounded by the audience to which he plays. Since the actor is not isolated, he cannot portray a character that is isolated. But, as Pitcher points out, the character portrayed

by the actor can be living in isolation even when the actor portraying the character is playing to a full house. In this argument, a fact about the actor is taken to be a fact about who the actor portrays, apparently as the result of unclarity regarding the distinction between the actor and the character he portrays. Likewise, Master Argument detractors believe that in argument, a fact about the image (its mind-dependence) is taken for a fact about what the image portrays, apparently because the image and what it portrays are not clearly distinguished.

21. Berkeley's arguments for (a) turn on the Likeness Principle, while those for (b) turn on the Manifest Qualities Thesis. See Phillip D. Cummins, "Berkeley's Likeness Principle," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 4 (1966), 63-9 and his "Berkeley's Manifest Qualities Thesis," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28:3 (July 1990), 385-401.

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